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OPERATING IN THE CREATURE

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
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THE CREATOR

OPERATING IN THE CREATURE

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IN THE
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
PREFACE

Man is created to know and love God. This is childhood's first lesson. In it is summed up human life. We live in time to attain the bliss of eternity. This, Our Lord tells us is for wayfarers of earth, "to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom He has sent." (*John xvii. 3.*)

For to know God rightly is to love Him. To love is the climax of the knowledge of the True, essentially Good as it is essentially True. By love we reach out to God who is drawing us with the bonds of love. By love we unite ourselves to God who first loved us and is embracing us in the everlasting arms. God created us in love. In His mercy God leads us in love all the days of our life. In and through and by that love we return to God in love. Love is the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end.

We know in order to love. To recognize it as Good, is the term of our knowledge of the True. As knowledge grows, love grows, prompting us to broaden and deepen knowledge, that love itself may increase. Should knowledge fade, love fails. Still God will not break the bruised reed nor quench the smoking flax. Man may forget God: God does not forget man. With impulses of love He moves His creature to a refreshing of knowledge that will be the return to love. This is the sum and substance of the Spiritual Exercises, with their reiterated prayer: "Grant me to know more clearly, that I may love more fervently."

God is knowable in the natural order. "He has not left Himself without testimony," says St. Paul, "doing good from heaven, giving rain and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." (*Acts xiv. 16.*) Thus, "the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen . . . His eternal power also, and divinity." Still this testimony to the omnipotent Creator, is not merely the existing creature, the effect indeed of omnipotence, yet in its existence and operation, so to speak, independent. What we attribute, too exclusively perhaps, to the creature, to nature and its law, St. Paul makes the operation of the Creator in the creature. It is God who does good from heaven. It is God who gives rains and fruitful seasons, and fills men with food and gladness. Wherefore St. Ignatius puts before us the doctrine of the Apostle, of the Fathers, of the Doctors, telling us "to consider how God works and toils for us in all things created



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on the face of the earth; that is to say, how He acts towards us, as though laboring, in the heavens, in the elements, in plants and fruits and flocks, giving them existence, conserving them, granting them growth and feeling. Then to observe how all good things are gifts coming down from above. My limited power descends from that Supreme and Infinite Power; and, in the same way, my justice, goodness, piety and mercy, as rays from the sun and waters from the fountain." (*Spir. Exer.* Contemplation to obtain Love.)

Nevertheless such considerations, however illuminated by grace in the Saint and his disciples, do not in themselves transcend our natural powers. Had man been left in the condition of pure nature, they would, as man gradually penetrated them, have constituted in this life, as theory, his theology, in their consequent practice, his religion. In them would have been perfected the knowledge and love of God, in which he would have found his natural beatitude.

For man raised to the supernatural order is needed a knowledge specifically different to found a specifically different love. Since the supernatural union, the crown of love, transcends all created nature, the love, which is in this life inchoate union, must transcend all created nature. The knowledge, therefore, its foundation, must equally transcend all created nature. It must be in the most absolute sense a *gift*. In no created nature can be found the root of supernatural love. The gift must *descend from above* in a nobler way than do the things of nature. It must originate from the term to which it is to carry the one receiving it. "Now that He ascended, what is it but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" (*Eph.* iv, 9.) Lastly, it must be a knowledge of God *present within us*, dwelling in us, giving us to will and to accomplish His good pleasure. This fact exceeds all human consciousness. It is manifest by revelation. It is believed by faith. The grounds of my reasonable confidence that the fact is verified in me can only be the fulfilment in me of the conditions prescribed in divine revelation. Hence to these must knowledge extend, taking in God working in the soul by actual grace, dwelling in the soul by sanctifying grace, operating, conserving, restoring, perfecting its supernatural life by the holy sacraments. Wherefore St. Ignatius would have men consider "how God dwells in creatures . . . how He dwells in me, grant-

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ing me to be, to live, to feel; making me to understand; also making me His temple, since to the likeness and image of His divine Majesty have I been created." (*Ibid.*)

It seems, therefore, that a gathering together within brief Compass of the teaching of Christian theology and philosophy concerning the Creator's operation in the creature; in the rational creature especially, and in him the operation both natural and supernatural, should have a real utility for professors and students, both men and women, in our higher institutions of learning; nor should it lack ascetic value as an aid to mental prayer. In the last chapter is summed up briefly the divine operation in the mystic order. For those who would pursue this matter more exhaustively, no better guide can be found than the standard work of Augustine Poulain, S. J.; *Des Graces d'Oraison*.

H. W.

University of Santa Clara,
Feast of the Sacred Heart, 1928.

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CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY NOTIONS

"Nothing is moved unless as it is in potency to that to which it is moved. What gives motion, does so according as it is in act; for to move something is to bring it from potency into act. Nothing can be simultaneously in act and in potency with regard to the same thing, but with regard to different things. What is hot actually, can not be at the same time hot in potency. What is hot actually is potentially cold. Thus it is impossible that, under the same respect and in the same manner a thing should move and be moved so that it should move itself.

"Whatever, therefore, is moved, is moved by another, which, as it can not move itself, is moved by another. This process can not go on indefinitely, otherwise there would not be one to begin the movement. We must therefore come to a first mover unmoved by any, whom all understand to be God." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol.* 1, ii. 3. 0.

"God in His unchangeable eternity created simultaneously all things whence times were to flow, and places were to be filled, and ages were to revolve by the movement of things in time and place . . . Over the corporeal creatures He put the spiritual, which could be changed through times only, while the corporeal could be changed through times and places . . . Wherefore, as the created spirit, moved through time only, moves the body through time and place, so the Creator Spirit, moved neither through time nor place, moves the spirit through time." *St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litt.* vii. 39.

"Do not think,' Our Lord would say, 'that my Father so rested on the Sabbath that therefore He does not work. As He even now works without toil, so I also work' . . . By the expression: 'My Father works until now,' Our Lord shuts out the opinion of certain persons who, in opposition to Isaias (xxvi.12), '*omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine,*' hold that God produces things by means of secondary causes. 'As, therefore my Father by instituting nature in the beginning works till now, so also I work in continuing and conserving it *by the same operation*, because I am the Word of the Father whereby He operates all things.'" *St. Thomas. In Evang. Joan v. 7.*

We quote in the first place from St. Thomas his first argument for the existence of God. Others he draws from causality; from the implication of the necessary in the contingent; from that of the absolute in the relative, and from the order of the universe. This, resting on the most obvious notions of potency and act, exhibiting moreover most efficiently the principle of contradiction, he holds to be clearer than the others. To it, as containing the notion of the First Mover of all, he often recurs. Nevertheless, it affords

the popular mind opportunities of misinterpretation. Hence a brief explanation will prove to be not superfluous.

"Nothing moves itself!" one exclaims. "How do you reconcile this with your doctrine that vital activity differs from mechanical, because the latter begins in one subject and ends in another; while the former begins and ends in one and the same, the living agent? The horse moves; the automobile moves. The verbal expression is the same. What it expresses in each case differs essentially. The automobile is moved by external force. Gasoline is introduced, vaporized, mixed with air, exploded in the cylinders; and the energy thus generated is directed through the mechanism to turn the wheels. The horse puts itself in motion. Moving its legs it walks, trots, gallops. Nothing else is required."

But notice that in saying: The horse moves itself, one has in view no more than to express the characteristic distinguishing vital action from mechanical. There is no idea of explaining how it moves itself, which is to be reached only by rigorous analysis. The intention is to shut out efficient energy coming from any creature; there can be no intention of shutting out that of the Creator. Let us dwell for a moment on the problem.

The horse was at rest. Now it moves, it trots, it gallops. To say it does so because it moves its legs now in the mode of a walk, now in that of a trot, now in that of a gallop, would be to reassert the facts, not to give the reason. In the first place, it is obvious that the horse moves because the rider has mounted. It trots because, though he has touched it with the spur, it is disinclined to go faster in leaving the comfort of the stable. Soon, however, untouched by the spur, at the call of the rider, the movement of the rein, the pressure of the knee, it begins to gallop over the soft turf that springs beneath its feet. Lastly, when its head is turned homeward, it breaks into a run in spite of the rider's strong pull on the curb. Here are a number of causes at work on the horse controlling, modifying its vital activity, having something to do with its passing from potency into act. They are all external, but they are not efficient causes. No energy passes from the spur into the legs. The memory of the stable neither withdraws energy at the setting out nor augments it at the return. The chirrup of the rider, the pressure of his knee, the movement of the rein, the nature of the turf communicate no force to produce the gallop. They appeal to something vital within the animal in

a way quite different from mechanical activity. They are to be reduced to final causes, with which in the course of our treatise we shall have much to do. But they do not solve our problem; though they put us on the right road to its solution. Let us follow the course they point out.

What, then, is that "something vital" to which they appeal, and what is the nature of their call? We shall begin with the latter question; and first of all we notice that with none of them is there initiative. A horse might live and die in the midst of them. Yet unless it perceived them as something good, something satisfying an appetite, or as something the contrary to be avoided, they could not move it to action. The initiative, then, is in the horse. These other things appeal differently to the horse according to their different natures. Subjection and obedience to man appeal in some equine way to the horse as good; but certainly not in the same way as the warmth and the food of the stable. The pressure of the knee and the chirrup of the lips are an exercise of dominion to which the horse finds it good to respond. Yet to this the chirrup may add a special gratification for the sense of hearing. Thus each in its way satisfies some appetite. Its appeal lies in the fact that the horse apprehends it as capable of satisfying an appetite *actually active*. If the appetite be inactive even its natural object will not move it. Unless it be hungry the finest oats have no appeal for the horse. Unless thirsty, it may be brought to the water, but no power will make it drink. The appetite comes from the nature. Its proximate activity comes from the lack at the moment of something that will perfect the living nature. Its actual expansion is set in motion by the sensible apprehension of that something in an external object. The expanding appetite sets the locomotive faculties going. These carry it to the external object. By their means it takes possession of that object and the movement of the appetite is brought to rest. If the exterior object supplies completely for the present hour all that vital nature calls for, the very activity of the appetite is suspended. Similar objects will be presented in vain. There will be no corresponding movement excited.

The movement of appetite comes from within. It moves other faculties apprehensive and locomotive once it is in motion; but it does not move itself. It depends upon the nature, and upon the condition in which the nature finds itself. Does then the nature move it, or is it not rather a movement of the nature? Behind it

we find an appetite for all that comes under the widest designation of the nature's good. Of this universal appetite all particular appetites are functions. It is dynamic in the highest degree possible to finite being. Always, so to speak, on the point of acting, it needs only a suitable object to perfect its activity by action. More than this, it is always in action. But, on the other hand, it is never completely actuated. Now it acts through this function; then, this function being satisfied, it acts through another. Now it goes out to this object; then, this attained, it turns to another. In all there is continual movement, perpetual change, perpetual passage from potency to act. It does not move itself. The objects presented draw it as goods to be attained: they do not move it efficiently. What moving power have we behind it? To answer we must ask, what is this universal expansion of the nature to its good, but its very life. It is the fountain of every activity. Its cessation is death. Behind it then, creating it with the creature its subject, conserving it with the creature, working with it, is the Creator, Himself unmoved, the Prime Mover of all things by this universal appetite or its analogues.

The next point to be understood and to be kept ever in mind is that, whatever be the process, the progression, the substantial or accidental change in creatures moved by God, these belong to creatures only. Necessitated by the finite, contingent nature, they follow the universal principle: "Whatever is received, is received according to the mode of the receiver." God, no matter what be the multiplicity, the variety of time and place in the term of His operation, operates in His creatures by the all-embracing creative word, spoken once, spoken eternally, in the absolute simplicity of His ever-present *now*. This eternal, unchanging *now* contains eminently all time created with the world itself, of which time is the duration. Containing every moment equally it is indifferent to all. But this indifference must be conceived, not negatively but positively. It is not a mere abstracting from the relations of time, something impossible in God, the Absolute Being upon whom all things in all their relations depend. It is rather the summing of all things in God their principle. It is the equal inclusion of their mutual relations of time in God's eternal present; the impartial referring of these to that unmoving and unmoved duration, the principle of all progressive duration; into which, nevertheless, they can not actually reenter, since—"Whatever is received is

received according to the mode of the receiver." As, therefore, the eternal *now* supports thus indifferently the time of the world, so the creative word operating eternally in the eternal *now* terminates with the same positive indifference in each creature appearing in the process of time. The babe born today is as immediately the effect of the creative word as was Adam. It is as strictly the term of that word as he. "God spake and all things were made. He commanded and all things were *created*." There is neither exception nor qualification in the sacred text.

We say: "The babe born today is as immediately the effect of the creative word as was Adam." The assertion implies distinctions of the greatest importance to be kept in mind if we would avoid confusion of thought. Immediate means a conjunction of the effect with the cause so close as to allow nothing to intervene between them. What the term excludes may be an interval of time. Thus we say that the flash of a cannon is perceived immediately, while its report does not reach us immediately. In the first case there is no appreciable interval between the firing of the gun and the perception by one at a distance of the flash; while in the second the sound takes a considerable time to reach him. In this sense our assertion is obviously true, since there can be no interval between the creative word independent of the relations of time, and its effect produced in time. Again, the term "immediate" excludes in general instrumental causes. Thus one who, in lifting a weight, uses his hands only, acts immediately. Should the weight exceed his powers he has recourse to mechanical means, to a jack, for instance; and he is said to act mediately. But here further distinction is necessary. Man is compelled to employ instruments as means to perfect his very narrow powers. He can paint a picture, carve a statue, but he must have his brushes of various kinds, his chisels and mallets. With instruments he can do almost anything: without them, just more than nothing. Nevertheless he is master of his instruments, not their slave. Nature gives him their material, but he designs and fashions them according to their work; and the more perfect the design and the more skilful the use, so much the more does the personality of the artificer prevail and so much the more is the instrumentality of the means ignored. Hence the proverb: "The botcher and bungler blames his tools." On the other hand in listening to a great artist, we never advert to the fact that without the perfect material and consummate

workmanship of his Stradivarius or Amati, he could produce none of the wonderful effects, which we attribute to him as the immediate cause.

This supremacy over the instrumental means is in God absolute. He is utterly independent of them. His effects follow His sovereign will. He uses means because His sovereign will is to honor the creature, enabling it to perform its fullest service in the lifting up the fellow-creature to its own level of service. But in this God is always the principal cause. He is moreover the complete proximate cause. In using an instrument He gives it all its efficiency, material no less than formal. Man gives his axe its cutting edges; but he does not give the steel the power of receiving the cutting edge. God not only adapts his instruments to their work, but also gives them their very adaptability. Because of the apparently insignificant part played by the instrument, we treat the artist as the music's immediate cause. Because there is neither instrument nor instrumental efficiency apart from God, He is absolutely the immediate cause of all things in a way exclusively His own. It is creation.

This great truth is grievously obscured today by new theories. Direct and indirect creation, with God as the proximate cause in the former, the remote cause in the latter; in the former the immediate cause in the strictest sense, in the latter acting mediately only, and that in a sense exalting the instrument at the expense of the agent; these notions, held by some as a necessary part of modern science, find neither foundation nor justification in theology or reason. These, it is true, distinguish creation and generation, as do St. Augustine and St. Thomas. But with them the distinction is modal only. It is the distinction of creation and administration, which, as St. Thomas tells us in a passage quoted at the head of this chapter, are really one and the same operation of the Word of the Father whereby He operates all things. The modern theory, though it retains the term creation, makes creation and generation essentially different; since it removes from the latter God as the immediate cause of life. From this it proceeds to take an impossibility for granted, that the power of communicating life is naturally in the generators, as the principal agents, with God as a remotely concurring cause only. Of such a notion, injurious to the Creator, impossible in the creature, St. Augustine and St. Thomas are the determined adversaries.

To forestall obvious objections we must note, before going further, that in the great schools of Christian philosophy, many things, the loss of which today causes much obscurity, were to scholars, no less than to teachers, so clear as to call for little explanation beyond the statement. Such was the fact that life can be effected only by creation, and this other, that creative power can be delegated to no creature. Hence every generation is a mode only of creation, not the alternative. If the old teachers appear to speak of it as an alternative, it is because they could conceive only an alternation of modes, of creation immediate and mediate. Of generation independent of creation or even opposed to it, of generation into which creation did not necessarily enter, they had no conception. Whatever may be the function in generation of physical agents, whatever seminal activity there be in parents, the new life distinct from theirs can not come about by any mere cooperation with the operation of the creature, such as is found in its own proper vital acts of vegetation, sensation, intelligence. This would be reducible to a delegation of creative power. Whence then comes each life? The theologian answers promptly, decisively: "In the beginning God gave certain definite matter the power to receive life in obedience to His creative word eternally uttered, never repeated."

Although the modern theory with its constantly repeated plea against unnecessary multiplication of agents and unnecessary introduction of divine action, makes God a necessarily remote agent, it will not be useless to insist upon what is not always firmly grasped, that remoteness in the agent and principality in his action tend to an inverse ratio, and with that remoteness the instrument tends in direct ratio to approach principality. I speak into a telephone. My voice vibrates a membrane, thus opening and closing an electric circuit. By this means the vibrations are communicated to a distant membrane, which reproduces my voice. I am remote as regards place. I am nevertheless the principal cause. The instrumentality of the telephone is well-defined. There is no approximation to principality. I hang up the instrument, and, until I speak into it again, it is powerless to transmit my speech. A phonograph is at work. Caruso, now dead and buried, remote not only as regards place, but also as regards time, is the principal cause of the song. Still he is less so than I was of the speech in the telephone. I was speaking; he is not singing. An indented

disc, a needle, a vibrating membrane and a resonator are causing in the air today waves exactly corresponding to those he produced twenty years ago. There is no Caruso today, yet the machine will sing his song again and again; and from the disc can be made others to sing the same song.

But let us suppose a skilful craftsman who, studying the indented disc, discovers the secret of the singer's sweet and resonant timbre, and so produces discs to sing with Caruso's voice songs Caruso never heard. Of this singing he would be for all time and every place the principal efficient cause. The disc would be his instrument only, on which he has impressed a permanent efficiency. Yet had Caruso never sung into a phonograph, the craftsman could never have reproduced his voice.

We say that the craftsman would be forever the principal efficient cause why this song should be sung, not that. The original Caruso disc would be his pattern or, as it is called, exemplary cause. The disc he produces is instrumental only. Nevertheless, that the efficiency of the instrument must always affect the efficiency of the principal cause, is certain. Had he used tin-foil, as did Edison in his first machine, he would never have given us a Caruso voice, and the efficiency of his causality would have reached no further than a single singing. Had he used a wax cylinder, as was the later practice, reproductions would have been comparatively few. That the song can be sung again and again in London, Paris, or San Francisco, or Melbourne, is due to the peculiar efficiency of the material of the disc.

In a word, the created agent is limited by more causes than one. Though remote, he remains a principal cause with varying efficiency, because the entire efficiency can be divided between principal and instrumental causes in varying proportions. In the Creator who "not only gives forms to things, but also conserves them in being, and *applies them to act*, and is the end of all their actions" (1.cv, 5, ad 3m); that is, who, using creatures as His instruments, gives them all their instrumentality, such partition is impossible. He must be intimately proximate. Make Him remote, not only in time and place, which would be bad metaphysics, but also, as modern theories do, in causality itself, and the instrumental cause can not but encroach upon and usurp His principality.

CHAPTER II.

THE APPETITE FOR NATURAL GOOD

"The natural necessity inhering in things whereby they are determined to one, is a certain impression of God directing to the end, as the necessity by which an arrow is set in motion so as to tend to a determined mark, is an impression of the archer, not of the arrow. In this, however, there is a difference. What creatures receive from God, is their nature; what beyond their nature is impressed by man on natural things, pertains to violence. Wherefore, as in the movement of the arrow necessity of violence demonstrates the aiming of the archer, so that natural necessity of creatures demonstrates the governance of divine providence." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol.* 1, ciii, 1, ad 3m.

"All inclination, whether natural or voluntary, is but a certain impression coming from the Prime Mover, as the inclination of the arrow to the target is nothing else than a certain impression from the archer." *Ibid.* 8, 0.

"Natural things, though without will, reach out nevertheless for something by the natural appetite; according to which they are directed to their end by the divine intellect, which grants nature its inclination to the end. This inclination is called appetite." *Idem, 2 Sent. Dist. xxxviii, 1, 3, ad 2.*

"God so provides for natural creatures, that He not only moves them to natural acts, but also grants them certain forms and virtues that are principles of acts, so that they are of themselves inclined to such movements. Thus, the movements whereby they are moved by God, become for creatures connatural and easy, according to the words: 'He disposes all things sweetly'. (Wisdom viii,i.)" *Idem, Summ. Theol.* 1, 2, cx, 2, 0.

"Of any operation whatsoever the principle is the form by reason of which something is in act, since every being acts inasmuch as it is in act. Wherefore the mode of an operation must be according to the mode of the form of which it is the consequence . . . Nothing can be the cause of its own being. Therefore things moved of their nature, do not move themselves . . . In brutes the moving forms in the senses and the imagination are not the inventions of the brutes themselves but are received from things outside perceivable by sense, which act on the sense and are discerned by the natural estimative faculty. Hence, though they are in a certain way said to move themselves, inasmuch as in them one part is the mover and another is moved, the movement itself is not from themselves, but partly from exterior objects perceived by the senses, and partly from nature. For inasmuch as the appetite moves the members, they are said to move themselves . . . Inasmuch as the appetite necessarily follows from forms received through the senses and the discernment of the natural estimative faculty, they are not as regards themselves the cause why they move." *Idem, Cont. Gent.* 2, xlvii.

In all living beings are two general faculties, the *expansive*, reaching out to things desirable, and the *apprehensive*, which first perceives, then takes hold of them. What are the relations be-

tween the two? Obviously sensible apprehension precedes expansion. The order, then, must be perception of the object by sense, tendency towards the object by expansive faculty, apprehension by locomotive-apprehensive organs. This is a matter of daily experience. Did the question involve nothing more, it would contain nothing worth calling a problem. Yet there is a problem deserving the name, and none the less because it passes unrecognized.

The first function of the senses is to apprehend things inasmuch as they can be objects of the expansive faculties. Many things that are not such are seen mechanically. For real apprehension the object must be perceived in its relation of desirability to the one perceiving it; and this relation must have its foundation. Antecedent, therefore, to the apprehension of a particular good there is in the irrational being something fundamental. To determine what it is—this is the problem.

Why, then, do the perceptive faculties recognize an object as good, and how does this recognition come about?

Let us consider a dog going along the street. Without question *sees* everything. The objects strike the eye. The mechanical effects take place in the organ. The images are projected on the retina. The sense is excited. It expresses the image of the object, which is the act of sight. But in most cases everything stops there. Nothing responds to the sensation. It comes as near to a mere passive reception as is possible for a vital act. The seeing is, as we say, only material. Men, women, children are passed unnoticed, until the master, or some friend or playmate, is recognized. The butcher's shop does not attract a turn of the head; a bone lying within reach is snapped up. Artificial dogs, its own image in a mirror awaken no interest; another dog puts it on the alert. As for street cars, automobiles, flowershops, all that go to make up the life of the street, such things are nothing to the dog. The few things that can be good or bad for the dog-nature attract or repel. Then the dog begins to *look*, which is in our terminology formal seeing; to *listen*, which is formal hearing.

How does this happen? You will say that the animal by its estimative sense perceives in things that are good or bad for the dog-nature, the reality constituting this relation; and you say well. This estimative sense, one of the great mysteries of creation, proclaiming irrefutably the infinitely intelligent Creator, is so evident a fact, that it can be neither ignored nor denied. Were we seeking

the proximate reason only, why a dog runs up to its master or play-fellow, after passing ten thousand people without a glance; why the meanest cur draws an attention that the noblest charger could not win; why a bare bone is snapped up greedily, while the cleverest imitation of a beefsteak is not sniffed at; the answer would suffice. These are the facts; and there clearly is such a faculty to explain them.

But we must go deeper into the matter. We are investigating, not particular vital facts, but what lies behind them in the universal nature of vital activity. To speak of something as good, means in the first instance, at least in the life of this world, something desirable, something not necessarily possessed, yet attainable; which, if possessed, would perfect the possessor. For this according as it is attainable, every nature reaches out, directing all its available powers to gain it. Moreover, it reaches out spontaneously. If the appetite had to be set going by some other interior principle, this would be the real appetite the other would be but its instrument. Were there not in the dog a tendency to bones in general, constantly active, ready to rush out as soon as the particular bone is presented, something else would have to take place inside the animal to explain the snatching at the bone. On the other hand, given the constantly active tendency, and the bone furnishing the opportunity of completing it, the snatching follows necessarily.

But the appetite for bones, though generally active in dogs is not universally so. Sometimes through sickness or satiety it is suspended; and in that moment bones cease temporarily to have for this particular dog the character of good. With returning health or returning hunger the appetite revives, and bones are again good. Bones, then, are not desirable as bones, but as things included in the category of good. When for a time they drop out of the category, they are as little to be desired as sticks or stones. Behind every particular appetite, therefore, and including all, is the universal tendency to the good of the canine nature, the principle of all canine activity, moving all the other faculties, expansive, apprehensive, locomotive; controlling in its own way what we have called the material sensitive acts, which, apart from it, remain merely seeing and hearing, without ever rising to the specific looking and listening, because what is seen or heard has no relation of good to the canine nature.

Without question all the vital faculties have their active potency. On the presentation of their object, they pass from potency to act; and in irrational creatures they do so necessarily. Moreover, they seem to participate in that constant activity in proximate first act, which we have been considering in the universal expansive faculty. Certainly, with the object presented, the eye needs nothing else to make it play its part. The sense of sight needs nothing more in order to see. But this is because both organ and sense are animated by the one principle of life which animates the whole being. The living receptive organ, the living perceptive sense, must perform each its function in the whole substantial being; but they are not the living being. Their acts, though vital, are not the living being's essential acts. On the other hand, the universal expansion towards the good of the entire nature is, to say the least, very close to the life itself. There is, in the case of lower organisms, life without hearing, life without seeing. There is no life, there could be no life, without this universal tendency to the good of the living, subsisting nature. This is the living substance's primary activity. It has no organ. Rather the entire being is its organ. As the life is the substantial act in itself always active, embracing all the subject's potencies, so its primary, necessary operation controlling all those potencies, has its own special, peculiar, constant activity. It is in very strict sense the dynamic principle of all action.

All other faculties, then, are subordinate to this fundamental expansion towards the universal good. Apart from it, whatever be their material, generic movements, these cannot be formal vital acts of this or that specific nature. Such movements are intermittent. Now the subject sees, now it hears, now it smells. But over all presides the ever-active expansion towards universal good differentiating the objects seen, heard, smelt; reaching out for what corresponds to the nature, passing over what is alien; so that for the former, sight becomes looking, hearing becomes listening, smell becomes investigating; while for the latter, sight, hearing, smell remain momentary and material, sensations that pass without affecting the inner life.

We said that external expansion lies between two apprehensions, the intentional apprehension, perceiving the good as unpossessed and presenting it to expansive activity, and the locomotive apprehension, taking actual possession. We said that the

perceptive faculties are always ready for action, because they share in the one principle of life of the entire subject. Let us now look closer, and we shall find the last reason of this proximate activity to be no other than the dynamism of the expansive tendency. The reaching out for universal good is the very root of all apprehensive activity, perceptive as well as locomotive.

From this intimate connection between the universal appetite for the nature's good and the life itself; from the fact that it is the primary universal act of the entire substance, acting through no organ, yet moving all organic action, we see two things, both most important. Of these the first, already mentioned, is the order followed in the obtaining of some particular good. Here is the process. The universal expansion, ever active, of the nature towards its universal good; the material perception of exterior objects by the senses; the differentiation of these by the estimative faculty and the formal perception of the good; the specific tendency to this particular good as the good of this particular appetite; the moving of the locomotive-apprehensive organs to take possession of it.

The other thing, equally evident, is still more important. It is that this universal expansiveness to the good of the entire nature is among the very primary fundamental things of life. It is the living nature in action. In other words, since to live is to act, it is distinguishable only notionally from life itself. It is purely dynamic. It is the essential function of progressive being that exists to attain its end by assimilating from external things a constant succession of means consonant with itself. It is the source of all other vital actions. Without it even the material act of the perceptive faculties would be impossible. Though they, too, are in their way dynamic, ever on the verge of action, so that with the presentation of the object they act spontaneously; yet they are not purely dynamic. They pass into complete active potency. They are vital, but vital organs of one substance. They live, but they live by its one life. In that one substantial activity is the principle of their organic activity. Thus, and thus only, are the organic activities coordinated, subordinated, harmonized, unified, so that in all their variety they are the adequate activity of one subject.

We say that each perceptive faculty, and consequently each particular appetite, is not without its intermissions of rest. All

are ever ready to see, to hear, to taste, to smell, to feel, to desire, because they are vital. They do not always exercise their functions, because they do not move themselves. Behind them is that universal appetite, which, because it is the essential activity of life, can never be absolutely at rest. Now it moves one particular faculty, now another, reaching out through all to the universal good of the whole being. This is to live. Life knows no return to potency. Its activity is not organic. Purely dynamic, identified with the living creature, nothing intervenes between it and the Creator. With life it is the movement impressed upon the creature. The term of creation, it is the participation to the creature of the Creator's activity, the movement, whereby the Creator, Himself unmoved, moves the creature universally to the end of its creation.

St. Thomas compares the Creator moving the creature to its end, with the archer directing his arrow to the mark. But he notes at the same time the immense difference between the two operations. The Creator dominates the nature absolutely, and this in the very operation of creating it. "Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, and all the deeps." (Ps. cxxxiv, 6.) Man is limited by the nature of things as they exist. In his wisdom he goes beyond nature, adding accidental forms whereby it accomplishes his designs. He uses nature; he does not dominate it.

The universal tendency to good is in every creature because each is a creature. It is therefore generic, common to all. In each particular creature the Creator specifies it, making it a tendency to the universal good of the specific nature. This He does by granting certain forms and virtues that are principles of specific acts. All animals see and hear. But all do not see and hear in the same way. One thing will fix the attention of the dog yet pass unnoticed by the horse; while what appeals to the horse is without interest for the dog. Moreover given an object of common interest, different animals will regard it in different ways. The horse, the dog, the cat, the bird, each will look at its master; yet each will do so in its own way. This specific difference in acts generically the same is to be observed in animals closely allied. The cat, the lynx, the puma, the jaguar, the leopard, the tiger, the lion, are all cats. Their actions are all feline, distinguishing them instantly from every animal of the canine family. Yet in each careful observation reveals little differences distinguishing

them among themselves. These virtues and forms, are not the senses or the faculties in themselves. They are rather elements of the substantial form, simple in itself, virtually complex in its functions, whereby every sense, faculty, organ is specified, so that all, coordinated and subordinated, make up but one nature, with its one adequate good to which its entire operation tends.

Man then uses the creature applying it extrinsically to effect his purpose. He adds to it certain accidental forms beyond its nature. His operation is coercive, or, as St. Thomas says, violent. The Creator enters intrinsically into the nature itself. He gives permanent virtues and forms, substantial in their character. Thus He moves the creature connaturally, easily, sweetly, with an interior impression and impulse so spontaneous, as to disguise, so to speak, His own operation, allowing in a very real sense the dictum: The living being is the principle of its own operation.

What we have said of the universal expansion of the sensitive nature, is completely applicable to the vegetative. Indeed, as its organism is less complex, the objects of its expansive operations are fewer, more elementary, more removed from the idea of being the matter of enjoyment in their use. Serving primarily the conservation of life and the process of reproduction, they are the immediate objects of the universal tendency of the life itself. Consequently the operations of vegetative nature, seeking out the elements of its sustenance, discriminating them from others, breaking up compounds to get them, using them in fixed measure, are nothing less than the movement impressed upon the creature by the Creator, "creating all things in measure, number and weight."

CHAPTER III

THE INTELLECTUAL APPETITE FOR UNIVERSAL GOOD

"As the intellect is moved by its object and by Him who gave it the power of understanding, so the will is moved by its object and by Him who causes the power of willing. The will can be moved, as by its object, by any good whatsoever, not, however, sufficiently and efficaciously except by God. Nothing is in itself sufficient to move another, unless the active power of the one moving exceeds or, at least, equals the passive power of the one moveable. The passive power of the will extends to universal good; for its object is universal good, as the object of the intellect is universal being. But any created good is a particular good; God alone is the good universal. Wherefore He alone fills the will and is sufficient to move it as its object. Likewise also the power of willing is caused by God alone. To will is nothing else than a certain inclination towards the object of the will, universal good. But to incline it towards universal good belongs to the Prime Mover, to whom the last end bears proportion, just as in human affairs to direct towards the common good belongs to him who rules over the multitude. Wherefore it belongs properly to God to move the will, but chiefly in the second way by inclining it interiorly." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 1, cv, 4, 0.

"There are two ways in which one thing may move another. In one, it moves as the end, as the end is said to move the efficient cause. In this sense the intellect moves the will, since good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as the end.

"In the other, one moves as the agent. The one changing moves the thing changed, and the one impelling moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul.

"The reason is because in all active potencies ordered among themselves, that which regards the universal end moves those which regard particular ends. This appears in natural things as in political affairs. The king, who directs the common good of the entire kingdom, moves by his command those who, set over single cities, care for the government of each. But the object of the will is good as the common end. On the other hand, each faculty is adapted to its own proper good, as the eye for the perceiving of color and the intellect for the knowledge of truth. Therefore, the vegetative part excepted, the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their acts." *Ibid* lxxxii, 4, 0.

"The intellect can be considered in two ways; inasmuch, as it is apprehensive of universal being and truth, and inasmuch as it is a certain thing and a particular potency having a determined act. Similarly the will can be considered in two ways; according to the community of its object inasmuch as it is appetitive of the common good, and inasmuch as it is a determined potency having a determined act. If the intellect and will be compared according to the community of their objects, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If the intellect be considered according to the community of its object, and the will inasmuch as it is a certain

determined potency, the intellect is again higher and nobler than the will; because the will itself, its act and the object are contained under the notion of being and true, which the intellect apprehends. Whence the intellect understands the will, its act and object, as it understands other things, as stone and wood, which are contained under the common notion of being and true. If, however, the will be considered according to the universality of its object, which is good, the intellect, inasmuch as it is a certain thing and a special potency; then the intellect, the act of understanding and its object, truth, each of which is a special good, are contained under the common notion of good; and in this respect the will is higher than the intellect and can move it. Hence we see why these potencies by their acts include one another, because the intellect understands the will to will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. Similarly good is contained under true inasmuch as it is something true understood, and true is contained under good, inasmuch as it is a good desired." *Ibid.* ad 1m.

"Though the will moves the intellect as has been explained, there is no need of an infinite process, but the process stops in the intellect as in the starting point. Apprehension must precede every movement of the will; but a movement of the will does not precede every apprehension. The beginning of considering and understanding is some intellectual principle higher than our intellect, namely God, as Aristotle also says." *Ibid.* ad. 3m.

"To be moved voluntarily is to be moved of oneself, that is by an intrinsic principle; but that principle can be from another extrinsic principle. Thus without repugnance one can both move himself and be moved by another." *Idem* 1, cv, 4, ad. 2m.

"The will passes from potency to act. It begins to will what it was not willing. Necessarily, then, it must be moved by something. It moves itself inasmuch as, desiring the end, it brings itself to desire what leads to the end. For this it needs deliberation. One wishing to be cured begins to think how to attain it. Thus he learns that a doctor can cure him, and so wishes it. But the will, not always wishing health actually, must be moved to begin. To move itself, it would need another deliberation. This would presuppose another act of the will, implying an infinite series. Hence it follows that the first act of the will must result from the incitement of one moving it from without, as Aristotle himself held." *Idem*, 1, 2, ix, 4, 0.

"God, as the universal mover, moves man's will to its universal object, which is good; and without this universal movement man can will nothing. But man determines himself by reason to will this or that, true good or apparent." *Ibid* 6, ad. 3m.

Having laid a foundation in irrational creatures, let us pass to man. We shall follow the same method. Observing evident facts, we shall draw inevitable conclusions.

Instead of the dog in the street, we consider the boy its master. Not much escapes his notice: nothing is excluded from it. Moving vehicles, automobiles at the curb, the shop-windows, the markets, people, animals, picture-posters, whatever is being said, all that is done, have an interest for him. What he does not notice is lost, not through limitations of his nature, but of the exercise of its powers. The circus parading will draw his attention from the

shops. Two dogs ready to fight, will suspend his study of the picture-poster. It is not with him as with the dog, question of appeal or of no appeal, but of appeal greater or less.

Nothing is beneath his notice. Put him in a room bare of ornament, with windows beyond his reach. He is not without resource. The beam of sunlight will interest him with its glittering dust particles. The straggling cracks in the plaster wall, the grain of the flooring, different in each plank, will arrest his eye. He will watch the circling flies. The cobwebbed corner will suggest a lurking spider and sudden death for a fly now vigorous on the wing. Only one thing is impossible. As long as he is awake his mind can not be inactive.

Why so? One answers: "The mind must act." But why? Because its nature is active. This seems a vicious circle. One explains: "The intellect is perfected by truth. It must seek it; go out to it when presented and grasp it." This is apparently to speak in parables, to make the intellect expansive as well as apprehensive. It is mated with the equally common assertion, that the will, perceiving the good, reaches out to embrace it. Thus the expansive faculty is in turn made apprehensive. Such expressions taken literally would make intellect and will, each with its own apprehension and expansion, two little independent souls, in defiance of the first psychological fact, that the soul is simple, spiritual, the source of all activity. It thinks, is conscious, judges, reasons, wills. Intellect is the soul apprehending, conscience is the soul reflecting, judgment is the soul affirming or denying, reason is the soul deducing, will is the soul expanding. Because in all this the soul passes from potency to act, because it is not always apprehending, reflecting, and so forth, but is always capable of doing so, we speak of the potency, rather than of the act, of virtues, powers, faculties. These are distinct among themselves, but they are **not** distinct from the soul. Still less do they divide it. The one, simple, indivisible soul seeks the truth and grasps it, perceives the good and embraces it. This fact of which all are conscious, underlies the common speech, founding an ellipse which, intelligible to all, removes every reasonable fear of error.

In strictness, however, the intellect is a faculty purely apprehensive; and I find no law obliging apprehensive faculties to work merely for sake of working. To suppose such would make the intellect a machine, its operations purely mechanical; and life

would be a kind of spring which, wound up, would keep everything moving until it was unwound. The intellect would apprehend and let drop, apprehend again and drop again, like a steam-shovel; or like an automaton, that shakes its head, rolls its eyes, kicks its legs, in response to the pressure of the spring.

You urge that the soul is essentially intellectual, that the formal object of its activity is being and truth. Quite true. Yet on looking into the nature of the intellect itself, we do not find anything necessitating action. "But on the presentation of its object it must act." Of course it must. The question, however, is not *whether*, but *why* it must act. Neither from the faculty itself nor from the object can such necessity be deduced. The cold calm reality of being, the self-contained unchangeableness of truth, can be conceived as in presence of the intellect, without any need of setting that faculty in motion. The explanation must be sought else where.

Let us go back to the order of operation in the irrational creature leading to some sensible good. It is founded in the tendency of the animal to its nature's good, a tendency ever active, pushing into action every faculty to attain this good. It keeps the senses ever on the alert for means, in order to use them, or for hindrances, so as to avoid them. Hence the formal perception of such, and their differentiation by the estimative faculty. Then comes in the appetite, that is, the specification of the universal tendency according to the relations different objects bear to the different natural functions, with its particular tendency to its particular object, and the consequent activity of the locomotive-apprehensive faculties to gain the object desired.

To this the operation of the intellectual creature is perfectly analogous. Its foundation is man's dynamic tendency to his nature's adequate good. Influenced by this, the powers of his soul, no less than his senses, are always on the alert to apprehend, reach out to and grasp what conduces to that good, or to shun its opposite. One apprehends because something lacking, not to his intellect as such, but to the well-being of his entire nature, is before him. In itself the object exhibits being and truth. Yet not for this is it apprehended; but because being and truth to the fullest extent constitute the good of intelligent man.

Here, then, we find our formula. Life is action. The living being must act. In the living man the intellect is a faculty of life. Were intelligence life, it would be pure act, as St. Thomas says,

“Did the intellect live by its own life, it would act spontaneously, of its own activity. As one faculty of many in the human substance, it acts concomitantly, moved by the impulse of the one common life.” (Summ. 1, liv, 1.). Whatsoever the activity of any faculty, however, high, or swift, or penetrating, its last reason lies outside the faculty in that one common impulse—the reaching out of the nature for the universal good.

Now, however, a difficulty appears. In the quotations at the head of this chapter St. Thomas, comparing the intellect and the will, gives the first place to the former, not only as the nobler faculty, but also as the principle of operation. Apprehension must precede every movement of the will, but a movement of the will can not precede every apprehension; otherwise we should fall into an infinite series. Hence the principle of all considering and understanding is to be found in God.

In the first place St. Thomas, taking the intellect and will as operative faculties, considers them from three points of view, viz: as universal faculties with their universal objects; the intellect as universal, the will in particular operations; the will as universal, the intellect in particular operations. From the first and second standpoints the intellect is superior. Its object, the True, is absolute; while in the Good is supposed the relation to the True of the creature perfectible by it. Moreover the intellect specifies the nature, elevating the generic tendency to good. In the second case the act of the intellect is prior to that of the will. The object must be apprehended as good before it can be willed. The third case remains, in which the will moves the intellect as the prince moves the body politic.

Here St. Thomas touches the will in its essential function, that of determining the universal expansion of the nature to this particular good, and of moving all the faculties according to its determination. For this it needs deliberation on the part of the intellect, since it must have a motive to pass from potency to act. This deliberation it wills; apparently another actuating of potency demanding another deliberation. An infinite process is impossible. The principle of voluntary operation, therefore, is the incitement received from God, the universal dynamic tendency to good, the vital activity, which impressed by God, has from Him its direction, and so calls for no antecedent apprehension of good.

St. Thomas gives us two first principles, that of the intellect, a participation of the divine intelligence; that of the will, an impressed movement. The first a substantial element of the nature, resulting therefore in the intellectual faculty; the second, the movement of the nature whereby all the faculties work. The former is prior by nature, as the nature is prior to the life. The latter is the prime mover, as the life moves the nature. Hence St. Thomas well distinguishes: "The intellect is moved by God who *gave* it the power of understanding; the will by Him who *caused* the power of willing."—Let us now come back to the boy.

Our boy is not limited in his interests like his dog. In the whole street there is nothing that is not for him in some way good, desirable therefore, and consequently to be apprehended as opportunity offers. Moreover, his interests being so wide; his natural expansive faculties, so unbounded; the good he finds in things, so various; the apprehensions exhausting all must differ essentially from his dog's. The brute has but sensitive appetites, its apprehensions do not go beyond what will satisfy them. The concrete obtainable food, to satisfy hunger; the concrete appropriate dog, to satisfy the appetite of fighting with his kind; the concrete attainable cat, to satisfy the appetite of hunting and killing those of different species; a few men, women and children, with whom it can be familiar; others to be barked at as strangers, even bitten; these make up a great part of the dog's apprehensible goods. The boy, as a rule, seeks the knowledge of the thing rather than the thing itself. "What is this, and why?" are the questions the natural impulse imposes on his apprehensive faculties. In the answers received, he finds the good to which his nature is reaching out. The brute seeks the *qualities* of things inasmuch as they satisfy a sensitive nature. The boy seeks the *nature* of each. The brute seeks its good without recognizing the good. The boy recognizes the good first of all, and then tends to its because it is good. The brute, seeing the good, acts through necessity. The boy through free choice. The brute relinquishes the object when appetite is satisfied. The boy sees possibilities beyond present satiety. The more the object corresponds to his intellectual nature and recedes from the merely sensitive appetite, the dimmer becomes the notion of satiety, until it vanishes entirely. To know appeals to his maturing mind as good illimitable.

Reaching perfect manhood, the boy can have but few material possessions; and with them he is content. No limit can be placed to his intellectual possessions, to his intimate knowledge of the nature of things, but the limit of things themselves. As long as there is anything new under his observation he will inevitably give himself to the investigation of its *what* and *why*. He will go beneath external sensibilities of quantity and quality, of all that indicates the individual, to the essential nature; and he will do so necessarily, because his first apprehensions are of the inner nature of things; not of qualities, appearances and notes. Nevertheless that apprehension is imperfect, inadequate. It leaves his boundless appetite for knowledge unsatisfied. He may apprehend the object as a kind of cat, a conifer, a crystal. He may not get that far. He may perceive only a mammal, a tree, a mineral. His inexperience may confine his perception to the transcendental *thing*. However it may be, this is certain, that the first concept is always *thing*, from which we perfect our knowledge until we reach specific nature.

Man, therefore, reaches the inner reality by an operation intellectual, universal, spontaneous. It is intellectual because it ignores the material things that are the objects of sense, and penetrates to that interior substantiality which, unchanging under the changing qualities and notes, escapes all experience of sense. It is universal, because nothing is too great or too small to be subject to it. It is spontaneous, because no sooner does an object come under the sense, than the operation takes place undetermined by any deliberate choice. I can say: "I will study the nature of this thing," or I can say: "I will not study it." I cannot say: "I will perceive this thing," or: "I will not." The study will result from free election. Unless before any possible election that spontaneous operation had furnished the notion *thing*, there could have been neither deliberation nor choice.

The operation is, as we have said, apprehensive, in its nature. It is, moreover, intellectual. It takes hold of the object as apprehended by the senses and represented in the imagination, strips it of all its accidental qualities and notes, so that the particular essence is presented to the mind as the object to be expressed in its idea. For specification's sake, we call the intellect performing this operation, the acting intellect. The same intellect, reacting and expressing the idea, we call the possible intellect; not that

there are two faculties of the mind really distinct, but rather two operations, elements of the intellectual concept.

This activity of the intellect, spontaneous though it be, is, nevertheless, subordinate to the universal expansive movement of the nature. It exists, because this movement must have its definite object. Indeed, all apprehension, whatever its nature, is ordained to the vital tendency to the universal good. It is absolutely necessary for clearness of thought to keep ever in mind, that in the common distinction of faculties in the soul, the use of the term is analogical only, based upon the operations of sense. Intellect and will are not distinct in the same way as hearing and sight, each with its own organ. If this be understood, we may call them faculties. For the sake of exactness, it might be better to employ the broader term, powers; since in fact they are in the concrete but the potency of two distinct operations in the one simple spiritual soul. It would be hard to determine the mental confusion arising from a thoughtless use of the common expression: "The intellect presents to the will the object of its tendency." If the intellect and the will be taken as two distinct faculties, this would suppose in the will a power of apprehension, whereby it should perceive its object as good, and an expansive tendency in the intellect which, recognizing the good, calls in the will to attain it. And, in fact, this is not very far from the common view of the matter. Hence though we have said this once already, our repetition is not a vain one.

The truth is that by one act, complex indeed, yet purely spiritual, the soul apprehends the good, is conscious of the apprehension, and expands to the good it is conscious of. The elements of the complex act are distinct by nature; they bear to one another by nature the relation of antecedent and consequent; yet they are absolutely inseparable, by virtue of the vital tendency to universal good, the last created reason for the act involving them. The active power of abstraction, that is, the acting intellect, since it is the very first principle of intellectual apprehension, is vital, spontaneous, dynamic, as is the expansiveness towards universal good. It is not in the strict sense determined to action by any particular object. Rather in itself it is always active; and therefore is most exactly termed the *acting* intellect. The particular object, as represented in the imagination, is the recipient of its activity, as the illuminated object receives the light but does not determine the

shining of the sun. Nevertheless, if the last reason of the existence of this ever-active power of universal abstraction be sought, it can be found only in man's progressive expansive nature. He tends to the Good. He must know the absolute Good. He must know the relative good of every creature inasmuch as it is the manifestation of the goodness of the absolute Good, and is a means whereby the absolute Good is to be attained. The spontaneous apprehension in every object, of its being and its goodness, is therefore a necessary function of the universal active expansion towards the Good, which, as we have seen is for all practical purposes the created life itself. This holds the supreme place :

*"Unde nil majus generatur ipso,
Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum."*

Nevertheless, to the acting intellect we may justly apply what follows :

*"Proximos illi tamen occupavit
Pallas honores."*

Hence the elements of human activity; are, 1. The individual nature, the creature of God. 2. Its movement towards good, dynamic, spontaneous, universal, the creature of God, impressed immediately on the nature, in a single word, the life. 3. Another vital, dynamic, spontaneous, universal activity, the foundation of the intellectual apprehension of good, the principle of understanding given by God, and a necessary function of the vital tendency towards universal good, namely, the acting intellect. 4. This same acting intellect dealing with concrete sensitive apprehensions, preparing them by abstraction for further intellectual operation. 5. The possible intellect expressing the formal ideas, in which the knowledge of the object consists. 6. The intellect reflecting, thus perceiving the objective relations of things to itself and to its end, and so recognizing in each the good. 7. The specification of the universal movement to good by objects so perceived, which thus becomes the will proper, with its freedom and voluntariness. 8. The free choice of one of the possible courses of action with regard to the objects so specifying the universal tendency, and the voluntary adaptation of such objects to the course chosen.

Such is the vital movement towards good. Impressed universally by the Creator, it is received in the free creature according

to the mode of the receiver. Man therefore, specifies it for true good or false. But whether man turns it to good or evil, the last step of the analysis of the human act finds before it only the creative word creating, impressing, conserving that universal movement as the dynamic force of life—as life in action. Thus in every operation man is moved by God, who, Himself unmoved, moves all His creatures.

CHAPTER IV

THE SPECIFICATION OF THE UNIVERSAL APPETITE IN PARTICULAR GOODS

"The potency of the will is always present in act to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it sometimes wills the end, is not always in the will. Wherefore the will does not move itself." *St. Thomas, Summ.* 1, 2, ix, 3, ad 2m.

"Man is master of his act, because he has the power of deliberating concerning his acts. Because reason deliberating is concerned with opposites, the will is ready for both sides." *Ibid.* vi, 2, ad 2m.

"The will is the root of liberty as its subject, reason, as its cause. The will can tend freely to desire things, because reason can have different concepts of good." *Ibid.* xvii, 1, ad 2m.

"Only that which is in some way the cause of the nature can be the cause of natural movement. A man having will can be moved by someone who is not his cause; that his voluntary movement be from some extrinsic principle, not the cause of his will, is impossible. Only God can be the cause of the will . . . God moves the will of man, as the universal mover, to the universal object of the will, the good; and without this universal movement man could not will anything. But man by reason determines himself to will this or that, which is truly good, or apparent good." *Ibid.* ix, 6, 0; and ad 3m.

"Free-will is the cause of its movement, because by free-will man moves himself to act. Nevertheless this does not mean that unless something be its own first cause it cannot be free, any more than that one thing cannot cause another unless as its first cause. God therefore is the first cause moving causes both natural and voluntary. And as in moving natural causes He does not take from them the naturalness of their acts, so in moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of voluntariness, but rather brings them about, since He operates in each according to its proper nature," *Idem.* 1, lxxxiii, 1, ad 3m.

"Election is the proper act of free-will. We are said to be free because we can take to ourselves one thing, having rejected another; which is to choose. Wherefore the nature of free-will must be examined from the act of election. To this concur something from the cognitive faculty and something from the appetitive. On the part of the cognitive faculty is required counsel to determine which of two should be preferred. On the part of the appetitive faculty is required, that what has been decided by counsel should, by tending to it, be accepted." *Ibid.* 2, 0.

The spontaneous, dynamic, universal movement of the creature towards good is the movement of the entire nature. It includes all particular movements of whatever kind. It is their source and origin; since they exist only as means to the attainment of its end, supreme good. It is life's concomitant activity, always, as St.

Thomas says, in act to itself. With life it is the term of creation, not a mere result of intermediate activities. It is, therefore, impressed on the creature by the Creator. In potency as regards things intermediate, its tendency to its term is not potential but actual; as coming from God's immediate act.

In it are found two elements, concupiscence tending to sensible good, and voluntariness tending to good perceived by the intellect. Concupiscence, however, tends to sensible goods, not blindly, as is the case with the brute, but, since it is the sensitive appetite of a rational being, to sensible good recognizable, and normally recognized as such. Hence, to every concrete good occurring in the field of universal good, both tend according to the measure of its particular good for each, not independently, but coordinately as the tendencies of one principle. Moreover to all such goods occurring they tend *positively* with the positiveness of the universal movement, their source. That is to say, as tendencies they tend to each, without excluding the others; thus tending universally to all.

For example, there occur in the field of universal good a spectacle to be seen, food to be taken, a friend to be visited, a problem in science on the point of solution. They can not be attained simultaneously. Nevertheless they are presented simultaneously. Hence a choice must be made, which as it supposes deliberation, demands indifference. But from the nature of things this can not be *negative*. Since the appetite is going out positively to each, it is a positive indifference, going indifferently to all.

Since life is action, the universal vital movement must complete itself. This it does through its specific functions; the intellect which recognizes such concrete goods, each able to actualize partially the universal capacity, none exhibiting infinite good, the term of vital activity; and the will that deals with them. The intellect perceives the truth; the will acts accordingly. All bear some relation of good to man's complex nature. Each is desirable. Each is attainable. To obtain all is impossible. Yet in them one way or another are seen means to that happiness, man's necessary end. A choice must be made. Man is necessarily free. He may take one, or he may leave all.

What is the physical nature of this free choice? We may consider it with regard to the object chosen, or with regard to those relinquished. From the former point of view, it is the specification of the necessary progression of the universal movement by

the accepting of the impulse to the object apprehended as a means either real, or assumed to be such, to the absolute good. From the latter, it is the consequent necessary abandonment of the initial impulse towards all other objects, as possible terms of the universal movement towards good. In the former case it is positive; in the latter, negative. In the former it is to obey the impulse, to yield to the movement. In the latter it is to omit all that such a yielding implies.

Now comes the crucial question. This yielding to the impulse towards one object out of many such impulses, is it a new act superadded to the positive tendency coming from the universal movement of the nature; or is it merely the physical completion of that tendency? To put it correlatively, is the omission to follow up the tendency with regard to all others, a positive resisting of the impulse towards them? The answer must depend upon one's concept of the will. If this be viewed, not as a function of the universal movement of the nature, but as a superadded faculty distinct from the essential movement which is the life itself, then certainly its act will be looked on as distinct from that movement. The yielding to the impulse towards one object will be held a superadded act; the omission regarding all others, a positive resistance to the several impulses towards them. If, however, this be grasped, which we have shown to be bound up with the simplicity of the soul, that the will is but a function of the universal movement of the nature, specifying its formal acts regarding inadequate objects, so that through definite means it may reach its adequate term; a brief reflection on the nature of the agent and on that of the specification of his generic tendency, will establish clearly that his choice is but a free yielding to one tendency out of the many to which their corresponding objects determine the universal appetite conditioned by the impossibility of actually embracing all; and that the consequent voluntariness in following up the tendency chosen, is the dynamic movement of the nature exerting itself in that direction on account of the cessation of movement towards all other goods. Choice, then, inasmuch as it is the negation of response to several impulses of nature, necessitated naturally by the response to one, is physically negative. For what is positive, the yielding to one impulse, the impulse itself, since it is an intrinsic movement of the nature, suffices; nor is any additional impulse called for.

Here some will object that our doctrine is contrary to experience. Too often we find that the abandoning of the movement of appetite is far from being negative, a mere omission. It calls for a strong effort, a vigorous resistance. The answer is obvious. Here we are analyzing the *intrinsic* nature of the physically free act of choice. The objection deals with another thing altogether, the *extrinsic* obstacles to the exercise of *moral* freedom. These may be present, or they may not. They may be greater or less. With regard to the act of choice they are *accidental*. They shall be discussed in our next chapter. But they have no place in the discussion of the *essential* nature of choice.

To sum up, let us guard against the idea that in creating man God creates a being with faculties in such a state of static equilibrium, that to pass from potency to act they need some transient impulse to be derived from, one knows not where. This would make God's living creature a machine. Life is action, not the quiescence of mere passive potency. In creating living man God creates the life itself, to manifest itself in this earthly state of progression by its dynamic force reaching out for the universal good. Its term is the attainment of that which will exhaust all its expansive energy. Its progression is the tending spontaneously to partial goods inasmuch as they participate in the goodness of the universal good, and are apprehended as means to its attainment. The powers of the soul, the senses, the organs of the body, live as they are moved by it. The intellect is moved by it to apprehend and judge of particular goods. Could there be anything existing outside the relation of good to man, his intellect could no more apprehend it, than can a dog perceive the nature of food in the tinned goods on the grocer's shelf. The will is but this expansive faculty determining itself after particular goods have been apprehended and judged. Its voluntariness is the consequent direction of its expansiveness within limits determined by the free choice. The organs act obediently, moved by that universal force, to put it into connection with the exterior world. The senses operate humanly; because in their perceptions is apprehended the good, to which they are ordained as instruments animated by the universal movement to good, and so sharing in its activity. The same is true in due proportion of the locomotive faculties and of every movement in man.

This spontaneous dynamic force, the very activity of life, God impresses on His creature, man, as *movement* moving him to his last end. With the beginning of life begins in man this divine movement. In God conservation differs in no way from creation; in man it differs only modally. Hence in man conservation is the continuation of this universal movement, this mainspring of all vital activity. Such conservation, without any additional operation or impulse suffices for man's *physical* action, giving full scope to his *physical* liberty. Thus God operates in man's physical operation, the Prime Mover, Himself unmoved, yet moving all things.

CHAPTER V

MORAL FREEDOM

"Though the will moves the understanding to understand, and we can will nothing that is not understood, it does not follow that we thus fall into an indefinite series; but the process terminates in the intellect, its starting point. Apprehension must precede every willing, but the movement of the will does not precede every apprehension. Higher than our intellect is the intellectual principle, the principle of considering and understanding, which is God." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol.* 1. lxxxii, 4, ad 3m.

"None is supremely happy but in the supreme good, which is received and retained in the truth we call wisdom. Before we reach supreme happiness, we have, nevertheless, its notion impressed in our minds, whereby we know that we will to be supremely happy, we assert it confidently without hesitation. In like manner before we become wise, we have the notion of wisdom impressed in our minds." *St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbit.* ii, 9, 27.

"Beatitude, inasmuch as concerns the object, is the highest good, pure and simple. As regards its act in beatified creatures it is the highest good, not simply, but as included among goods than can be participated in by creatures." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 1. xxvi, 3, ad 1m.

"To do without all assistance absolutely is beyond man's power. Every man needs, first of all, divine help. In the second place, he needs human aid, because he is naturally a social animal, unequal to the providing for his own life." *Idem* 2, 2. cxxix, 6, ad 1m.

"'The tongue no man can tame.' Should you wish to tame it you could not, because you are a man. See a likeness of this in the beasts we tame. The horse does not tame itself, nor the camel, nor the elephant, nor the asp, nor the lion. So also man does not tame himself. To tame a horse, or a camel, or an ox, or an elephant, or an asp, or a lion, we seek a man. Therefore that man may be tamed, let God be sought." *St. Augustine. Serm. de Scrip.* 55, c 2.

We have analyzed man's tendency towards universal good. It is movement. It has no special organ. It is not apprehended as a faculty. We know it is not pure activity, since this is impossible in a finite being. On the other hand, we can not conceive it quiescent in simple passive potency. It passes from potency to act. But its potency is active in the highest degree. It is in what we may term proximate first act, always on the point of acting, needing only the presentation of a definite object to be perfected in complete second act. This St. Thomas expresses in the formula already quoted: "The potency of the will is always present in act

to itself." It is man's vital activity; the vital activity of his entire being. It is in common speech the life itself, so narrow is the distinction between life and its activity. Life is action. In this sense we term it with respect to the particular faculties and organs, dynamic, the principle of all their activity, moving them as its ministers in all their functions; itself the essential vital movement, the creature of God the Creator of all life, created by Him and sustained till life ends in death.

This universal tendency must have an object. In some efficacious way the universal good must be apprehended vitally, not by a transient act, but by a permanent habit. A transient act would terminate a momentary movement; while the movement to universal good, is, as we have seen, permanent, dynamic, the next thing to pure act. A permanent actual apprehension would imply the actual presence of the universal good, and the consequent cessation of all tendency. Hence some permanent habit lying between these extremes will give the nature of that vital apprehension of good which, without completing the vital tendency, gives it, nevertheless, its reality.

Is the habit innate or acquired? The Ontologist would not allow it to be acquired, holding it to be an incipient intuition of the Being transcendently Good. The partisan of innate ideas would equally deny its acquisition, holding that God in creating the soul, creates in it at least the idea of being, the transcendental good. These opinions have difficulties no explanation removes. How could the habitual intuition of universal Being, supremely Good, even though imperfect, because received according to the mode of the receiver, not reduce active tendency to rest? As to innate ideas in their accepted sense, they do not differ essentially from the subjective forms of Kant; and always carry with them the Kantian difficulty of bridging the abyss between them and objective reality. We therefore will say that the unique habit we are investigating is to be found fundamentally in the mutual interdependence of intellect and will, as faculties of the one simple, spiritual soul, and functions of the one vital activity.

As we have seen, St. Thomas tells us that the intellect and will, as potencies, include each other mutually in their acts (1. lxxxii, 4, ad 1m). From this the conclusion suggests itself that by tracing back their activities through particular acts to the more universal, we shall find the solution of the problem. We do so;

and, with St. Thomas, see the Creator participating to the creature the power of understanding, and impressing on the creature the movement towards good. This He does according to the essential relations of the power and the movement as the simultaneous term of the one creative word. The power of understanding is under one respect antecedent of its nature to the expansive movement, because its function is to present the object. Under another respect the expansive movement is of its nature antecedent to the apprehensive, which, unless moved, could not act. The term of the creative act is the living creature in full vital activity, antecedent by nature to any operation, yet requiring no further intrinsic determination to begin its course.

There is strictly no innate habit, no acquired habit. There is a fundamental habit not only capable of evolving itself by experience acquired in acts, but demanding such an evolution. There is the complete active potentiality of developing the intellectual habit by intellectual processes, according as objects are presented exhibiting as creatures the finite participated true, the finite participated good. There is the dynamic vital activity urging that development. Behind them is God alone, the Creator granting the intellectual power, causing, impressing the dynamic tendency to universal good, the Prime Mover of all things, Himself unmoved, participating to His creature His uncreated reality, His supreme intelligence and will; the former the necessary principle of all understanding, the latter the necessary principle of all movement. Thus from one eternal indivisible source originates one intelligent progressive creature, the living man.

Hence appears most clearly how great an error it would be to suppose a formal intentional apprehension of universal good, setting the vital expansion in movement, to be followed by similar intellectual apprehensions of particular goods, and by acts of the will going out towards them. The mutual inclusion of the potencies in their several operations, or better perhaps, the unity of the operation originating from the two principles, means rather that, as St. Thomas puts it, both apprehension and expansion are intrinsically actuated by their Creator; so that to pass from proximate first act to formal second act, nothing further is needed than the occurrence of an object at which their activity may be terminated. They may be likened to the hunter in his ambush, ready for instant action the moment his quarry comes within range.

This being understood, there can be no difficulty regarding the evolution of the fundamental habit. Whatever the first object presenting itself may be, the intellect, urged by the nature's tendency to the universal good, apprehends it instantaneously as *being*, and no less instantaneously as *good*. This suffices for the expansive vital activity. It not only reaches out for the object itself, but also imposes on the intellect fuller investigation, and the consequent judgment that the knowledge of it or even its possession will or will not be for the good of the whole nature. As knowledge grows expansion increases. Specific appetites are excited. The universal movement functions formally as the will. This imposes itself on faculties, sensitive and intellectual, until the locomotive faculties are reached and the good is acquired by their means.

Thus the rudiments of the idea of happiness in the possession of good bound up in the Creator's initial impulse in starting human life, become, as He continues to move the creature by its universal tendency to its adequate good, the idea itself. With the idea of happiness grows consciousness of its incompleteness in this life. Thus is perfected the formal notion of supreme happiness in the possession of absolute good. Man recognizes the nature of his native tendency to the Infinite. We know, St. Augustine says, that we will supreme happiness, and that what we know, we are always ready to affirm.

The identity of Being with the Good, and of both with the True, is the foundation of wisdom. From the beginning we see in some way that knowledge helps to larger knowledge, that partial truth leads to fuller truth, and minor good to greater good. Yet, however we draw out the process, it can but *lead* to that perfect happiness which it can never *give*. It is the road to be travelled. The term in which the traveller will find rest can only be the absolute Being, the fullness of Truth, the supreme Good. The term being unique, the road must be clearly defined. Our life, that is, our progressive activity, must be so ordered as by that road to reach the one and only end. Our actions must be human, that is, freely chosen and freely specified as means to the end. This is the moral law; and in our power to observe it lies our moral freedom.

To assume at this point that the mere demonstration of physical freedom establishes moral freedom, would be a serious error. In each particular contingency as it arises we are physically free.

This, however, gives no more assurance of an ability of collective observance, such as the moral law demands, than in the fable the power of breaking each individual stick demonstrated the same power over the faggot. The power to observe the moral law must be practical, extending to the whole law, under all circumstances however difficult. As regards the exercise in it of our free-will two impediments occur, ignorance and concupiscence.

Touching the first, we draw from St. Thomas and St. Augustine no more than that, in the matter of supreme Being, of the True and the Good, we have radical ideas and an initial impulse. From these most people will allow that a man by his unaided intelligence could draw the distinction between right and wrong; the obligation of doing the former and avoiding the latter; and a few elementary notions of right and wrong in the concrete. Whether he would do so is another question, which happily cannot be tested, unless by speculators so utterly abnormal as to forget that man's nature is social; that the pure individual removed from social intercourse would be in a condition so unnatural as to be positively monstrous.

"To do without all assistance is beyond man's power," says St. Thomas. By discussion with his fellows man reaches from first principles conclusions accepted by all. These, handed down to succeeding generations, become principles from which further conclusions follow. So it is in science generally; and there is no reason why moral science should be an exception. Again, as in science men can at any moment go in practice only as far as their actual conclusions reach, so in morals one can not but conform his conduct to the certain practical judgments of the general conscience.

But St. Thomas puts in the first place the need of divine help. Were there no other reason for it than the absolute necessity of the moral order for every man, this would suffice to ground his expectation of special assistance. This is obviously true, unless we are prepared to deny that in all things God is the Prime Mover of His creatures. Nevertheless there is not only in the particular man, but also in men acting socially, a cause, not only of moral ignorance but also of moral error, which demands such aid.

The greatest impediment to moral freedom is concupiscence, the natural consequence of a composite nature such as ours. The nature is one, the life is one. Hence expansive activity is one.

Yet as the nature is complex, intellectual and sensitive, so also is the expansive activity. It includes an intellectual expansion towards the good of man as a rational being, and a sensitive expansion towards the good of his senses. No sooner do the senses by what is termed practical reason, perceive such a good in some concrete object, than the sensitive appetite reaches out for that good, which, on account of the unity of nature, is in itself a good of the entire man. Hence the whole natural expansion moves towards it, or, in other words, the first spontaneous movement of the will is to grant what the senses desire. Synderesis follows instantly. This is man's spontaneous recognition, as a spiritual creature, of moral danger from which he shrinks. Only when the expansive movement of the whole nature is thus in action does the intellect form its judgment of the impossibility of conforming the enjoyment of this particular sensitive good with the higher good of man's last end; the necessary condition of a will in conflict with the sensitive appetite.

The too well-known power of the goods of the sensitive appetite over the intellectual nature has a two-fold origin. First, they are present, either actually so, or else virtually inasmuch as they belong to this present life and are proximately attainable. The true good of the intellectual nature is far away, attainable only as this life ends: the means to attain it, in themselves difficult and repulsive to the sensitive appetite, can be good only by participating in the goodness of that remote, shadowy good, the attainment of which is so uncertain. The second reason is still stronger, since it is drawn from the natural relations between sensuality and reason. The very first act of the intellect, without which no judgment is possible, is to abstract from the object of sensible apprehension all its individuating notes and qualities, so as to view the relation it bears in its essential nature to the moral law. But this is not enough. To form a sound practical judgment it must, as a rule, take up the individuating notes, viewing them also according to the conditions of the case in their relations to morals. The sensitive appetite knows nothing of all this. It seeks its satisfaction in these individuating notes the intellect must first abstract from and then judge. It clings to them, and the more closely it clings, the more difficult does abstraction become. Thus one is drawn to revenge some wrong. The presence of the injurer unsuspecting danger, his contented air, his prosperous appearance, all

the circumstances of his malice, the hatred these excite in the one injured, the goods one has lost, the favorable opportunity, the loaded pistol, these inflame the imagination urging on the sensitive appetite. From them the intellect can hardly abstract. Indeed to do so may be for the instant impossible. In that instant, then, the injured person is incapable of a human act. He is for the moment insane.

All this is the necessary condition of a composite nature, rational and animal. It is quite a mistake to make the warfare, so terribly one-sided, between flesh and spirit a consequence of Adam's fall. There are, it is true, accidental intensities occurring in the supernatural order. In itself the difficulty is natural, calling for a natural remedy. Let us see what this remedy must be.

The impediment is external only. Nothing is more certain than that the will remains in itself absolutely free. No creature can enter into its internal working to affect in the slightest degree its freedom of choice. God will not do so to diminish in the least the freedom of his creature. The difficulty lies in the exterior conditions. These are such as to obscure the concept of the supreme and only true good. To remedy this, God enlightens the understanding, illumines its object. They are such as to hamper the exercise of the free will by the excessive impetus of the sensitive appetite. God balances this by augmenting the more vigorous impulse of rational expansion to true good, consequent upon the greater light. And so we have our formula: "God enlightens the understanding and moves the will."

One may ask whether such aids would in the purely natural order be free gifts or something due? They certainly are not free gifts in the sense that actual grace in the supernatural order is a free gift. In the supernatural order everything is a free gift, since the very revival of the supernatural in fallen man is such; while in a merely natural order these would be demanded by the nature God created. Provided, however, that the aid sufficed to attain its end, God would be absolutely free to give it in greater measure or less. Since God is infinitely merciful and loving, superabundance would doubtless be the rule, and any superabundance would always be a free gift.

With this we conclude considerations of the highest moment in our study of God's operation in man. Nothing could be better calculated to keep in our minds the clear concept of Him the

Supreme Mover, Himself unmoved, moving all things sweetly; and to banish the strange idea springing from a too exclusive consideration of secondary causes, that God somehow after starting things, leaves them to themselves to do their work, only interfering, as the saying is, to prevent a catastrophe or to obtain some extraordinary end. Not only every perfect gift of the supernatural order, but every good gift of the natural, is in the strictest sense "from above, coming down from the Father of lights."

CHAPTER VI

PROVIDENCE IN PREVISION

"Clouds, winds, tempests, rains, lightnings, thunders, hailstorms, snow, and whatever from this damp and foggy air God wills to be made over the earth . . . You see what kind these things are, changeable, disordered, terrible, corruptible. Nevertheless they have their place, they have their order, even they in their own way fill up the beauty of the universe and so praise the Lord" . . . *St. Augustine Enarr. in Ps. cxlviii, 7.*

"All things lie under Divine Providence, not only collectively but also individually, as the following consideration makes clear. Since every agent acts for an end, the directing of effects to attain the end is co-extensive with the causality of the agent. Should anything appear in an agent's works not directed to the end, this would happen because that effect would come, outside the agent's intention, from another cause. But God's causality extends to all beings, since He is the prime agent as regards the beginnings, not only of species, but also of individuals, corruptible no less than incorruptible. Hence everything having being in what manner soever, is directed by God to the end" . . . *St. Thomas Summ. Theol. 1, xxii 20.*

"The providence of a universal provider differs from that of one whose care is confined to some particular thing. The latter excludes, as far as he can, defects from what is under his charge: the former allows some defects to happen in particular cases, lest the good of the entire body be impeded. Thus in nature corruption and failure are said to go counter to the individual nature. Nevertheless they are according to the plan of universal nature, in which the defect of the one turns to the good of another, or of the whole". . . *Ibid ad 2m.*

"Providence contains two elements, the determination of the order of things foreseen to attain the end, and the execution of such order. As regards the first, God provided immediately for all things, since He takes count in His intellect of all things, even the very least; and gives to whatever causes He designs for particular effects the power to produce them . . . Hence He must have had beforehand in His plan the order of such effects.

"With regard to the second, Divine Providence uses some means. God governs the lower by the higher, not indeed through any lack of ability to do otherwise, but through His excessive goodness, in order to communicate even to creatures the dignity of causality" . . . *Ibid 3, 0.*

"The immoveable and fixed order of Divine Providence consists in this, that what are foreseen by God all come about in the way wherein God foresees them, some necessarily from necessary causes, others contingently from contingent causes" . . . *Ibid 4, ad 1m et 2m.*

Providence is intimately connected with prudence. As far as the human virtue is concerned providence is held to be a part of prudence. Among all the parts of prudence providence is the chief

in its relative place, and noblest in its nature. Hence from it the virtue derives its name, prudence; *prudentia*, being but an abbreviation of providence, *providentia*.

Providence contains two elements; the foreseeing of the course of future events, and the procuring of its accomplishment. We do not altogether refuse it to men. A father may be said to show it in the care of his family. Still his foresight can be no more than conjectural; and the means he takes to bring it about are never fully efficacious, often quite the reverse. Hence we speak of *foresight* in men, reserving *providence* for God; so that even when we apply the adjective, *providential*, to human affairs, or define their acting by the adverb, *providentially*, we have in view God's care of his creatures, rather than any human foresight in bringing things about.

The reason is quite clear. God's prevision is absolutely perfect; His execution, absolutely adequate. Here we speak analogically. In the Divine vision there is no before or after. In His execution there is no succession. These belong to time. God sees all successions of time simultaneously in the indivisible instant of His eternity, which embraces in its infinite simplicity all possible durations indifferent to their variations of before and after. "All things are naked and open in His sight," says St. Paul. His execution follows the same law. By the one creative word spoken eternally all things are created in their real objective existence, whatever be their place and their appearing in the long processes of time. Nevertheless, considering that these differences of time and place, since they are realities, must have their foundation in that eternal present, to express that correspondence and that foundation we apply our feeble utterances of time analogously, for we can do no better, to express the mysteries of eternity.

Coming closer to our subject, we see that free choice implies the recognition of at least two practical alternatives. For freedom of election these are, to act or not to act. For freedom of specification they are, to do this or else to do that. We perceive too that for man in his progressive existence, the assertion of freedom implies three moments; the present moment, the moment proximately past and the moment proximately future. Let us consider two cases. I write and I might not be writing: I write and I might be reading. In these I regard primarily the moment proximately past, in which I need not have begun to write, or might have left

off writing, or might have begun to read, or changed to reading. I regard secondarily the moment proximately future, in which I may leave off writing or change to reading. But I regard in no way the present moment in which I am writing and can not be doing anything else. In every finite being there is an analogous succession; even in the angels for whom, though they pass from potency to act, there is no time. But what is inconceivable of the finite creature is just what we assert of God. In the everlasting *now*, He creates and might equally not create. Yet even in God there must be a real foundation for those relations in the term or object, of priority and succession, that enter into the very nature of choice. Hence, to express it in our imperfect way and to exclude every idea of any real progression, we use in discussing the elements of divine free choice, on which God's providence of prevision rests, the term, "priority of sign."

Here exact analysis is called for. To say that God chose this existing world, is to say that God knew intimately all possible worlds down to the very last detail of each; otherwise would be lacking the very perfection of freedom, full deliberation resting in full intelligence. To say that God knew intimately all possible worlds, is to say that He knew them either with or without the free creature. To know intimately all possible worlds, including the free creature, demands an absolutely perfect knowledge of all free acts of each possible creature, and the countless modifications of the course of each possible world arising from such free acts. To say that with this perfect knowledge God decreed the present world with all its moral evil, is to say that somehow God decreed the evil; since the world exists exactly as it is in virtue of that decree. Hence we distinguish the following order of signs:

In the first sign God knows all possible worlds, in general and merely as possible. This we call the science of simple apprehension.

In the second sign God knows in each possible world each possible rational creature with every kind of aid, natural and supernatural, and the free acts of each, should it actually exist. Thus He knows the complete course of every possible world down to its last detail. This we call the middle science.

In the third sign God decrees this present world, which He sees in His eternity, with all its concatenations of free acts existing in its whole course down to the last particular of the last moment of time. This we call the science of vision, the formal prevision of His Providence.

We shall consider each of these at some length. In the first place we must see in what possibility consists.

A common notion makes it depend upon the efficiency of the agent. To build a palace in a day is impossible, because we can not conceive any combination of material means and human ingenuity adequate to the task. We certainly do not mean that it is impossible in itself. In discussing possibility with regard to the Omnipotent, that notion must vanish. The question touches intrinsic possibility only, the possibility of things in themselves. That there is such possibility and impossibility is certain. That two and two make four and can not possibly make five, that the whole is greater than its part and that the part can never equal the whole, rests, not on any exterior efficiency, but on the interior realities of things.

There is no reality without God. He is the absolute Reality, the absolute Being. Nothing exists except it receive its finite relative being by participation from the infinite and absolute Being. Its intrinsic possibility is the possibility of such participation. We ask, for instance, is a dragon, a centaur, a mermaid really possible? Could man in this world be intelligent and yet not free? We may never quite satisfy ourselves. Between the really possible and the impossible there are for us many possibilities more or less doubtful. We can not in them get back to the very last criterion of possibility, the imitability of the Divine Being. This is known to God alone in the divine idea contemplating that imitability and in it the objective possibilities of creatures. With God, then, there can be no dubious possibilities. Inasmuch as His Divine Being is imitable, things are possible; inasmuch as the suggestion of imitability includes contradiction, things are impossible. But the imitability of the Divine Being is infinite. Hence the possible universes known to God are infinite in number.

But if the creature can really exist, only because in it can be imitated by participation the absolute reality of the Divine Being, there can be nothing in it that is not so participated. All its nature, all its faculties, all its operations have therefore, their primary reality in God. God, knowing Himself, utterly, adequately, by an act identical with Himself, knows them to the very last limit of their finite intelligibility. Knowing His participating omnipotence, He knows the full content of their participated powers, that is, the possible acts, not collectively only but distributively

also, of each individual. Knowing His participating omniscience, He knows their participated knowledge. Knowing His participating liberty, He knows the free act of each possible creature under every possible condition. Should the possible creature be supposed to exist under definite conditions, possible free acts become conditional realities dependent for their objective possibility, no less than before, upon the Divine Reality intimately known to God. Should John and Thomas meet will they quarrel? They may never meet. Yet should they do so, they will quarrel, or they will not. It depends on their free-will. They may be purely hypothetical. The free-will of each may be hypothetical. Still as realities they would be individual participations of the Divine Being. In that case, then, their free-wills would be individual participations of the Divine Free-Will. As possible individual participations of the Divine Being they are known to God in their individual natures, even in their hypothetical existence, because He knows all reality in Himself. He knows in the same way what each free act of their hypothetical wills would be, because He knows the infinite reality of His own Free-Will. Men see things that are. The wisest penetrate but imperfectly to *what* they are. Even for such God's perfect knowledge of all dependent, participated, relative being by His simple knowledge of His own independent, unparticipated, absolute Being, must remain a mystery insoluble. Yet it is clearly one of the things essential, not only to His wise Providence, but also to His substantial Knowledge, identical with Himself, which "calls the things that are not, as the things that are."

Some may imagine that to make the course of the free creature's acts depend upon the fact that it is a participation of the Divine Being, must destroy human liberty. Were it a participation of the Divine Being inasmuch as this is necessary, the objection would have its force. But this would go further than the objector would wish. It would make necessary not only the creative act, but this particular creation also. Again, if one would view the free creature as a participation of the Divine Being with freedom superadded as an extrinsic denomination, freedom would be but in name. If he be regarded as he really is, namely, as a participation of the Divine Being infinitely free, his being will be contingent on the Divine free-will; his operation will be specified by his own free choice. Lastly, should our formula be made to run thus:

God sees in His absolute Being what the possible creature would choose under any given conditions, because He sees what He Himself would choose in the same case, freedom certainly would perish. But the formula is absurdly impossible. Running as it should: Knowing substantially His absolute Being, God knows intimately its every participation; not only, therefore, the possible free creature and what in any given circumstances it *might* choose freely, but also its freedom *as such* and what it *would* choose freely; we have indeed a mystery. But then a mystery is something in itself certain beyond cavil, of which the adequate reason is beyond our comprehension.

Knowing intimately by His middle science all possible worlds containing the intelligent and free creature in infinite variety, with all the variety of helps He would in each of such worlds give the intelligent creature, enabling him to attain, each in his own degree, the perfection designed for him; knowing, moreover, adequately, what in each such possible world down to the last particular would be its course under the action of the free creature, He who numbers the hairs of the head and feeds the birds and clothes the lilies, having in His omniscience the full knowledge of all conditions arising from the exercise of freedom; chose freely to create the world that now exists. Given this existing world, we can find reasons enough for its existence. God created it to communicate His goodness, to manifest His glory, to open to the intelligent creature the reward of service. If it be asked why God chose this world in preference to all other possible worlds, we can only answer with the Apostle: "Who has known the mind of the Lord?" There is a reason. But it is buried in the infinite abyss of the Divine Essence.

In choosing this world God decrees its existence, not in general but in particular down to the last detail. By this decree creatures exist. No matter what instrumentality there be, generative or otherwise, this does not intervene between the creative word and the creature; since that word, in effecting the creature, effects simultaneously all the instrumentality of the instruments. In immediate obedience to this decree, therefore, each creature during the long course of time comes into being with its relation of creature to the Creator. But this brings about no corresponding relation in the Creator, making Him, as it were, more of a Creator than He was before. Even the decree itself induces no

real relation in God to the creature, since in God creation is the divine action which is the Essence Itself. Yet because without the creature God would not be Creator, it follows that we speak of creation in terms of the creature; and in its real relation to the Creator find a solid foundation for our notional distinctions in Him. Hence our use of the signs of before and after in the simple creative act. Thus teach St. Augustine and St. Thomas, saying, that names implying relation to creatures are predicated of God, not from eternity but with regard to the beginning of time.

In this way therefore, we speak of God's providence foreseeing in His decree of creation the whole course of the future world down to the last detail.

CHAPTER VII

PROVIDENCE IN EXECUTION

"The effect of any action whatsoever can be measured by its end, since the effect of operation is to reach the end. Of the government of the world the end is the essential good. All creatures tend to a participation in this and to its likeness. Wherefore, the effect of government can be taken in three ways. One point of view looks to the end itself. Thus the effect of government is one, to be made like the supreme good. From another point one may view the effect of government with regard to the things whereby the creature is brought to the likeness of the highest good. In this way there are in general two effects of government. The creature is made like to God in two respects, namely; inasmuch as God is good, and inasmuch as He leads others to good, so also the creature is good and so also leads others to good. Hence the two effects of government, the conservation of things in good and their movement towards good. From the third point of view may be considered the effects of government in the particular being. Thus considered they are beyond our power to enumerate." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 1, ciii, 4, 0.

"That God operates in everything whatsoever operating, some took to mean that in things no created virtue does anything, but that God alone operates all things immediately; for instance, that fire does not heat things, but God in the fire, and so they understood of all things else.

"This, however, is impossible. First, because thus the order of cause and caused would be withdrawn from things created. This would reach out beyond them to impotence in Him creating them; since the giving to the effect the power of acting is from the virtue of the agent. Second, because the operative powers found in things would have been allotted to them in vain, if by these they operated nothing; nay more, all things would seem in some way to exist in vain, were they to be deprived of their own operation; since all things exist in order to act. The imperfect is always for the more perfect. As, therefore, matter is for form, so form, the first act, is for operation, the second; and so operation is the end of the thing created. God, therefore, is to be understood as so operating in things, that things themselves have for all that their own operation.

"To see this clearly one must consider that, while there are four kinds of causes, *matter* is not a principle of action, but the subject receiving the action's effect. The *end*, however, and the *agent* and the *form* make up the principle of actions; but in certain order. For the first principle of action is the end, which moves the agent. In the second place comes the agent, in the third, the form of that which is applied by the agent to what is to be done, although the agent himself acts through his own form, as appears in the works of human skill. The artisan is moved to work by the end, which is the thing operated, say a box or a bed, and he applies to the action his axe, which cuts by its keenness. Thus in these three ways God operates in every operating being. In the first place He operates according to the manner of the end. For as every operation is on account of some good, true or apparent, (but nothing is or appears good otherwise than as it has by participation some likeness of the Supreme

Good, which is God), it follows that God Himself, as the end, is the cause of every operation whatsoever. In the second place one must consider that should many agents act in order together, the second always acts in virtue of the first. For the first agent moves the second to action; and in this way all things act in virtue of God Himself. In the third place one must consider that God not only moves things to act by applying the forms and virtues of things to operation (as the artisan also applies the axe to divide, though he sometimes does not give the axe its form), but that He also gives their forms to creatures acting and keeps them in being. Hence, not only is He the cause of actions inasmuch as He gives the form which is the principle of action (as the generating agent is called the cause of the movement of things heavy and light), but also, as the one conserving the forms and virtues of things; as the sun is termed the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and conserves light whereby colors are manifested. And because the form of a thing is within the thing, and so much the more, as it is understood to be near to the first form and is more universal; and because God is the exclusive cause in all things of universal being itself, which in all things is what is innermost; it follows that God is the inmost worker in all. For this reason the operations of nature are in Scripture attributed to God according to the text (Job. x, ii.): 'Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh; Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.' *Ibid.* cv. 5, 0.

"As the intellect is moved by its object and by Him who gave the power of understanding, so the will is moved by its object, good, and by Him who causes the power of willing. The will can be moved by any good, but not efficaciously except by God . . . He alone fills the will and moves it sufficiently as its object. The power of willing is caused by God alone. To will is nothing else than a certain inclination of the will to its object, which is universal good. To incline to universal good is the function of the prime mover. Hence God moves the will both ways; principally by inclining it intensely." *Ibid* 4, 0.

"He moves with hidden power His universal creature; and while angels obey His orders, while the constellations fulfil their courses, while the winds rise and fall, while the ocean tosses in billows that swell and subside under the blast, while green things sprout and run to seed, while beasts are born and lead their lives according to their various appetites, while the wicked are allowed to trouble the just; the universe, revolved by Him, unrolls the ages which He had placed in it, as it were, rolled up, when first it was created. Yet these, nevertheless, it would not unroll into its own courses, should He cease to administer by His provident movement those other things which he has created." *St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Litteram*, v. 41.

We have seen in the decree for the creation of this present world God's Providence as a *foreseeing*. We shall view in His administration of the world that same Providence in its execution. In creating God is the sole Cause. In administration He is every where the Principal Cause moving the creature proximately as His instrument.

It will help much to a clearer understanding, to observe the difference between the Heavenly Artificer and His earthly analogue. The latter begins with a general intention to make a

certain complicated work, say a calculating machine. He then prepares a tentative design. Pondering over this for days or weeks, he finds some elements to be useless; others, inefficient; others, capable of improvement. At length he has a provisional plan. Then comes the selection of materials, the manufacture of parts, during the whole process of construction there is a constant modification of plan, a closer adaptation of means. In God on the other hand, there is no distinction between the planning of creation in its decree, and the execution of the plan. The distinction is simple and purely between the creature to exist, and the creature existing. Hence not the smallest element can be omitted in the plan, to be supplied afterwards in the execution; nor can anything in the plan, however, apparently insignificant, be passed over in the carrying of it into effect.

This must be clear if we but recall how, in choosing the world, God knew it among all possible worlds most completely down to its last particular. He knew its course made up of the necessary acts of irrational creatures, the free acts of men using them this way or that, the free acts of men among themselves, the special helps to right action to be used by each individual human being, or to be abused. All these and all their multitudinous effects, the necessary effects of necessary causes, the free effects of free agents, the dependence of the necessary causes on the free agents using them, to us a perplexed and utterly perplexing web, lay clear and open in His sight. Why God preferred this world to all others, we can never know. The reason is buried eternally in the infinite profundity of the Godhead. What the end is of the world He freely called into being, we do know. It is that, participating in His Being, His Goodness and His Truth, it might glorify Him with that predetermined glory which this definite participation of a definite creature implies. It must in its existence shadow forth the Supreme Good. It must in its course lead others to good. In its individual activities it must work out to the last particular the process of good foreseen in the decree of creation. In God the direction of the creature to the fulfilment of its course is Providence in execution, or the Divine Government of the world. In the world governed and directed it is the operation of the Creator in the creature.

Operating in His creature, God operates proximately and directly. For Him of whose work the term only is in time, whose

operation is eternally in that *now* which, embracing eminently all times, is indifferent to any particular time, the remote causality favored by modern science is impossible. "In Him we live and move and are" is no hyperbole but a formula rigidly exact. The Participator of all good, He is, as we have seen, the term of each created nature's movement to its specific good. But, again, as the Participator of all good He is the "Life-giving Lord." The First Principle of that movement which in every living creature is its vitality, in all, animate or inanimate, their essential activity, He is the Prime Mover in all operation; conserving that life which is His creature, moving it in all its vital action.

There can be no doubt on the subject. All operation terminates in *something*, in *reality*, in *being*. The creature may specify being, may determine it in time, place, relation. But being itself, this no creature can effect. Most universal, the very innermost reality of things, it is effected by the Creator only. Even the very acts of the creature determining and specifying and establishing relations, are beings, and as such are the effects of the Creator's operation: "In Him we live and move and *are*." And so the unrolling of the world's time is but the movement of the things of time determined by the Creator's decree "in measure, number and weight"; moved by Him, each in its own appointed time and place, until the sum of creatures and their movements shall be accomplished and time shall be no more.

This is but an inadequate expression of the execution of Divine Providence, of God's government of His world, of what the great theologians put on an equal footing with the origin of the world; making administration and creation equally the operation of Omnipotence, so that indistinguishable in the Creator, they are distinguishable in the creature, only as the continuance of an act is distinguished from its beginning. Hence St. Augustine never wearied of repeating as its formula Our Lord's words: "My Father worketh hitherto and I work." That is to say: God's sabbath of rest in which He ended the work of creation was the beginning of the work of administration whereby the world begun was to be carried to its appointed end. In the light of such doctrine Our Lord's words, "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father": "God feeds the birds and clothes the lilies"; "The very hairs of your head are numbered"; for even some Christians a somewhat extravagant exaggeration, are seen to be rigorously

exact; while the Psalmist's: "Who covereth the heavens with clouds and prepareth rain for the earth; who maketh grass to grow in the mountains and herbs for the service of men; who giveth to beasts their food, and to the young ravens that call on Him"; which the modern mind would transfer to the region of poetry, remain firmly fixed in dogmatic truth.

But this seems to land us in a difficulty. The evil of this world is as much an element of its existence, as the good. The treason of Judas enters into its course no less than the conversion of St. Paul. Nero and Diocletian are as much a part and parcel of it, as Alfred and Charlemagne. Having chosen and decreed the world with its Judases, Neros, Diocletians, as well as its Pauls, Alfreds, Charlemagnes, God so administers it, as to bring about the former with their villanies and the latter with their good deeds. St. Thomas is express on this point. God is the principal cause of the whole course of the world, applying, as instruments to work out His end, creatures, to which He gives forms, that is specific activities, and which He conserves in being. God is the principal cause of the discovery of America and of all that followed; of the heroism of missionaries and the salvation of a countless number of heathen; of the extirpation of the natives of the Antilles and of all the bloodshed by land and sea, of which the New World was the scene. "I am the Lord, there is none else. I form the light and create darkness. I make peace and create evil. I, the Lord, that do all these things." (Isa. xlv. 6.7.) Whether the action be orderly, or whether it be disorderly, there is a very definite sense in which God is the cause; and, if a cause, necessarily the principal.

It could not be otherwise. God must be supreme in his creation. We recognize His Providence both in the good and in the wicked. So Job made no distinction between the fire of God consuming his flock, the desert wind destroying his children, and the robber bands of Sabeans and Chaldeans carrying off his cattle. To the one cause he attributed all his ruin. "The Lord gave, the Lord has taken away. Blessed be the name of the Lord." Any other supposition includes the impossible, making God powerless against evil.

Here some would jump to the conclusion that God is responsible for moral evil. He brings it about, and man can not resist Him. Should they do so, they would make a sad mistake. God

brings about moral evil, in exactly the same way, neither more nor less, as He chooses it; for, as we have seen, His providential administration corresponds absolutely to His providential choice, in which His prevision consists. In the first place, He chose this existing order directly as a whole, for a reason of infinite wisdom, buried in the secret of His Divine Essence; and in choosing it, He chose indirectly each element, whether good or evil, of which it is made up. "Secondly, the choice of particular goods, though indirect, is a positive intention of the Divine will, accompanied with the positive grant of the aids suitable to attain each. The choice of evil is more complex. It is in itself negative, a mere permission. It is accompanied with the grant of sufficient aids positively intended to prevent the evil. It is conditional therefore. By middle science God sees that should this world exist, mankind will freely fulfil the conditions of a certain series of evil deeds. Decreeing the world, He decrees the conditions and tolerates their free fulfilment. Let us elucidate this by our fundamental doctrine.

In creating the world God impresses on it and on every creature in particular the universal movement to the good of its nature, a movement in the living creature, vital, concomitant with its life. This universal movement is specified in presence of particular goods, according to the nature of the subject. In man it is by free choice, whereby he elects to be carried by this movement of his nature towards one object; and consequently ceases to be moved towards others inconsistent with it. This suffices for freedom of action as viewed from the merely physical stand-point.

For moral freedom in the natural order more is required. If man is to use effectively present goods to attain his last end, he must be able, under whatever conditions he is placed, not only physically but also morally, to subordinate the movement of concupiscence to the voluntariness of a well-ordered will. This means that not only in each case taken distributively he will make a free choice, but that a good free choice shall also be rendered sufficiently easy, so that, considering the frailty of human nature, one may reasonably hope that the whole course of his actions taken collectively will be such as to conform to the Creator's law. For this in each crucial moment a special light would be needed to dispel the obscurities of passion. That, however, would not suffice. Concupiscence is already inclining the will; the will needs an impulse in the opposite direction, if concupiscence is to be habit-

ually controlled. This aid God will give; a light to discern the true good; an impulse towards it. If man rejects the sufficient aid, his destruction is from himself. He frustrates God's positive work for good.

We do not at this point enter the supernatural order. We shall see hereafter that in it the special aid of actual grace is absolutely necessary for the least supernatural act. In the natural order such would not have been the case. Aid would have been given according to need; and need would have varied according to individual conditions of age, temperament, circumstances of life, in which external temptations and occasions of sin would have been more frequent or less. But in many of the occasions of daily life the light of reason, elevated to that natural instinctive insight into right and wrong, called by St. Jerome and those following him, *synderesis*, with acquired virtue would have sufficed, as a rule, to establish one in that moral freedom which the observance of the natural law supposes.

Hence into the order of providence helps for the rational creature would have necessarily entered, efficacious in themselves, given with a real will for their efficacious use, specified in their number and degree for each individual according to his need. Such would not necessitate the recipient. Their actual efficacy would depend on his acceptance. The universal tendency to good can be necessitated only by present universal good. Man therefore would have remained free to specify his natural universal appetite, to move freely to any specification of that appetite.

Were the world restricted to the irrational creature, its providential administration would be a simple affair. Its individual elements, determined in measure, number and weight, moved by the necessitating law imposed upon their natures by the Creator, would work out the accomplishment of the divine plan. Now that God has placed over the works of His hands the free creature, man, the case is different. By the exercise of human freedom reaching out through the entire creation, the process of the world is modified continually. There is not one, however obscure, whose free act is not without its effect, mediate or immediate, on the course of things. For instance, had Charles Bonaparte, not married Letitia Ramolino, the history of the world from the end of the eighteenth century would have been very different. Similarly, what an influence on mankind had the parents of Julius Caesar,

and of other such characters. But we must remember that, like every other child of Adam, Napoleon Bonaparte was the result of a succession of marriages. Had any one been omitted, there would have been no Napoleon. And each of these depended on an immense number of little casual free acts. Had one or other done this or omitted that, the future husband and wife would not have met, or meeting, would not have been mutually attracted. What free acts of parents and others delayed or hastened their union! On how many did their lives depend and that of the child, and so on! As we view the world in the execution of God's providence, it appears that it is being continually turned from its natural course by the free acts of man. It is following, say this definite line today; what direction it will have tomorrow depends on free acts that the rest of men cannot, and God Himself will not control.

Yet this is but a very superficial view. In choosing this world, God knew it among all possible worlds most completely down to its last particular. Its course, made up of the necessary acts of irrational creatures, of the free acts of men using them this way or that, of the free acts of men among themselves, of the special helps to right action to be used or abused by man, lay clear and open in God's sight. He knew the course of the world because so it would be. His fore-knowledge was in no way its cause. This was man's free-will, which in its moral exercise belongs to him alone.

We may not omit another element in Divine Providence of supreme importance. Man's highest prudence consists, as a rule, in conjecturing the future, in foreseeing probable evil and doing what he can to prevent it. His intimate consciousness of this is not the least reason of his frequent question: If God foresees the coming evil, why does He not prevent it? Yet there are cases in which the prudent man permits the evil he foresees, because from it he will be able to draw a greater and a lasting good. Such cases occur especially in parental government. They are recognized as of a higher order than ordinary preventive prudence; though, like this, they can not be more than conjectural in their results.

Now what in human prudence is occasional, enters into the very essence of Divine Providence. To be bound in any way to frustrate the free-will of His creature would be in God an impossible servitude to man, generated by His perfect fore-knowledge, binding Him more strictly according as human malice should be

greater. To Him therefore belongs, not prudence, but the noblest providence which alone is consonant with His infinite perfections. Into every possible world, seen by Him as a term capable through the free creature of imitating His free Being, of attaining freely to the True and the Good, enters such a distribution of aids to the right exercise of free will, as has for its norm the bringing of good out of every occurring evil whatsoever. Thus each, not conjecturally but definitely, would in its course be for every rational creature therein a means, constant and efficacious, of ultimate good; and in its term would attain that good in which it would set forth the Divine Goodness and Truth.

We may express, if not adequately, at least intelligibly, the difference between human prudence and Divine Providence. In the former the good to be obtained is contingent, partial and conjectural. Hence circumstances, so uncertain as to be called chance, have the first word, and the last. In the latter, the good is necessary, full and certain, the word, both first and last, being with God.

The execution, therefore, of God's Providence includes necessarily the bringing about of the conditions of a good choice, in which men will exercise their free-will, whether well or ill. It includes the evil exercise in exactly the same way as it was decreed, namely, permissively and concomitantly, not exclusively and formally. Such an exercise, though wrong in itself, God in His Providence turns in its effects to good, according as men will use them. The sin of the robber demonstrates to the one robbed the uncertainty of material goods; that of the persecutor of Christians is for his victims the opportunity of heroic virtue. Thus in its execution God's Providence carries all things to their final end, the ultimate good, according to the relation borne to the Supreme Good by the world chosen to exist, and existing by the creative decree.

In the article quoted in the beginning of this chapter (cv.5) St. Thomas puts an objection, limiting, very much in the way of modern notions, God's operation in His creature. He says: "If God is the cause of the creature's operation, it is because He gives it the power of operating. But this he does from the beginning, when He makes the thing. Whence it seems that He has no further operation in the operating creature." His answer is brief. "God not only gives forms to things," that is, brings them into existence, "but He also conserves them in being, applies them

to action, and is the end of all their acts"; that is, He operates in them as long as they exist and act. From what we have said, there can be no difficulty regarding the final cause. God has created all things to return to Himself. He carries them back to Himself in the execution of His Providence. The difficulty lies in the words: "He applies them to action."

To attempt a purely figurative explanation would take us away from their true sense. St. Thomas uses them so literally, as to compare God operating in the creature to the carpenter cutting wood with the axe. God is the principal cause. The creature is but the instrument. Indeed an adequate concept of Providence in its execution excludes any other idea. To grasp the Saint's sense we must see the difference between the mutual relation of a man and his instrument, and the unilateral relation of instrumental causes to God.

Man uses instruments to supply his natural deficiencies. He conceives many operations, most ingenious and complicated, calling for instruments of various kinds, and often contrived most skilfully: his mere hands are inadequate to any but the simplest. God employs instruments because such is His will. In so doing He honors the instrument, and effects an admirable order among creatures that manifests His glory exteriorly. But there is not an effect among creatures which God could not have performed by His single creative word alone.

The human agent may give its form to his instrument, though he does not always do so. He never gives it fully and completely. The carpenter sharpens his axe, giving it the proper cutting edge. He might as a blacksmith have forged it also. But he could not give iron the power of becoming steel by the assimilation of carbon; nor to the steel the capacity of developing various qualities according to different processes of tempering. Nor could he effect in matter the substantial form of iron. All these are the work of creation only. The Creator forms His instruments completely giving to each its full instrumental capacity. The human agent, but partially and imperfectly.

The human agent consumes his instrument in the using. He may be able to restore its efficiency from time to time, as the carpenter does when he sharpens his tools. But he can not prevent the waste of substance in use; the very restoring of efficiency means further waste. God, who creates His instruments con-

serves them by the same creative word, as long as, in His Providence, He wills to use them.

To man the instrument gives its own special efficiency; and upon this efficiency man so depends, that without it he would be absolutely helpless. He directs the instrument in the work, so that agent and instrument, according to the proper efficiency of each, constitute one composite efficient cause. God gives His instrument all its efficiency. He does so absolutely; since whatever it is in itself, whatever efficiency is in it, all inasmuch as *real*, as *being*, God alone effects. In using his instrument He gives it all its efficiency. Suppose, by impossibility, God laying aside an instrument and an angel taking it up. The instrumental efficiency would be there no longer. Apart from the Creator, the creature is impotent. Hence God and the instrument are one efficient cause, not composite but simple. The instrument has no efficiency of its own. It gives none to its Creator. The operation is creative. Its term is a creature effected by the word, once spoken, whereby all things were created. The instrumentality of secondary causes is real. The creature existing through it is really distinct from one existing without it. The adequate operation whereby the former exists is modally distinct from that originating the latter. Yet, notwithstanding the foundation thus given, the distinction between the Creator operating without instruments and the Creator using the instrumentality of creatures is only notional. By our nature we rest in things visible, and observe their visible operations. We speak of what we see and we see only instrumental and secondary causes. This for us, who as yet have not attained to the beatific vision of God operating in His creature, is a necessity. Though an imperfect knowledge, it involves no error. It is truth limited to the condition of those who, walking by faith, can but see as through a glass in a dark manner. If, however, we forget St. Augustine's formula: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," and St. Paul's: "God is not far from any one of us. In Him we live and move and are"; if we begin to attend too exclusively to the visible creature, to talk of "permanent instruments" implying as its correlative a remote Creator, and to make a real distinction between creation in the roots of times and its daily terminating in the processes of times; then we have begun to wander out of the *way*, to miss the *truth*, which binding together indissolubly the Creator and the creature, is the very *life* itself.

Finally in all the activity of the world working out to the end of its creation, God applies His instruments to action. This follows necessarily from the fact that the world is God's creature created by Him, not to work aimlessly, but for a definite end; so that each creature in the world is His instrument working in virtue of its instrumentality. It can not be explained better than by repeating, St. Augustine's words quoted in the beginning of this chapter: "He moves with hidden power the universal creature; and while angels obey His orders, while the constellations fulfil their courses, while the winds rise and fall, while the ocean tosses in billows that swell and subside under the blast, while green things sprout and run to seed, while beasts are born and lead their lives according to their various appetites, while the wicked are allowed to trouble the just; the universe, revolved by Him, unrolls the ages He had placed in it, as it were, rolled up, when first it was created. Yet these, nevertheless, it would not unroll into its own courses, should He cease to administer by His provident movement those other things which He has created."

Not a little obscurity in this matter arises from the fact that in speaking of God as applying creatures to act, we instinctively recur to the artisan using his tools, or to the ploughman directing his team, forgetful of the warning of St. Thomas, that all such extrinsic applications by creatures include violence. Thus, speaking of the world in general, and using his frequent illustration of the archer, he says: "The natural necessity inherent in things which are determined to one, is a certain impression given by God directing them to their end, as the necessity whereby the arrow is carried to its mark is an impression coming not from the arrow, but from the archer. But there is this difference. What creatures receive, is their nature. Hence it demonstrates, not merely direction, but the government of divine providence." (*Summ. Theol.* 1, ciii, 1, ad 3m.) Here he answers an objection that, so far as irrational creation is concerned, it would suffice to start the world going. He answers that the objection might hold if the world moved to the end by a mere impulse in a definite direction. But as its movement is its nature it demands from the Creator all that nature implies; and, as we have seen, apart from the Creator there is neither existence nor persistence in being, nor operation, nor any movement. He is the Prime Mover, moving all things to Himself.

As God moves man's will by giving the form itself with its essential inclination to universal good, and by being Himself the Universal Good, its adequate object, it follows clearly that the application coming between the form and the object can be no other than the disposition of His providence, whereby exterior things, interior illuminations and impulses so conspire, as to enable man by his free nature, not by compulsion, to attain to the Supreme Good.

On the other hand, we must not imagine God as working out a preconceived plan mechanically, as a builder executes the architect's plan with its defects as well as its perfections. All that is in the most skilful artificer enabling him to perfect his design in the process of its execution, is found eminently in God decreeing the universe in that degree of perfection which in His infinite wisdom He chose for it. Moreover, as we can not know the intimate reason why God chose this particular universe, we can not grasp the full meaning of the order He decreed for it. We know, nevertheless, that this order contains high designs for the good of his creature to be infallibly brought about by the disposition of that movement whereby, as Prime Mover of all, He moves providentially all things. Thus we read: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will, He shall turn it." (*Prov.* xxi, 1.)

So far we have been dealing with the natural order. Having in the decree of creation decreed to raise man gratuitously to the supernatural order, God added to His natural providence, not as a part, nor as its complement, but as a supplement, His supernatural providence of grace. In this the fall and restoration of man brought about the Incarnation, and with it the institution of the Church as the means whereby men should gain that restoration. This in turn had to be demonstrated. Wherefore God granted in His supernatural providence the miracle, the link between the natural and the supernatural.

CHAPTER VIII

MIRACLES

"Even in corporeal agents we see that movements impressed on inferior bodies by superior are neither violent nor contrary to nature, although they do not appear to agree with the natural movement which the inferior body has according to the particular nature of its form. For, though the natural movement of water is in one direction only, to the middle, we do not call the ebb and flow of the tide a violent movement, since it is from the impression of the heavenly body. With much greater reason, anything done in nature by God can not be called violent or contrary to nature.

"Moreover all creatures are compared to God as the products of art to the artificer; wherefore all nature is as a work of the divine art. Should an artist, even after giving the first form to his work, operate in it otherwise another effect, this would not be contrary to its nature. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature, if in natural things God works something otherwise than is in the customary course of nature.

"Hence Augustine says: 'God, the Creator and Author of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature. For what He, from whom is every mode, number and order of nature, does to anything is natural to it.' " *St. Thomas, Cont. Gent.* iii, 100.

"Among the kinds of movement, a certain natural order is observed. For of movements the first is local movement, and it is consequently the cause of the others. In every class of things the first is found to be the cause of all that follow in that class. But every effect produced in these lower things is necessarily the result of some generation or change. Hence if it be the work of some incorporeal agent incapable of movement strictly local, it must come through something moved locally. But effects produced by incorporeal agents using corporeal instruments, are not miraculous; for bodies do not work otherwise than naturally. Wherefore, created incorporeal substances can not by their own power work miracles, much less corporeal substances, every action of which is natural. Therefore it belongs to God alone. For as the order embracing all things flows entirely from his Providence, so He alone is above that order. Besides, since His power is altogether infinite, it is neither determined to any special effect, nor to the production of its effect in any determined manner or order.

"Hence of God is said: 'Who alone does great wonders.' (*Ps.* cxxxv, 4.)" *Ibid.* 102.

Before entering on any discussion we must get rid of false notions and expressions, containing a very begging of the question of the possibility or of the cognoscibility of miracles.

In the first place we find a false concept of the laws of nature and an exaggerated idea of their necessity. Law is a relative term. On one side its correlative is the lawgiver; on the other,

those bound by his law. Law is an ordinance of reason for the common good made and promulgated by him who has charge of the entire social order. It is an ordination, not a precept. Its scope is general and permanent, not individual and momentary. But it is far from the universality and necessity imagined for nature's law by Pantheism and its developments of today. In such systems Nature is conceived as a sort of person, working necessarily through blind forces towards its perfection never to be actually attained. To man in his ignorance it is assumed to exhibit only phenomena occurring and recurring. As every notion of a lawgiver has been cast aside, occurrence and recurrence follow a blind necessity admitting no exception. This necessity is by an abuse called a law. To it is added a reflex abuse. The idea of absolute necessity becomes identified with absolute supremacy. This is transferred from the physical to the moral, social order. Here absolute supremacy finds a correlative, unquestioning obligation. Thus the notion of law—an ordinance for the common good is everywhere perverted into blind force, submission to which is inevitable.

To come back to saner ideas. Law supposes an intelligent lawgiver caring for the common good. The law manifests his rational will for the common good. As such it commends itself to the rational wills of his subjects, uniting all wills by the rational force of moral obligation, the very bond of human society. Thus legislators and subjects alike understand the end of all legislation to be the common good. But they also understand that any ordinance indicating the course to be followed under ordinary conditions by people in general during an undefined future, can not cover all possible conditions of times, places and persons. Exceptional cases must arise, in which the rigid application of the law would be undesirable, cases even in which might be verified the adage: *summum jus, summa injuria*. There must be a way of saving the common good outside the law, not contradicting the law. It is found in the dispensing power.

This power, the perfection of social order demands; since any deficiency in the protection of individual right, any personal wrong permitted, however small, is a deflection from the common good. To keep this in mind is the more important, because in civil society today the formal recognition of a dispensing power is practically extinct. We say *the formal recognition*, because the thing itself,

so necessary for the intelligent administration of social authority, exists, as a moment's reflection will show. Of laws based purely on public utility, nowhere is there a hard and fast execution. Where execution is more rigid, the positive law is bound up with the overpowering authority of the moral law. The formal recognition of the dispensing power is extinct, not as is commonly supposed, because dispensation is immoral, but for lack of its necessary condition. This, hardly found today, is that the legislative power must be concentrated in one person. Only one with full authority over the law, can dispense from the law. Today in view of a good otherwise unattainable, legislative power is divided. The executive and the judicial authorities have in it each their part with the legislative. Dispensation, however desirable in itself, becomes therefore impossible.

Upon this question; where was the subject of legislative authority? turned the whole dispute between the Parliament of England and the Stuart Kings. Was the law the King's law, or the Parliament's law, or the law of Parliament and King? The Stuarts exaggerated royal prerogative. Nevertheless to represent them as tyrants planning the destruction of constitutional liberties, would be unworthy of one of ordinary reading and culture. The question was really complex. Much was to be said for either side; the solution should have included much distinction. The final crisis came under James II, who sought to relieve his fellow-Catholics from undoubted wrongs. He could not repeal the unjust laws, because he could not control Parliament. He therefore took the way of dispensation. All legal tradition ran in favor of the view that the law was exclusively the King's; and consequently, that he could dispense from it. The judges supported that view; and to pretend that they did so otherwise than sincerely, requires more assumption than can fairly be made. However, Parliament triumphed. Everywhere now the partition of legislative power prevails. In civil society the dispensing power is, at best, a memory; more commonly, a by-word. Men remember it without regret. Rightly or wrongly they think its abuse would far outweigh the good to be derived from it.

This they do the more easily, because the dispensing power is not an intrinsic perfection of legislative authority, but an extrinsic consequence. Legislation terminates in the law, universal in its nature. Its act does not advert to dispensations. It is perfect in

itself without reference to them. The power of dispensation comes as a consequence, not of the law, but of the conditions of those under the law. The law is general in its expression. To conceive it as running; "This must be done or that omitted, except in cases of legitimate dispensation," would be destructive of the very essence of law. Hence the dispensation is not the *complement* of the law, but its *supplement*. It does not fill out the law to its perfect dimensions; but takes from under a law intrinsically active and complete, certain cases in which its rigid application would be less conducive to the common good. We can illustrate from Geometry. The right angle is viewed as the perfection of its kind. A complementary angle perfects one less than 90° , by bringing it up to that perfection. This notion we must exclude from the relation between the legislative and the dispensing power. A supplementary angle would bring it to 180° . Any line, therefore, through the apex and lying between one containing line and the production of the other is subject to the law of angularity of the original angle. Once it coincides with the line produced it is outside such subjection. The original angle remains unchanged. The supplementary angle now formed does not touch its intrinsic perfection. Yet by forming that angle the line drawn passes out of its relation to the original angle. This is our idea of the dispensing power. It does not affect the universal force of the law. It but withdraws from its applicability a particular case, which the common good removes from its sphere; and in so doing affirms the universality of the law.

We said that the dispensing power is a consequence, not of the law but of the conditions of those under the law. When such are relatively few in number, living under virtually the same conditions of time and place, touched by the law in but one element of their complex life—the usual status of the subjects of modern law—there is hardly place for dispensation. When laws reach out to multitudes in different times, of various civilization, in every variety of climate, to touch them in all that makes up human life, there must be the dispensing power. This is why its exercise is so common in the Catholic Church, testifying, not to any defect in the law, but to the supreme perfection of its qualities as a universal law.

A dispensation is a legitimate relaxation in some particular case of the obligation arising from law. In the order of Divine Providence the miracle is its analogue. Natural laws are the con-

stant will of the Creator imposed upon His universal creature for the common good of all. A miracle withdraws from the law some particular case, wherein the universal good is thus according to God's wisdom, attained more perfectly. Clearly the power of the Supreme Lawgiver to dispense from His law, and the fact that such dispensations are wise and holy, can not be called in question.

Certain physicists who have got rid of the logical idea of the infinite Creator, who have replaced Him with the utterly illogical phantasm of monistic evolution, and have paid the penalty of their folly in forfeiting their power of purely intellectual concept, vociferate that such an idea of natural law is in their jargon "unthinkable." Material atoms not inevitably bound by the law of universal attraction are, they cry, unthinkable. That a moving body could be suddenly stopped without generating a definite heat proportional to its mass and its velocity, is, they exclaim, unthinkable. That one solid body should pass through another is, they are sure, unthinkable; and so on. The fact is, that the wisest of such men know nothing of the intimate nature of attraction, heat, resistance. Having formed in their imagination a material image, which they fancy to be a concept, whatever disarranges it is unthinkable. The result of their presumptuous declamation is the introduction into common speech of terms that prejudice the public mind against the miraculous. The miracle is called an "interference" with the laws of nature, an "infringement," even a "violation" of the law. Such language, a mere begging of the question at issue, is condemned by St. Thomas in the first passage at the head of this chapter.

Again we are told that whatever excites wonder is for the untutored mind a miracle. This from the etymological point of view is true; and so, though not entirely untutored, we speak of miracles of genius. The dome of St. Peter's is a miracle. So is the "human fly" who mounts the wall. Those averse to acknowledging the reality of miracles in the theological sense, become eloquent over the savage wondering at the sight of white men, at their ships, their guns, their horses. How the dark ages, they exclaim, would have been astonished at railways, steamships, automobiles, flying machines, phonographs, telephones, radiographs, moving pictures. Hence the obvious conclusion that as all these, miracles to the uninitiated, far from being exceptions to natural laws, are the results of a more perfect knowledge of them, so what

Christianity has accepted as miraculous, was nothing more than the application of a knowledge of nature beyond the ordinary attainment of men. When to this a few jocose remarks are added concerning Friar Bacon, Doctor Faustus, and Albertus Magnus, the case against miracles is held to be established.

Yet the argument rests on an unjustifiable assumption and a logical blunder. The assumption is, that the man of the middle ages and the savage could so far forget their very nature, as to remain in a stupid astonishment, instead of looking for the causes of such remarkable effects. Experience of savage tribes teaches that they are very quick in getting over their wonder and in accepting its object as a work of human ingenuity. Whence we may conclude that men of the dark ages, which were not so dark after all, would not have been less ready to do so. The blunder ignores the first rule of the convertibility of propositions. A miracle is indeed something wonderful; but not everything wonderful is strictly a miracle. A horse is an animal; but not every animal is a horse. Had men on the day of Pentecost heard a number of phonographs speaking, one Greek, another Latin, a third Syriac, a fourth Chaldean, and so on, they would surely have wondered; and they wondered when St. Peter's words came to each in his own language. Had the Apostles seen a man in an air-plane flying over Olivet, they would have wondered; and they wondered as Our Lord rose spontaneously into the upper air. The savage wonders as an apparently harmless stick vomits fire with a loud report and his comrade falls dead beside him; and the bystanders wondered as Ananias fell dead at St. Peter's word. But in each pair of cases the wondering would differ essentially, as the causes would be essentially distinct. In the mere mechanism the means used would be recognized as natural, though the wisdom applying them would astonish; in the strict miracle the witnesses found themselves outside the bounds of nature, when they saw done directly without any intervening aid, what universal consciousness testified to be beyond human power. Moreover the assailant of miracles forgets conveniently that those through whom were worked the greatest miracles, were those who had no opportunity of acquiring that deep insight into the secrets of nature which his theory supposes.

So far was the savage or the man of the middle ages from confounding the idea of a wonder merely natural with that of a miracle, that between those both had a very clear notion of magic.

One may interrupt me to say that the savage never got beyond that point. This may be true. No one reaches the idea of a miracle purely *a priori*. Miracles are closely connected with revelation. Both are bound up with a supernatural providence. It is safe to say that even the philosophic mind never reached the idea of a miracle through pure reason. But neither providence, revelation nor miracle is unintelligible. Announce the revelation as coming from God, work the miracle in God's name to confirm it, and the savage will comprehend perfectly. There is the natural use of natural means, whereby the wise can do what others can not do. There is the preternatural use of natural means, whereby the magician aided by invisible spirits can produce effects otherwise impossible to men. There is the supernatural act, producing without any necessary use of means, whether preternatural or natural, effects in nature above any possibility of created nature. Each is of a different order. They are perfectly distinguishable. The savage distinguishes the first and the second perfectly. In the third he recognizes something new, the effect of neither human intelligence nor of magic; and so he forms the *a posteriori* concept of a miracle. Superior intelligence made him wonder. Magic begat fear. The miracle wins confidence. He accepts it as the proof of the divine mission of one calling on him to change his life; to renounce the superstitions in which magic held him captive, that so, emancipated from the slavery of devils, he may enter into the liberty of the sons of God.

Let us go back to a couple of our examples. Had there been on Pentecost twenty phonographs, and had the multitude watched the whole process of winding up, selecting the disc, adjusting the needle, setting the machine going, they would have wondered at the wisdom contriving such a machine, but they would not necessarily have presumed magic. Had all preparations been made beforehand, the machinery so covered as to seem only a row of boxes, from which at St. Peter's bidding should have proceeded connected speech in divers tongues, they would have asserted magic; and, perhaps, have concerted the means to propitiate the demon and his agent. When a single man speaking in his own language was heard by the men of twenty different countries in the language of each, the bounds of nature were passed. The creature recognized the Creator. So a savage seeing for the first time a gun go off and a comrade dead at his side, would think it

an instrument of powerful magic. Having watched the process of loading and firing, and having found the bullet in his comrade's corpse, the notion of magic would be replaced by that of superior wisdom. But that a man, rebuked in the name of the supreme God, falls dead, and his wife after him in the same way, is seen to be neither wisdom nor magic, but something higher, essentially different, a supernatural effect.

Another reason alleged for not accepting the miraculous is that we do not know the full extent of natural powers. It is an argument of great utility, since it is urged also to justify incredulity regarding magic, which today takes the form of spiritualism or psychic action. It is specious enough. It so lends itself to oratorical amplification as to hide its futility. Yet everyone can see that to know the limits of a thing is very different from the knowledge of its contents, the real point in the objector's mind. The former is one of the commonest objects of knowledge; the latter, one of the rarest. It is much easier to bound the United States, than to enumerate the States themselves. I do not know how many pounds I can lift; but I know very well how many I can not. I do not know the full extent of the vagaries of any human will; nevertheless I am not going to meet all the trains arriving today, because my wealthy aunt may take it into her head to pay me a visit. To know that I do not own a thousand dollar greenback, I need not know the location of every one in existence. Indeed the two knowledges have different principles. The boundaries of the United States are fixed by things external which are not the United States, not by things internal which are. The limit of my lifting power is not determined by what I can lift. I may reason from the difficulty or ease with which I lift one hundred and fifty three pounds. The fact itself neither affirms nor denies my power of lifting one hundred and fifty-four. The limit dividing what I can lift from what I can not, implies an equation between potency and act; within or beyond the limit, an excess of potency or a defect. Without touching a weight I know I cannot lift two hundred pounds. To know that I do not possess a thousand-dollar greenback, I need not even know whether or not such a thing exists. It is enough to know that my purse is outside the limits of all even possible thousand-dollar greenbacks. In a word: however varied, however complex the contents, they can never transcend limits clearly defined.

Similarly, to determine whether anything be outside the limits of nature, it is not necessary to know adequately and exactly what is within them. Should the thing lie close to the border, the decision may demand some definite knowledge, the lack of which will leave it undetermined. But not everything lies so close to the border. I may not be sure whether such a house in Kansas City be outside the State of Missouri or not; but I am quite certain about any house in Topeka. We are ready to admit that there are on the border-line between the natural or the preternatural on the one side, and the supernatural on the other, things we may always be in doubt about. But that is no argument against the supernatural if there be but one fact clearly established which lies clearly beyond the limits of any creature. This clearness is not to be attained by any consideration of what nature can do, but by the deduction from the essential nature of created powers of their necessary limitations. Thus anything containing the exercise of creative power, as the instantaneous restoration of atrophied or corrupted matter, the instantaneous cure of wounded tissues without even a scar remaining, the resurrection of the dead, are all most certainly beyond the power of any creature. Moreover, and this must never be forgotten, such a miracle may easily guarantee others in themselves not giving the same evidence.

A miracle, then, is a work operated in nature, yet, either in itself or in the mode of its operation, beyond the power of any created nature. It is necessarily attributed to the supreme Creator and Lord of all nature. In working miracles God uses men as His instruments. Miracles are worked for men. They belong to the order of Providence in a very particular way. Special cases of exceptions to, or dispensation from the universal laws imposed on nature, they are in their natural relations subsequent to these laws, and demand as a sufficient reason an end to be obtained of the highest importance. They are the last and highest provisions of God's providence for what is highest in this lower world, man elevated and restored to the supernatural order; for what is of the last importance, the rendering of the attainment by man of his supernatural end, not only speculatively possible, but also practically easy. Briefly then miracles are given to establish the Divinity of Jesus Christ, to authenticate His Mission; to confirm the continuance of that Mission in the Church. They demonstrate the perpetual operation of the Holy Ghost in the Church,

producing fruits of sanctity among its members; evincing the infallible truth of its doctrine; marking out special sanctuaries connected with the sublimest dogmas of revelation, where extraordinary graces are showered upon pious pilgrims; and setting in clearest light the oneness in the universal Kingdom of Christ, of the militant Church on earth and the Church triumphant in Heaven. Such a concept of the relations between Creator and the creature demands the miracle; any lower concept leaves the miracle without sufficient reason. Without the miracle there could be no Catholic Church. Granting mere Protestant Christianity, the miracle would be irreconcilable with Divine Wisdom. For Rationalism the miracle is a monstrosity summed up in the Apostle's analysis of the greatest and most firmly established of all miracles, the crucified and risen Christ: "To the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Gentiles foolishness; to them that are called, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Here is to be found the adequate reason of the world's antagonism to miracles.

A miracle is beyond all power of created nature. God therefore is its sole efficient cause: *Qui facit mirabilia solus*. Since all creatures are absolutely subject to His will, God, in working miracles, is essentially independent of instrumental causes. Nevertheless, because miracles are the crown of His providence for creatures, He commonly uses instruments in working them; in most cases the end for which the miracle is worked demands it. These instruments are persons and things; angels, men, relics, pictures and images, natural elements indicated in some supernatural way, as the spring at Lourdes, or specially blessed in honor of the saints. What is their function?

This may be purely mechanical though preternatural in mode; as, for instance, the collecting by angels of the dust of the dead for the general resurrection; or, as is probable, their gathering of matter for the multiplication of bread in the desert. It is usually some condition to be fulfilled by the one said to work the miracle, or by the recipient of the grace. These are external acts or signs. In the recipient they express faith, as the devout use of the water of Lourdes or of a relic. In the one working the miracle they are either ministerial, as when one applies a relic to another, or impetratory. In the latter case we have a subdivision into acts of petition, as when one lays his hands on another with prayer expressed or implied, and acts of power, as that of Josue command-

ing the sun to stand, or of St. Peter, at whose word Ananias and Saphira fell dead. Moreover petition and power may be mixed, as happened when St. Peter said to the cripple at the Temple-gate: "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk."

It must be noted that in using the term *power* we regard the mode only of the exterior act. We do not for a moment mean that the creature receives any intrinsic supernatural elevation taking him out of the category of mere instruments into that of principal causes. The reason, as given by St. Thomas, is obvious. The working of miracles extends to whatever can be performed supernaturally. Once the limits of nature are passed the operation of the creature ceases; and there is nothing to limit the possibilities of potency, but the principle of contradiction. Consequently miracles are the proper function of Omnipotence. None, therefore, however elevated by grace, can be in any way the efficient cause; since, as St. Thomas points out, the proper action of the creature never can exceed its nature. Wherefore, in the case of Josue, we are told distinctly that "God obeyed the voice of a man." The form of words expresses perfectly the wonder of the fact. What He inspired His servant to command so confidently, God, the only efficient cause, effected. Whence we see that, whatever be the apparent initiative in even a thaumaturgus, he differs from the occasional wonderworker in this only, that his inspiration is relatively constant.

Let us now determine exactly the place of the miracle in God's Providence. Some think to save both miracle and law, by making it the effect of general laws of which we are ignorant. Others would include it in the particular laws of nature making them run in some such form as this: The laws of attraction, of liquids, of life, etc., shall obtain except in these particular cases. However capable of sound explanation the ideas behind such doctrine may be, their expression is, to say the least, ill-chosen. To make the miracle part of the natural law brings it within the limits of nature, and so contradicts the definition admitted by all. But, to come to the root of the matter, we have shown miracles to be dispensations from the law, intrinsically different from it. The law is none the less universal because of legitimate dispensations, which rather acknowledge its force than limit it. Law originates in the need of providing for the universal good and nothing more. Dispensation comes from the incompatibility of some particular case

with enforcement of the law, or from the propriety of its exemption. The individual good directly, indirectly the general good, and reverence for the majesty of the law, recommend the dispensation. The dispensing power is not the complement of the legislative, but its supplement in one person at once supreme legislator and supreme executive. Dispensation is an act of particular providence in its nature subsequent to the law, which is a universal administrative ordination. The closer our examination into the nature of the miracle, the more clearly is it seen to share in the nature of dispensation, the special function of executive providence in executing the law, the farther is it seen to recede from any possible inclusion in the law.


Providence is distinguished from the laws of nature, as administration is distinguished from creation. To this belongs the universal law. To that belongs its providential execution. How then and when does God introduce the miracle into the course of His providence? In discussing the question we can not analyze the divine act intrinsically. This, because divine, is absolutely simple. God spoke once the eternal creative word and all things were made, as they had been seen in all their complicated relations of cause and effect, of necessary and free, of conditioned and conditionate, of succession in time, of diversity of place. But since all these relations are realities in the creature, they must have had, as we say, *eminently* their corresponding reality in the Creator, hence we know that the infinitely simple creative decree is, in a way beyond all finite comprehension *eminently* complex. This complexity we must discuss with reverence. We can discuss it only in its term, the creature, in a discussion that is analogical, not univocal, as some appear to regard it. We use the terms of the creature, but not in the sense of the creature. We use them to express, as best we can, the secret mysteries of the Creator, ignoring all they imply of limit or imperfection, recognizing only the necessary relation of origin and dependence, that the participated being of the creature must have to the essentially necessary Being, the Creator. This is what St. Thomas means when he says that we discuss creation in the creature, not in the Creator.

Following this rule in speaking of creation, we analyzed the free act. Finding in it certain necessary relations of antecedence and consequence—the knowledge of the possible and the conditional must in some way precede a rational choice—we concluded

that what in the progressive creature demands successive moments of time, must have its corresponding reality in the eternal Creator independent of any such succession. This we expressed analogically, using the terms *signs*, distinguishing in them the science of simple intelligence and the middle science, prior to the decree of creation, and the science of vision, consequent to it. With the decree of creation the universal natural laws were established. In the science of vision they were declared to be good. Then began their execution in the order of providence.

Taking up again our analysis at this point, we see that the miracle, the final providential act in the order of execution, must have had its due place in the order of intention. Human dispensations from human law are given as occasions demand; for to men future contingencies are unknown. All such are eternally known to God, with the reasons for leaving each under the operation of the universal law, or for withdrawing it by dispensation from the law's operation, and so working the miracle. Such being the fact we can introduce another sign, not into the order of creation, closed by the universal law the term of the creative word, but as the first in the order of providence, the administration and execution of the law. In it the Founder of all things, now their Ruler, surveying the whole course of creatures, all the ends to be obtained for the common good, the relations between them and individual goods, decrees as the supreme crown of His providence certain exemptions and dispensations, in which, exercising His power, He will manifest most excellently His goodness towards mankind.

Thus the miracle is neither a violation of the law nor an interference with it. Neither is it to be included in the law. It is above and beyond the law in a different order. It is the prerogative of the Law-giver in the execution of His providence. It is not the complement of the imperfection of the law, which is perfect in itself. It is the supplement of the law, working coordinately with it in the hands of Him who, both legislator and administrator, works out by both His eternal purposes for the welfare of men.



CHAPTER IX

CREATION AND GENERATION

"The question is raised whether God operates in nature by creating. Regarding this question there were different opinions. Of all these the one root and principle seems to have been that nature can not make anything out of nothing. Thus some held that nothing was made otherwise than by being extracted from another in which it lay hid. Such was the opinion of Anaxagoras, who seems to have gone astray through not distinguishing between potency and act. He thought that what is generated should have actually preexisted. It should preexist in potency, not in act. Preexisting in potency it would be made from nothing. Should it preexist in act, it would not be made; for what exists is not made.

"Others asserted that, because what is generated is in potency by matter and in act by its form, a thing is made as regards its form, its matter preexisting. Because the operation of nature can not be from nothing, and consequently should be from something presupposed, nature's operation, according to them, was confined to the disposition of matter to the form. Since, however, the form must be made, not presupposed, it must come from an agent who not presupposing something, can make it from nothing. This is the supernatural agent; according to Plato, the giver of forms, according to Avicenna, the last intelligence among separated substances. Some moderns following them say that this agent is God. This, however, seems inconvenient. For, once it is the nature of every agent to effect its own likeness, a likeness according to the substantial form in the natural agent would not be looked for, unless the substantial form of the thing engendered resulted from the action of the agent. From the fact that what is to be acquired in the thing engendered, is found actually in the natural agent, and that everything acts according as it is in act, it seems incongruous to pass over the generator and seek something else outside his action.

"We must understand, therefore, that these latter opinions originated in ignorance of the nature of the form, as the former came from that of the nature of matter. *To be* is not predicated univocally of the form and of the thing generated. What in nature is generated is said *to be* of itself, and in the proper sense, as having being, and subsisting in its own being. The form is not said *to be* in the same way, since it does not subsist of itself, nor has it being of itself. It is said *to be*, or is called a *being*, because by it something exists; as accidents are called *beings* because by them the substance is of such a kind or of such a size, not because it simply *is* by them as by the substantial form. Wherefore, accidents are more properly termed *of being*, than *beings*. Whatsoever is made is said to be made, in the same manner as it is said to be. For to be is the term of the making; whence, what is properly and of itself made is the composite. The form is not made, it is that *whereby*, that is, by the acquisition of which, something is said to be made. The principle that nothing is made from nothing, does not therefore forbid one to say that substantial forms are from the operation of nature. For what is made is not the form but the composite, which is made from matter, not from nothing. Indeed, it is made from matter

inasmuch as matter is in potency to the composite, because it is in potency to the form. Wherefore the form is more properly said to be drawn out of the potency of matter, than to be made in the matter. From the very fact that the composite is made, not the form, the Philosopher shows that the forms are from natural agents. For, as what is made must be like the maker; from this, that what is made is composite, it follows that the maker must be composite, not, as Plato thought, a form existing independently of matter. Thus, as what is made is the composite, while its making consists in the reducing of form in the matter to act; so the generator is composite, not a form only, yet the form is that by which he generates; the form, I say, existing in this matter, in this flesh, in these bones, and in other such like." *St. Thomas. De Potent.* iii 8, 0.

"The question is raised, whether in the works of nature or of art there be an admixture of creation. Against it Augustine distinguishes the work of propagation, which is nature's work, from that of creation. (*De. Gen. ad Litt.* v, 6.) This question arose on account of forms, which according to some do not begin by nature's action, but preexist in matter. Thus they assumed the latency of forms. This befel them through their ignorance of matter, because they knew not how to distinguish between potency and act. Because forms preexist in matter in potency, they assumed their simple preexistence.

"Others supposed that forms are given and caused in a creative way by an immaterial agent. According to this view creation is joined to every operation in nature. This opinion resulted from ignorance of the form. They did not consider that a body's natural form is not something subsisting, but that whereby something is. Wherefore, since to be made and to be created agrees properly with the subsisting thing only, it belongs to forms neither to be made nor to be created, but to be concreated. What is properly the work of the natural agent is the composite, which is made from matter. Hence in the works of nature there is no admixture of creation, but something is presupposed to the operation of nature." *Idem. Summ. Theol.* 1. xlv, 8. 0.

"The form can be viewed in a two-fold way, according as it is in potency, and so concreated by God with matter without any intervening action of nature to dispose the matter; and according as it is in act, and so, not created, but educed from the potency of matter by a natural agent." *Idem. De. Potent.* iii. 4 ad 7m.

"From the words of St. Augustine creation is attributed to God in the works of nature on account of the natural virtues which in the beginning He put into matter by the work of creation, not that in every work of nature something is created.

"St. Augustine in quoting the text: "I planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase," takes creation in its exact sense. Nevertheless it is not to be referred to the effects of nature, but to the virtues whereby nature operates, which were placed in nature by the work of creation." *Ibid* 8 ad 1m et 2m.

"The Lord God had not rained upon the earth, and there was not a man to till the earth. But a spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface of the earth' . . . Since the fountain irrigating the earth was just as efficacious as falling rain, why is attention called as to something great, to the fact that before giving rain God had made all seed-bearing plants? . . . Does scripture here also follow its custom, speaking as to the weak, according to their weakness, yet indicating something intelligible to him who is able to understand? . . . As if He said: God did not make the plants then as He makes such plants now when rain falls and man

labor. Now these are made through intervals of time, which then were not, when God made all things simultaneously; whence times also had their beginnings." *St. Augustine De. Genes. ad Litt.* iii c 6, 19.

"In the natural generation of animals the active principle is the formative virtue in the seed . . . In the beginning of things the active principle was the word of God, which from elementary matter produced animals, actually according to other saints, virtually according to Augustine. Not that water or earth had in itself the virtue of producing all animals, but because this very fact that by virtue of seed animals can be produced from matter, is from the virtue given to the elements from the beginning." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 1, lxxi ad 1m.

"In two ways a thing is said to preexist in creatures according to causal reasons. In one way according to active potency and passive, so that not only can it be made from preexisting matter, but also that some preexisting creature can do this. In the other way it preexists according to passive potency only, so that it can be made from preexisting matter by God." *Ibid.* xci. 3, ad 4m.

The Rationalist's aversion for what he terms "interference" in the world of a God he would ignore, has brought about a sad mutilation of the idea of creation. "Who made you?" the child used to be asked. The answer was prompt and sincere: "God made me." Nor was this the persuasion of childhood only. It remained through life with men and women in no wise troubling themselves with the how or the why. They understood that without the present God no process of nature could effect anything; and so they spoke their inmost conviction: "Thy hands have made me and fashioned me wholly round about." (Job x, 8.)

Then came in a would-be scientific exactness. All things are God's creatures, but in different senses. The first of each kind were created strictly. These reproduced their kind by generation; and so the process worked on. Inasmuch as we come from Adam and Eve, we are all God's creatures. Inasmuch as present actualities are concerned, we are children of our parents, terms of a natural process working out in obedience to a necessary natural Law.

The older doctrine made no pretense to adequate expression. It was the rudimentary perception of natural reason, which sees that, whatever be the innermost nature of generation, the creature can produce only the creature. Generation can never be freed from the operation of the Creator. His operation in it must be intimately proximate and principal. Generation, therefore, can never be more than a mode of creation.

In its devotion to experimental science the modern school forgot this. Its physiological researches showed plainly the whole

process of generation from spermatozoon and ovulum to the offspring newborn. Unless, therefore, one would ignore the certain facts of physiology, the conclusion was inevitable; creation and generation as vital origins are essentially distinct. If this be so, analysis will demonstrate it.

All generation—and every process of natural production is generation in a certain sense—is a means to attain an end, the thing generated. Is the physiologist's analysis of the process adequate? There is but one test, that of the equation. Analyze the term, the thing generated. If to every element of the term, a corresponding adequate element is found in the process, the whole analysis is adequate. Otherwise it is not. In the term I find an individual life, newly beginning, distinct from that of the generators. To it I find no corresponding adequate element in the process. I repeat my analysis, I try new methods to push it further. The result is always the same. There is no equation. That new individual life stands out, the final term of the process of generation with nothing in the analysed process adequate to it. There can be but one conclusion. Something has been overlooked.

This is not to be supplied by the vital forces of the generator, nor by the active fertilizing force of the spermatozoon, nor by the capacity for fertilization in the ovum. To assume that these solve the difficulty is to fall into the error, nowadays too common, of begging the question. One who should do so, would come under the rebuke given by G. K. Chesterton to those who, to explain certain mysterious phenomena, utter the word "telepathy" with the same sense of finality that they have when using "telegraphy" in connection with the explicable facts of every day. The problem is, how from the individual lives of the parents comes the distinct life of the offspring, having from the instant of conception its own powers of assimilation, of converting assimilated matter into its own living tissue, of organizing it so as to build up for itself a perfect body?

Science gives in the analysis, Seminal activity + Physical and chemical forces + Inorganic matter, such as phosphate of lime. These do not carry me beyond the vital activity of the generators. How am I to cross the chasm to the new and independent life of the generated being? What can I add to fill the gap? A theologian from the dark ages suggests the potentiality of the matter actually involved, positively determined to receive at this time

and place this particular life in obedience to the creative word, which, uttered once, created all things simultaneously. I gaze round my laboratory. I refer to my books. I examine anew my radiographs. I study my microscopic slides more diligently. I repeat my reactions with all possible care. I find no trace of any such determination. The recommendation seems to be sound without sense.

Yet the theologian has given me the problem's solution, the very point of which modern science has lost sight. Abstracting from human generation, of which the term is the infusion of the living soul into matter, all generation is the eduction of life from matter. This the biologist will not deny. The question is, how the life educed was in matter? It was not there actually, otherwise all such matter would be alive. It was there potentially. Here one might say that as all so-called substantial varieties are but varieties of molecular action in matter, the potentiality of life in matter is but the potentiality of those peculiar molecular complexities in which the various kinds of life consist. The eduction of life, then, is but the setting of those complexities in motion. Even were this so, it would not solve the problem. It would be another case of using *telepathy* with the same finality to explain the mysterious, as *telegraphy* is used to account for the obvious, but it is not so. Life is in the potency of matter in a way quite different from mobility. Were life but a mode of molecular motion, and this the ultimate in the constitution of matter, life should be the climax of all material existence; the falling short of it would be privation. Yet not only does matter exist without life, but the great mass of matter is destined never to be called to life. Nay more, to be without life is, according to universal persuasion, the very characteristic of mere matter under its ordinary forms. Life is something superadded. Indeed, though there is life purely material, yet in discussing it we draw very near the boundary of the material order and stand upon the confines of the immaterial, looking out over a wide expanse where something else is at work than mere physical force.

Here it is most important to have a clear idea of the potentiality of matter. If we view it in the abstract as pure passive potentiality, it is unbounded, except by the universal possibility of material things. If, however, we view it as actually existing, the case is very different. From all we have discussed concerning

Providence it is clear that in decreeing this world God determined the abstract potency of matter to that alone which was actually to exist. Hence, dealing with the fact, St. Thomas declares that prime matter is in potency to those things only which are in nature. (2 Dist. xxx. 2, 1, 0.) This determination is positive. By His creative word God gave existence to prime matter under elementary forms, determined as regards each particle to the functions it was to discharge, to the end of time. What was to enter into living beings had its definite potentiality to life. What was never to do so, had no concrete potentiality to life. Moreover, this potentiality to life was determined to time, place, species, generators; so that, when these concurred, the new life originated obedient to the creative word. This is the essence of St. Augustine's doctrine of seminal reasons, accepted by St. Thomas without question as the necessary philosophy. The generators have their function. We may analyze it materially. Their seed is in themselves to generate only according to their own kind. How are we going to analyze this formally? In this is the mystery. All we can say is that they are instruments of the Creator, receiving from Him in His Creative word all that efficiency which constitutes the distinction between primordial creation and generation.

When the question is confined to material life St. Thomas expresses the doctrine of seminal reasons by saying that its forms were concreated in the potency of matter, to be educed from it, in the case of the first individuals of each species, by the mandate of the creative word according as in the process of time the moment arrived for each kind to begin its course. In succeeding generations the generated creatures came to exist, each in its own definite circumstances in the process of time, and no less than the first ungenerated, each in obedience to the same creative word. But now, disposing the matter duly, the generators educe the form instrumentally. Evidently, if the matter of the future lamb be for the moment under the form, say of grass, such a process is needed; not indeed absolutely, since for this the creative word would suffice, as it sufficed for the first sheep, but because now God chooses to use instruments. This then is the function of the generators according to their instrumental efficacy, a virtue received from Him. This St. Thomas sums up briefly by saying that in the first creatures the potency was passive only: in generation it is both passive and active, passive in matter, active in generators. Yet he

does not say that this passivity in generation is of another kind than that involved in creation. He simply indicates that it receives according to the Creator's will a new relation to the instrument He deigns to use. But He works in all who is above all, without whom no creature could work. In every generation He is the Creator. The new life following a thousand generations is no less a creature, than the remotest ancestor from which it springs.

Here one will object: You contradict St. Thomas flatly. In the passage you quote in the second place as a foundation for this chapter, St. Thomas says explicitly that in the works of nature there is no admixture of creation: You say that generation is but a mode of creation.

We may begin with the terms. Considering these we see that between the two assertions there is no necessary contradiction. An admixture would suppose elements arising from two independent principles. We mix wine and water. Each element functions according to its nature, with a result that the mixture is more stimulating than water, the effect of the wine; less intoxicating than wine, the effect of the water. When the mechanic applies his axe to cut, the cutting into the wood comes from the nature of the axe. The result of the cutting in the production of the particular thing comes from the nature of the mechanic who directs the cutting. Here there is again a mixture. Since, however, in generation the instrumental cause receives all its efficiency from the Creator, He is the sole principle of operation. Consequently there can be no idea of mixture. That this is included in the saint's doctrine will appear very clearly in the course of the discussion.

No one can hope to understand doctrine who ignores the circumstances in which it is given and the adversaries against whom it is asserted. Regarding the circumstances in which St. Thomas taught, one must remember that principles, the loss of which occasion today much obscurity, were then, to scholars no less than to teachers, so clear as to call for little explanation beyond the mere statement. Such were the facts that life can be effected only by creation: that creative power can be delegated to no creature. If the old teachers appear to speak of creation and generation as alternatives, they conceived an alternation of mode only, of creation immediate, and mediate by the mediation of instrumental causes, a mediation absolutely unique. A generation into which creation could not enter; a generation with no other dependence

on creation than that resulting from a long thin thread of intermediate generations, a dependence purely extrinsic; could have no place in their philosophy. It was an error of heathenism to be rebuked and refuted. Whatever might be the function in generations of physical agents, whatever the seminal activity in parents, the new life distinct from theirs can not come about by any such cooperation on God's part with their vital acts, such as suffices for the effecting of sensation or intelligence within the compass of their own bodies. Even the assimilation of food would demand the special creative determination of the potency of its matter. Much more, then, to enable generators to pass over to matter hitherto inanimate vital activities which they enjoy, so that it should begin another life all its own, would be needed a delegation to them of creative power. Whence, then, is the new life? The theologian answers promptly, decisively: In the beginning God gave to definite matter the power to receive a determined life under determined conditions, in obedience to His creative word spoken eternally, never to be repeated, since all times in the long process of the centuries, are immediately subject to it.

All this was in the mind of St. Thomas when, replying to the question proposed, that there is no admixture of creation in the works of nature, he adds that there is something presupposed in the operation of nature; and that the errors he refutes arise from an inability to grasp the ideas of potency and act.

He reduces his antagonists to two classes, both of whom abuse a self-evident principle, that nature can not make anything out of nothing. Hence Anaxagoras and his fellows, not understanding potency, held that all things that are to come to light exist actually in matter, to be extracted from their hiding places at the appointed time. The other class understood that things to exist are in potency as regards matter and come to existence by the form. Hence the form to be received by the matter must pre-exist actually, the work of some extrinsic agent. Plato attributed it to the giver of forms. Avicenna makes it the creature of angelic spirits. Others hold it to be the work of God. But whatever its origin the form is held to precede in existence the compound of matter and form. Thus in all such systems there is the dual principle, nature doing its part and a creative agency supplying what is beyond nature's power. Hence there is that admixture of creation in the work of nature which St. Thomas rejects. Such admix-

ture, he says, is uncalled for. Every agent produces its own likeness. In the natural effect is found infallibly the likeness of the generator's substantial form. It would be unreasonable to pass over the generator, to seek the source of this likeness in the activity of some other principle, whether this be some unknown giver of forms, or an angel, or God Himself. St. Thomas excludes even God, but only in the sense of a partial cause of a mixed operation, not as the principal universal cause of the one operation.

Here we must pause for a moment, so as to collect our ideas. St. Thomas founds his rejection of any admixture of creation in the work of nature upon the doctrine of St. Augustine as his master. Equal to the older doctor in intelligence, no less erudite, he does not follow him blindly. He draws his own conclusions. He simplifies his master's teaching: he does not contradict him. Now there is nothing on which St. Augustine loves more to dwell than on the operation of God in that of the creature; so that in effecting the fruit in the vine and the child in the womb, He works as wonderfully as in changing water into wine, or in raising the dead. In the miracle the Creator works by His mere word. In the process of growth terminating with the ripe fruit and its juice fermenting into wine, or in the conception of a new life and its development in the womb to the hour of birth, though He uses instruments, yet in working with them by His creative word, He gives them all their instrumental efficacy. Considered merely in the term generated or created, generation is one thing, creation is another. If the whole operation be taken adequately in principle and term, the entire dependence of generators on the Creator, the principal and universal cause, makes the distinction modal only.

As errors rejected arose from misapprehension of potency and act, St. Thomas, in rejecting them, explains his doctrine very lucidly. Generation terminates in existence. What exists is the composite substance. The form exists only inasmuch as it is that whereby the composite substance exists. In this sense then the form is not made from nothing by the generator, since the term of his activity is the composite substance. Neither does it demand a Creator on its own account, since it has no proper existence of its own. On the other hand, since the composite substance does not lie hidden in its own existence to be brought to light by the generator, the form does not either on its own account or by reason

of the latent compound, exist actually the work of the Creator, so as to give rise to an admixture of creation in generation.

The form, then, in generation comes from matter, which is also the material element in the composite. The matter is passive. The form is active. The matter is itself determined, yet it gives the form to determine itself. The composite is matter determined by the form in the actual existence. The form is not matter. Yet it is drawn from matter to determine the actual existence of the composite. This needs elucidation.

The errors refuted express two extremes of doctrine, both false, as so often is the case with extremes. In one there is matter under some elementary form, in which the generator works. Concealed in it lies the thing to be generated which the generator will bring into the business of the world. Whence it originates is a matter of less importance. One thing is clear. It exists, not by generation, but by at least the equivalent of creation. Hence two principles, and the admixture of creation which St. Thomas rejects. In the other, again, is the matter in which the generator works. The form, which he in no way touches, is created by an external agent, with whom he is in no way connected. Again two principles and the admixture of creation which St. Thomas rejects. Between the actual existence of the thing to be generated latent in matter, and the creation of the form in the moment of generation, there is room for another theory, the accepted doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, depending upon the clear concept of potency and act.

According to it all material forms preexist in the potency of matter. Generating activity draws them out of potency into act to actuate the matter. Hence the composite is the single adequate term of generation; in which there is a real action on the form, since by it the form actually exists in the thing generated. Unless, however, the meaning of preexistence in the potency of matter be clearly understood, the doctrine can only be a jumble of words.

Prime matter is pure passive potency. It might become anything. Of itself it is nothing. Hence St. Augustine, were this permissible, would call it something-nothing. From this point of view, in which it is indifferent to all forms, none can be said to exist in its potency. For this some positive action is required limiting its potency to definite things, converting an abstract negative passive potency into a concrete positive passive potency. This

determination of the potency of prime matter is the Creator's work, who creating it, imposes upon it the various realities into which it is to enter during the whole course of time. Hence, the creative act includes this determination of the passive potency of matter. It includes also the actualization in each particular element of matter, under definite circumstances of time and place and material conditions, of its passive potency so determined. It includes the agencies whereby the potency in each element is to be actualized and the mode of the actualization. It defines, whether this is to be primal creation, generation, miracle, or preternatural action of evil spirits. In defining generation, it views the individual generators. In defining miraculous actualization, whether the ministry of angels is to be employed or not. All this results from God's free choice of the world. There could have been no free choice unless God had known this world as possible down to its very last element. Once the choice was made, the decree of creation followed that knowledge, decreeing the existence of the world, in its minutest particulars. The creative decree whereby God is Creator stopped short of no actualization of potency. He is the Creator of the life beginning today, no less than of the life of the first of its species. He is the universal principal cause of all things. He uses secondary instrumental causes or not, according to His supreme will. But principal cause and instrumental cause are united as one. In the unique case of the Creator and the creature, there can be no diversity of origin. Hence, though in generation the Creator operates as the principal cause, the creature acting instrumentally only, there is no *admixture* of operations. The operation is but one, with the necessary consequence that generation as has been explained, is a mode of creation.

Viewing the question from our human standpoint in the progressive processes of time, St. Thomas tells us that all composite beings, man alone excepted, have an existence, not fanciful but in its own way, as we have explained it, most real, antecedent to their actual production. They exist potentially in the potency of matter. This, presupposed to the operation of nature, is what renders futile any theory of *admixture* of creation in generation. But as the matter always exists under some form, carrying in its potentiality what it is yet to be, it follows that the potential existence of the material compound is reduced to that of the form. Hence with St. Augustine St. Thomas tells us that all material

forms were concreated potentially with matter, without any intervening action of nature to dispose the matter. Inasmuch as they are reduced to act, they are not created, but educed from the potency of matter by a natural agent.

One may object that we seem to strain unduly the doctrine of St. Thomas in maintaining that he holds generation to be a mode of creation. In the words just quoted he says distinctly that in their eduction from matter forms are not created. But one may not forget the false theories he refutes. All see that behind generation there must be creation. The false theories made it something distinct in its principle from generation and in one way or another mixed with generation. St. Thomas puts one principle the Creator; using instrumental causes, making generation the final term of His creative word. That eduction, in itself the activity of the instrumental causes, can not be creation is clear. That there is no need to torture it into creation, as Plato did and Avicenna, is equally clear; since the creative act needed in generation is found in the creation of the forms potentially in matter, of which the necessary term is their actual existence in the composite substance, which is the immediate effect of generation. In a word the generator exhausts all his instrumentality in educing from the potentiality of this particular matter the form concreated with it, whereby, in obedience to the creative word, it was to become at the appointed time, by the appointed means this material being. Since, then, considered formally and in itself generation is the eduction of the form so concreated with matter; since the generator disposes instrumentally the particular matter, in which the form was concreated potentially for that eduction; since of all the forms concreated in that particular matter, the generative virtue communicated by the Creator to the generator prepares the matter for the eduction of the form like to itself, and of no other, it would be useless to introduce another extrinsic creating agent into the process.

Still a serious difficulty remains. St. Augustine in attributing to God, as to the principal agent every operation in nature, never wearies of quoting the words of St. Paul; I planted, Apollo watered, God gave the increase. St. Thomas says that in so accommodating the text he attributes to God creation in the works of nature, on account of the natural virtues which in the beginning had been put into matter by the work of creation; not that in every

work of nature something is created. Creation is taken in the exact sense. Nevertheless, it is not to be transferred to the effects of nature, but to the virtues whereby nature operates, which were placed in nature by the work of creation.

Here St. Thomas answers an objection to the effect that St. Augustine favors an opinion he rejects. There is question of propagation, generation. Paul plants, Apollo waters. The analogy is to mere disposition of the matter. God gives the increase. The form is created; it is not educed from matter. St. Thomas replies: Not so. Creation is not to be asserted of the effect of nature, the eduction of the form, but of the virtues whereby the form is educed, virtues placed in nature by the work of creation.

Nevertheless, this answer brings us into collision with Christian Evolutionists, who conclude that St. Thomas admits that St. Augustine confines the Creator's operation in the works of nature to remote causality, which justifies their claim that he supports their doctrine that any other activity would be an intervention, a multiplication of activities and entities quite unscientific. At first sight, indeed, one might think that this intervention of the Creator which the Evolutionist would exclude from natural processes, is that admixture of creation which St. Thomas rejects. But from all that has been said in the preceding pages, it is abundantly clear that the theologian whose business it is to make his own the mind of St. Thomas and of St. Augustine, finds for their doctrine a very different interpretation. Let us explain.

The solution of the difficulty turns on the sense of the term "virtues" which in the beginning God put into the works of nature. The evolutionist considers that these are necessarily active, certain forces which working in nature from the beginning terminate in the genus and species, and the individuals of each distinct kind. St. Thomas, on the contrary, uses *virtue* in a general sense for any perfection of potency, whether active or passive, towards act. Such perfection clearly must follow the nature of its potency. If it be a perfection of substance actually existing, it may be active or passive according as the potency perfected be active or passive. If it be a perfection of prime matter as such, it can only be passive, whatever respect it may have to future actuation. Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. Thus in a passage quoted at the head of this chapter he says, that in natural generation of animals the active principle is the seed's

formative virtue, i. e., its efficiency in disposing matter so as to educe the form, a virtue perfecting active potency. Nevertheless, he adds: "that animals *can be produced* by virtue of seed is from the virtue given to the elements from the beginning." Here the change to the passive voice clearly indicates the determination of passive potency to this and that particular animal, in which the potential concreation with prime matter consists. This appears clearly in our next quotation. "According to causal reasons a thing may preexist in two ways; either in active and passive potency, so that it can be made by some preexisting creature from preexisting matter; or in passive potency only, so that it can be made from preexisting matter by God." One would hardly deny that intrinsically the passive potency is the same in both cases. Neither would one rashly assert that in the former the creature takes the place of the Creator as principal cause. In both cases the actuation of the passive potency is the Creator's work. In the former there is the additional instrumental relation of the generated effect to the generator, the Creator's instrument, which is not found in the latter. This is the consistent doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Let us in its light review the former passage: "Not that water or earth had in itself the virtue of producing animals, but because this very fact that by virtue of seed animals can be produced from matter is from the virtue given to the elements from the beginning." Here there is question of two virtues, active and passive. The former is in the seed, not absolutely so that nothing more is required for its exercise than the subjection to it of a universal passive potency, but relatively only in a necessary dependence upon the subjection of a passive potency predetermined by the Creator to be actuated by its activity. Hence, as we have said already, in all generation the determined passive potency, the concreated form, by which the generated effect is in strictest sense a creature, holds the more important place. Of this significative use of the passive we have a daily example in the last Gospel at Mass: "To as many as received Him, He gave power to be made the sons of God." This He did not by implanting in them active evolutionary virtues, but by determining in each his passive obediential potency to a receptivity of grace at a determined time, in a determined mode and degree, through, as a rule, the instrumentality of His minister, whose efficiency as an instrumental

cause would depend in the concrete upon the subjection of the receptive potentiality to his ministry.

This doctrine so simple and clear seems to the modern mind unintelligible because the modern mind understands not potency and act. In this matter of origins, potencies and virtues are for it always activities, vital principles, quasi-seeds ready to germinate into life through their immanent forces, all, as it were, working in a perpetual ferment, producing life, differentiating species, developing higher ones. The system is almost a negative pantheism. It does not positively deny the Creator. It does not wholly ignore Him. But it puts Him far away, so far as to be easily lost sight of. It is the practical antithesis of the doctrine of St. Paul, the doctrine, too, of St. Augustine and St. Thomas: "In Him we live and move and are."

Passive potency is for such a mere metaphysical term. They may conceive it vaguely as a sort of general abstract possibility; but it does not enter into their laboratory speculations. That it is a reality, that it is *the* reality, the last reality to be reached in the analysis of the creature, a reality so pervading, so overpowering that, though purely passive, it is worthy of the name of virtue, is beyond their present comprehension. Nevertheless St. Thomas with a wider range of view tells us, repeating it more than once, that *virtue* is to be taken for whatever can be a principle of any operation or movement. (3 *Dist.* xxvii, 1.1 ad 1m.)

These virtues are neither seeds nor special forces. In themselves they are but determinations of pure passivity, which still remains purely passive. They are *reasons* with an analogy to seeds, not seeds in some way explanatory of origins. Wherefore with St. Augustine St. Thomas calls them seminal reasons. But as such their causality is material only and passive. Like seeds they *contain* in their way all future things regarding which they are the concrete determinations of passive potency; but they have not the *causality* of seeds. This, though instrumental, is active. Seminal reasons, as such, evolve things to come only when taken adequately with the agents drawing to existence the forms of which they are the potencies, passive in prime matter. Thus St. Thomas does not hesitate to call them, as we have seen, virtues; but in a very broad sense. They are such, not on account of their activity, but for their infallibility. Obediently to the creative word, they shall certainly come into existence. Another reason

may be drawn from the dignity to which in them certain prime matter is raised to be the subject of life. Through them dead matter becomes capable of receiving life. "For this very thing that by virtue of seed animals can be produced from elementary matter, is from virtue given in the beginning to the elements." Inasmuch as in the elements it is given to prime matter, it is the determination of this particular matter to become at its appointed time and place this particular living thing. But this carries with it a further determination. When in obedience to the creative word it has become this living thing, it shall have in its seed virtue to cooperate instrumentally with the Creator in the production from the passive potency of matter of other living beings like itself. In discussing the feeding of the multitude with five loaves, St. Augustine gives us a beautiful example of his use of the term seeds: "From whence He multiplies the harvest from a few seeds, thence He multiplied in His hands five loaves. The power was in the hands of Christ. Those five loaves were, so to speak, *seeds*, not indeed *committed to the earth*, but *multiplied by Him who makes the earth*." (*In Joann. Tract. xxiv.*)

By these forms St. Augustine explains the simultaneous creation of all things. Yet we must bear in mind, what St. Thomas requires for the true understanding of potency and act, that they could not be the direct object of creation. They are not *created in* matter. This would reproduce the error of Anaxagoras. They are *concreated with* matter. They are so concreated to exist. They will exist actually in the composite only, which therefore is the term of the creative word. But by them the composite is *virtually* in prime matter. For this the creative word in the beginning implanted in the elements the power of receiving individual life in due time, place and conditions, in obedience to that word. In creation, no formal specific disposition of matter precedes the eduction of the form. The compound begins to exist, obedient to the word. In generation active potency as the Creator's instrument, disposes the matter He has ordained to this definite life. But all its efficiency as an instrument is from Him. It is efficient, yet this efficiency can terminate in this new life, only because this matter was determined to this individual life, for this time and this place and these agents in the word whereby all things were created simultaneously. The effect of *creation* is referred *directly* to that moment of eternity, ever-present in every instant of time, because

into it enters no created activity. The effect of *generation*, referred *directly* to the moment of time in which the generating agents do their office, goes through them to the Principal Cause in whose virtue they operate; and so to His determination of the primal potency of matter in the simple instant of eternity, which, knowing neither past nor future, embraces all time. Hence we say with St. Thomas, that if we consider the mere effects of generation, the production of new being out of antecedent matter, there is no *admixture* of creation, because creation is presupposed in the form hitherto virtual, potential, now to give actual being to its destined composite by eduction from its long potentiality in matter. Viewing the operation adequately we see with him that, not only does creation enter into it, but also that it has the principal part, not by partition of functions, but as the universal cause, giving to every element in the operation its efficacy. Wherefore, generation must be termed most justly, not the alternative of creation, but its mode.

And so St. Augustine, without distinguishing between the two, reduces the whole actuation of the creature to the unfolding of the processes of time. Let us close this part of our discussion with a citation showing clearly his view of the Creator's work in generation, how purely instrumental he held the share of the natural agents to be. "Who draws water to the grape-cluster through the vine-roots, and so makes wine, but God who, though men plant and water, gives the increase? But when at the Lord's command water was in a moment changed to wine, even fools acknowledge the power of the Divinity. Who but God clothes the tree year by year with leaf and flower? But when Aaron's rod blossomed the Godhead, in a way, spoke with doubting mankind. Surely the earth is the common matter of the generation and conformation of all trees and of all animals; and who makes them but Him who commanded the earth to bring them forth, and in His same word rules and moves what He created? But when He changed instantly the same matter from being the rod of Moses into the serpent's flesh, there was a miracle, of a thing changeable, to be sure, but for all that an extraordinary change. Yet who animates every living thing that comes to birth but Him who, when need arose, gave momentary life to that serpent? And who restored the souls to the corpses Ezechiel saw arise, if not He who gives

life to flesh in the mother's womb that men may be born to die?" (*De Trin.* iii. 11.)

One will probably object that this doctrine makes light of the efficacy of generating agents, which day by day appears more wonderful as the biologist's researches reveal it. If to bring out the Creator's part in generation we have had to insist more on the creation of things in passive potency, than on the active potency of the instrumental causes, this does not imply a minimizing of the latter. As well might St. Thomas, who insists on this active potency, be supposed to rebuke St. Augustine, who dwells less upon it. St. Thomas, it is true, tells us that in a few points there is a difference between the doctrine of St. Augustine and that of other saints, but he in no wise insinuates that even in these he prefers the latter. On the contrary, in this matter St. Augustine is as clearly his master as is Aristotle in metaphysics. Apparent differences arise from the different stand-point of each, St. Thomas viewing creation in its term, the existing creature, necessarily brought in its active potencies. St. Augustine considering, as a commentator on scripture, more exclusively the operation of the Creator, while acknowledging the instrumental activity, did not attempt its rigorous analysis. Indeed such differences of treatment can be found in St. Thomas, himself, as one can see by comparing his view of the efficiency of the creature when he speaks of generation, and his apparent reduction of it to the lowest term when he thus sums up providence: "God not only gives forms to things, but also conserves them in being, and applies them to act, and is the end of all their actions." (*Summ. Theol.* 1, cv, 5 ad 3m.) Anyhow the objection comes with little grace from the laboratory, where the generating agents are treated with scant respect. How few there see in them the reason of their own efficiency! They are rather the instruments of physical and chemical forces. To mention vital force is often held to be unscientific. There are those who spend their lives in striving to produce life without its assistance. Perhaps to treat the generators as God's instruments receiving from Him an efficacy no laboratory can analyze, is, after all, the nobler way.

Since experimental science, dealing necessarily with secondary causes only, took its place in the modern world, the idea of generation as a mode of creation has become dim, and that of generation and creation, as alternatives has imposed itself. Thus the

doctrine of seminal reasons, so clear to the old theological mind, becomes utterly confused. The determination of the abstract passive potency of matter, to the concrete potency of becoming what is actually to exist, a potency, not of making, producing, evolving, but, as St. Thomas puts it, of being made this or that in obedience to the creative word through the instrumentality of generating agents, instead of standing out as a clear summary of creation in generation, is regarded as a hopeless tangle of words. Passive potency is taken to be a metaphysical subtlety, if adverted to at all. It has no place in the activity of the laboratory. Seminal reasons, therefore, must be active principles, or they are nothing. With this taken as a principle, isolated texts from Fathers and theologians are interpreted in a sense their authors never dreamed of. Thus St. Augustine is made an Evolutionist and patristic doctrine in general evolutionary by one writer after another down to De Dorlodot, a doctor of Louvain, a man of incontestable learning in his proper sphere, but whose whole discussion turns on that false principle. From it he reaches the extraordinary conclusion, so important in his eyes as to demand italics, that St. Augustine "would have repudiated all special intervention of God in the natural order outside of the primitive creation." He, who placed no limit to the Creator's work, whether in the first creation by the mere spoken word, or in administration, which, though it adds to the creative word the instrumentality of the creature, in no way *interposes* that instrumentality between the word spoken eternally and its effects in time; he, on whose lips was constantly the text: "My Father worketh hitherto and I work"; he, for whom the smallest thing in nature, even the generation of a gnat, was, instrumentality apart, no less the immediate effect of the word that spoke and all things were created, than the first being of the noblest kind; would he not have repudiated, 'not so much the fact, as the very terms of its expression and the ideas behind them? How, he would have asked, can the notion of special intervention be conceived of Him, who, unmoved through time or place, moves all things in time and place; whose instant operation pervades all creation, who so operates in the creature, that without His operation, no operation of the creature is conceivable?

Having reached so rash a conclusion the learned doctor, unconsciously, because he is seeking, not the real sense of St. Augustine, but to bolster up a theory with his own interpretation of the

saint, goes on to divert to a sense entirely foreign the famous doctrine, to which we have alluded, of the identity of the Creator's operation in the natural course of things with that exercised in the working of miracles. He quotes no passage. We may, however assume that he had in mind the better known one from *De Trinitate*, which we touched upon a few paragraphs back. The Saint, does not say that God manifests His greatness better, still less much better ("*bien mieux*") by the natural activity of second causes than by His miracles. On the contrary, he grants the miracle, as a manifestation, a greater efficacy, just as he allows the administration of the whole world to be extensively and in its term more wonderful than the feeding of the five thousand. In themselves, however, there is, he says, no distinction of more or less between the natural process and the miracle, because—and this is the very gist of his teaching—they are essentially one and the same operation of the Creator, differing only in mode.

From this doctrine of the theologians open out wonderful views of the operation of the Creator in the creature. Not generation only, but all our vital processes involve that giving of life to matter, which is the Creator's exclusive function. The converting of food into the substance of the body, into its organs the seat of sensitive life, what is it but a continuous communication of life to matter without life? That I live; that to live, my body must be sustained with food; are obvious truths. That I, therefore, of my own power, change bread and meat into living tissue, organized thus in my eye, otherwise in my brain, otherwise again in my other internal organs, yet another way in nerves and in muscles and in bones, in each in the way proper to each; would be a conclusion unwarranted by facts, beyond conscious experience, and contrary to reason. Let us take St. Augustine's favorite example of the vine, and ask, who draws the elements changing them now into root, and stem and branch and leaf? Who forms of them the sap rising to the flower and the fruit? Who changes this from sour to sweet, and the juice expressed into wine? Who does all these things, if not He who changed by His word the water into wine? The wonder is the same in each. The miracle moves our admiration because it is rare.

What St. Augustine says of the vine, he repeats in many ways. The yearly growth of flower and herb is as much the divine work as their first production from the earth in obedience to the creative

word; the blossoming of the tree, as that of Aaron's rod; the animation of all that comes to birth, as the changing of the rod of Moses into serpent's flesh; and who, he asks in climax restores life in the resurrection, but Him who first gave it in the womb to flesh that was to be born to die? Moreover, the Saint carries the doctrine into the inorganic world. The rain falling naturally in its season, is as wonderful a work of the Creator, as that which followed so suddenly the prayer of Elias; the thunder and lightning of the summer storm, as that which rolled and flashed round Sina. The whole process of the world depends upon the creative word, determining the abstract potency of matter to its concrete potency in measure, number and weight, giving each individual particle its own receptivity of form to be actuated in its own time and place; so that in all its variety of inorganic being, vegetative sensitive, human life this is to be worked out to its least particular, while no other actuation of matter enters into the actual possibilities of things. The execution of that creative word is the unceasing operation of the Creator in the creature to which St. Augustine applies continually our Lord's saying: "My Father worketh hitherto and I work."

Our Lord tells us that God clothes the lilies and feeds the birds of the air; that not a sparrow falls without Him who numbers the very hairs of our head; in a word, that nothing, however minute, escaped His providence. We may have looked on this as hyperbole, legitimately employed to convince us of God's general care of creatures, and consequently of His special care of man, the chief creature, but not necessarily to be taken literally. The doctrine we have explained makes impossible any but the strictly literal sense. Indeed we may push things further without any fear of being too literal.

For the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas is universal, touching all creatures in all their potencies. Take for instance a simple example from chemistry. Should carbon and oxygen be brought together under certain conditions, they will combine in definite proportions with the evolution of a definite amount of heat, to form a new substance, carbon dioxide. This law is universal. We read it in the essence of carbon and of oxygen, which are such and no other, because thus and not otherwise is the divine essence imitable in the creatures, carbon and oxygen. But because it is universal, it is abstract. Its verification demands

the existence of carbon and oxygen. Of this its inmost truth is independent. Whether the elements exist or not, whether they are brought together or not, it is eternally true.

But the verification is necessarily concrete. As creatures carbon and oxygen entered into the creative decree in exact measure, number and weight. So much prime matter to each, neither more nor less. Every single combination of carbon and oxygen, whether by combustion, or by vital activity, or by organic decay, since it has its place in the process of the world, is defined and decreed in the word once uttered, never to be repeated, whereby all things were created simultaneously. The forms of all carbon dioxides to exist were concreated potentially with the prime matter involved in each, to be actuated each in its own time, as the time of the world should be unrolled. These and these alone are the possible carbon dioxides in the concrete. There is carbon buried in the earth, never to be oxidized. There may be oxygen in the air, or in chemical compounds, that never came, that never will come into combination with carbon. For such the law is true, hypothetically, in the abstract; it has no concrete reality for them in the existing creation. Thus there is not a grain of sand, a drop of water, a single leaf, a breath of air, that has not its matter charged with the burden, more or less honorable, of the processes of the universe; that is not watched over continually by the Divine eye, before which no creature is invisible, which sees the things that are not as the things that are; that is not moved by Divine Providence to the perfecting in due manner, time and place the function laid upon it. When we begin to grasp all this, then, and not till then, do we begin to penetrate St. Augustine's deep saying: "As mothers are pregnant of their children, so the world is pregnant with the causes of things coming to birth." Then do we turn away from the flippancy that would convert it into a mere evolutionary formula, realizing that this implies nothing less than the substitution of the creature with its secondary instrumental activities for the operation of the Creator in His creature.

But, remember, this is not biology, nor chemistry, nor physics. It is theology. Nevertheless, theology underlies necessarily all science experimental as well as rational. It is the light of science whereby is distinguished the false from the true. It is the safeguard of science against extravagance, leading it back by the one safe way to Him who, as He is the beginning of all true science, must be also its last end.

CHAPTER X

THE CREATOR'S OPERATION IN SOCIAL MAN

"To be altogether without need of any other is above man's nature. For every man needs first of all divine help. Secondly he needs the help of his fellow-men; being by nature a social animal, because he is not sufficient to provide for himself what appertains to life." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol.* 2, 2, cxxix, 6, ad 1m.

"Man is naturally a social animal. This is evident because nature provides sufficiently in few things, giving him reason whereby to prepare for himself all things needful for life, as food, clothing and such like. Nevertheless one man is not sufficient for working all these. Consequently, that he should live in society, is placed in man by nature. But the order of providence takes from nothing what is natural to it, but rather provides for each according to its nature. Wherefore man is not ordered by the ordination of providence in such a way as would involve the abolition of social life. But this would be destroyed, were our elections as are the natural instincts of other animals. Laws and precepts of life would be given in vain, were man not master of his choice. In vain would punishments be provided for the wicked and rewards for the good; were it not in us to choose these things or those. But should such cease, social life would straightway be destroyed." *Idem. Cont. Gent.* 3. lxxxv.

"The divine law is promulgated to man to aid the natural law. To love one another is natural to all men, as appears from this that by a certain natural instinct, man comes to the assistance of anyone in need, even though a stranger, just as though each man was to every man a familiar and a friend. *Ibid.* cxvii.

"Community of things is attributed to natural law, not because natural law dictates that all things are to be possessed in common, and nothing to be possessed as private property; but because distinction of possessions does not follow natural law, but rather human agreement. Hence private possession is not contrary to natural law, but is something superadded to natural law by means of the conclusions of rational investigation." *Idem. Summ. Theol.* 2, 2, lxvi, ad. 1m.

"Natural right, or what is naturally just, is of its very nature adequate or commensurate to something else. This may happen in two ways. In one it is considered absolutely. Thus the male is commensurate to the female for purposes of generation, and the father to the son so as to nourish him. In the other, a thing is commensurate naturally to something else, not according to its absolute nature, but according to something following from it; as, for example, private property. For considering this field absolutely, we see in it no reason why it should belong to this one rather than to that. If however we consider it with respect to the opportunity of cultivating it and to its peaceful use, it has from this point of view a certain commensuration to be owned by one and not by another. To lay hold absolutely of a thing is natural not only to man, but also to other animals. Therefore, what is called natural right is in the former way common to us and the other animals. From such natural right is separated the law of nations. That is common to all animals; this only to man among themselves. To consider something by comparing it with what follows from it, is the function of reason. Wherefore, what natural reason dictates, that same thing is

natural to man according to natural reason. Hence Gaius the jurisconsult says: What natural reason establishes amongst all men, is most justly observed in every society and is called the law of nations." *Ibid.* lvii, 3, 0.

"As the actions of irrational things come from natural potencies, so human operation proceed from the human will. In things irrational it is right and proper that those of a higher order should move the lower to their actions through the excellence of natural virtue given them by God. Whence in human affairs it is proper for superiors from the power of authority divinely ordained, to move inferiors by their will. But to move by reason and will is to command. Therefore, as in irrational matters, from the very natural order instituted by God the inferior things are necessarily subject to the movement of superior things; so in human affairs inferiors are held by the order of the natural and divine law, to obey their superiors." *Ibid.* civ, 1, 0.

"It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like unto himself." *Gen.* ii, 18.

The nature of anything is shown by its activity. Whether there be question of minerals without life, of trees and plants with vegetative life, of animals with sensitive life, with the products of human skill, the principle is universally true. What is the nature of nitric acid, or of silver, of oxygen or hydrogen? The answer is found in the properties and potencies. So too we distinguish between oaks and pines and palms; between horses and oxen and bears and lions; between a steam engine and a gas engine, a piano and a typewriter.

Sociality permeates all human activity. Should a hunter or a prospector come across signs of another human being in the wilderness, his first impulse is to seek him out. For good reasons he may check this impulse, but this confirms the fact of its existence. If two or three go out on a short camping-trip, a rudimentary social organization dividing burdens and providing for mutual help comes about spontaneously. One with the necessary qualities will become the leader. The others will accept him instinctively. Should a ship's company and its passengers be cast away on a desert island, a closer organization would follow. Should both sexes be present in due proportion, the deliberate choice to settle permanently on the island would inevitably result in a permanent society completely organized in all its functions.

Into all this, however, so much of free choice enters, that the common idea is, not that man is *social*, necessitated by the intrinsic movement of his nature to live in society; but that he is merely *sociable*, that is, of a nature indifferent to either individual or social life, choosing this rather than that on account of the advan-

tages it offers. This idea appears generally in modern sociology. It is laid down as an axiom in legal text-books that mankind organized society for the protection of his rights against domestic aggressors, and for self-defence against enemies from without. It is true that every supreme society in the present condition of the human race must provide for these two things. But it is equally true that in no well-ordered state are they its chief functions. There are criminals and there are enemies. Yet for one who is held in check by the police, there are thousands who respect rights and obey laws, without any thought of the penalties of a contrary conduct; for whom a policeman is a fellow-citizen, stalwart and courteous, with a fund of information concerning the town, which he is always ready to share with them. So, too, wars will come. But the ordinary state of the world is peace, in the preserving of which the influence of armaments has a minor effect only. Hence St. Thomas asserts the obvious truth that, though man had remained in the state of innocence, he still would have lived in society organized according to his essential nature for the common good.

The modern idea pervading the popular mind has its proximate origin in the social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau. The former assumes that man, originally purely individualistic, lived in a state of warfare with his fellows. Perceiving that this must end in his extinction, each, through an instinct of self-preservation, entered into a contract with his fellows to terminate it by mutual respect of rights. In this contract originated the overpowering state. Rousseau accepted the idea of a golden age in which man led a life individualistic and blissful, followed by the iron age of perpetual warfare. This he supposed, like Hobbes, to have been terminated with a contract. But, as the moralist of the Revolution, he took a further step. Kings, have violated the contract. The state, as Hobbes put it not unapprovingly, had become the Leviathan, the god of the world. The people were in chains. They must break their chains, chastise the criminal kings, and return to the state of nature of the golden age. We say that the modern idea had here its proximate origin. As for the universal individualistic savage state of man, in general, it has been a commonplace of the kingdom of darkness from earliest times, even though man's creation in grace and innocence was retained vaguely in the fable of the golden age.

Such theories, however plausible they may appear, are self-contradictory. Man is so essentially social, that he can not think but in social terms. Hence the plausibility of the contract theories. Man purely individualistic—between such and social man there can be no undivided middle; therefore, no room for man merely sociable—could have neither language, nor permanent union of sexes. He could have no concept of right to possession, of moral obligation, of contract. Yet, because we are unable to think otherwise than socially, Hobbes and Rousseau could imagine some inventing, all comprehending, a most complex bilateral contract, whereby A, B, C, . . . X, Y, Z, severally, would contract with all the others collectively, to form a society by putting themselves under the authority of P., whom they bound themselves to obey; and few have since perceived the contradiction.

The social contract finds favor today with extreme Evolutionists, because it fits in with their notions. The Socialist, the Communist, the Nihilist view it as the foundation-stone of their hopes. If human society originates in the contract, the one universal fact, there can be but one universal society. The existence then of different nations originating each in man's social nature determined by distinct constituting facts, would be an intolerable abuse growing out of ambition, tyranny, force. Thus civil obedience would be cowardice; patriotism, a vice; war could only be a crime against the solidarity of the universal brotherhood of man in the social contract. Hence are justified the International Association, the Red Flag, the unceasing conspiracy against all existing governments.

From the fact that St. Thomas proves man's social nature from his inability to provide alone for his needs, one might suppose that the saint viewed the matter from a standpoint quite utilitarian. Such, however, is not the case. In the first place, he argues as follows, not as a utilitarian but as a metaphysician: Man is created to live and act. For this he has from God his definite nature. To be in his life and action independent of all others would be to transcend the nature God has given him. Therefore that nature whereby he must live and act, which he can not put off at will, must be essentially social, requiring him to live in society. He gives another argument deriving also its force from the relation of the creature to the Creator. Man comes by a certain natural instinct to the aid of his fellow-man. Should one remain in secondary causes without adverting to the First Cause who unmoved Him-

self, moveth all things, the argument would seem inconclusive. On the other hand turning to the divine positive law of the love of our neighbor, we see that it supposes in those subject to it a natural disposition antecedent to all positive law. Indeed putting the argument in all its force we prove beyond all exception that a being, intelligent and free, can not but be social. The argument is very simple: "The heaven of heavens is the Lord's: the earth He has given to the children of men." But the earth in all its variety is given to men not distributively, but collectively; the distribution is left to human intelligence and will. It is the Creator's will that of His gifts each man should have what is appropriate for the attaining of his last end. Hence no man may pursue a selfish course, but each must wish for his fellows the Creator's good gifts, under the same respect as he seeks them for himself, and must aid them in need according to their need. But this implies the social nature as opposed to the individualistic. The latter, therefore, for a being intelligence and free, is impossible; the former is intrinsically necessary.

Particular societies are the effects of voluntary association according to certain definite constituting facts. Yet inasmuch as they come from man's social nature, they are creatures of God. The association is voluntary, because it is human. Yet the potency it actuates is not abstract and universal, but concrete and more or less limited by antecedent and concurrent facts. Take for example the United States. In the abstract the founders of the nation might have set up a kingdom, an oligarchy, an autocracy, a religious despotism as did Mohammed. In the concrete, whatever were their personal sentiments, they found only the democratic republic possible. They were eager to retain to the full the distinct individuality of each State according to the ideals that had grown up during colonial times. Possible in the abstract, in the concrete it proved impossible. National unity had to prevail as the logical result of antecedent facts. Louisiana and California came into the union, not by the free act of their inhabitants, but by purchase and by conquest. Yet sooner or later came inevitably voluntary assent to the change, not for any material advantages involved, but because of man's social nature. He must not only live in society, but also be a part of it. Society is human, held together by union of wills, not by physical force. The assent to the society in which we live is the necessary outcome of our social nature. Our

freedom of election in the matter is always limited. Even when the society begins with free association, its development brings in natural facts and antecedent rights that in the concrete narrow down that freedom, which in many cases becomes little more than freedom to choose to live in the country or to leave it. Often one's circumstances and condition are such as to take away even this.

Every human society, therefore, depending so much on man's nature, so little upon mere free choice, is inseparable from the Creator. It is a creature like man himself. This will appear more clearly from the following consideration. In discussing Providence we showed that in signs antecedent to the creative decree God saw among others infinite in number, this world as possible, not in a general way, but down to the very last particulars as these would arise, not only from the necessary sequence pure and simple of the irrational creature, but also from this as affected by every individual free act, however minute, of the rational creature. In decreeing this world, God decreed it as He knew it, decreeing positively all physical effects, all natural aids and supernatural graces, all the moral good following free correspondence with them, permitting the moral evil coming from failure to correspond. Thus in the creative word, he created not only the world and the individual human beings who were to dwell in it to the end of time, but also the political societies, republics, kingdoms, empires, that were to be the result of the activity of man's social nature.

Again, we have seen that, with the exception of man's spiritual soul, the forms of all composite beings to exist were concreated potentially with prime matter, to be educed according to the creative decree, each in its own time and place and mode. As individual men and women are the matter of human society, and authority binding their wills together is the form; and the specification of authority in the concrete gives the mode of the society, and its individuality; and this specification is the result of the necessary activity of man's social nature operating according to certain constituting facts; it follows immediately that all societies, and consequently all supreme political societies with which chiefly we are concerned, were created by God in the beginning potentially in definite potential human beings, to be actuated with them, each in its own time, place and mode. Thus in the potency of the members of colonial legislatures and of the Continental Congress; in that of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence, of the

soldiers and leaders of the army, and of the individual people of the colonies, all as yet themselves potential, God created potentially the United States to be actuated by their social activity in defending their constitutional rights. But conservation differs from creation only in this, that the term of the creative act is the creature in time and therefore progressive in its existence. Hence in the potentiality of the men and women of succeeding generations actuated, as St. Augustine says, in the unfolding processes of time, God conserved the United States. From your potentiality and mine, and from that of over one hundred million fellow-citizens, social authority educes social acts, which if in accordance with the fundamental Constitution, tend to preserve the nation, if at variance with it, are preparing the nation's ruin.

Supreme civil society, or in one word, the State, is God's creature. It is human. It has its own intelligence and will to know and choose the good. God moves it according to its nature, as He moves His free creature, man, by its essential dynamic tendency to its universal good. The notion of the laic State ignoring God, a law to itself, indifferent to any idea of morality, because, on account of its perfect independence, it is incapable of either an immoral act or a moral, is the concentrated essence of the rebellion of the creature against the Creator. The State must acknowledge God; it must worship and serve Him according to its social knowledge.

This does not mean that it must necessarily and immediately profess supernatural religion or Christianity. That it will reach the perfection of God's revealed religion, if it discharges faithfully its duty according to its existing knowledge, is certain. The real issue in the United States today is religion. According to the fundamental Constitution it believes in God, worships Him, looks to His providence for guidance and protection. The Constitution rests on religion, said the older statesmen. All the educational work of the body politic today is directed to the elimination of God and His providential government of the world; and, strange to say, a work so unpatriotic, so destructive of true Americanism is supported with public money.

Stability is of the very essence of the State. It is possible only under two conditions, government and order. By government is meant a rational movement of the body-politic uniting all individual wills in the procuring of the common good. This does not

mean the extinguishing of private rights, but the harmonizing of them. These do not originate from the State; it is out of the State's power to destroy them. There are two theories of the origin of government, the artificial and the natural. The former is bound up with the social contract. It supposes individualistic man surrendering in the contract certain purely individual rights, to purchase protection for others; for which purpose he subjects himself to a supreme authority created by the contract. The theory rests on falsehood. Man is not individualistic, but social. As a social individual he has personal rights perfectly compatible with society. Purely individual rights incompatible with social life, are the fiction of one who fancies individualistic man, and reasons about him in terms proper only to social man. Right is a relative term. Its correlative is obligation. Right is a moral power binding the wills of others. Obligation is in the will thus bound. Consequent upon right and obligation come coercion and sanction. These four imply necessarily social relations.

Were John individualistic, he might perhaps plough a field and sow it with grain and reap the crop. Should Thomas attempt to help himself to this, John would repel him by force because the same food can not serve two persons. But he could not say: "This grain is mine"; nor could he require Thomas to recognize and respect the right so implied. As individuals each would see a definite relation of service between the grain and himself; he could see none between himself and his neighbor, that would require him to respect the relation of the grain to the other, and to ignore its relation to himself. Moreover, though the contract theory seems to protect personal rights, it really opens the door to tyranny. The matter of contract is definite. The condition of primitive man making the contract defined its matter. I will obey the chosen superior by refraining from violating the home and property of another, provided that superior protects me in the peaceful possession of home and property. Home and property meant but little then. With the progress of time home comes to mean more than a hut or a tent; property, more than a boat and a net and weapons. The individual needs further protection. "You shall have it according to our contract theory, by paying the price. I have no obligation," says the chief, "to protect you beyond the actual terms of the original contract. Pay in the surrender of further rights and I will extend my protection." Hence the

development of civilization, the multiplication of interests would bring about the binding of the individual in bonds he cannot loosen. This is theory, one may say. But history confirms it, wherever the social contract theory prevails even implicitly.

Opposed to this we have the natural origin of government. In it there is no thought of conflict between the individual right and the social. Founded in social harmony, it preserves and perfects that harmony in a social organization developing into more intricate relations of right and obligation. Man is social. Society is God's creature. It cares for the exterior order with due regard to the interior. It provides for things temporal, so that each of its members may attain to things eternal. It is not the god upon earth of Hobbes; yet in its own order it represents its Creator. To make it a mere creation of human will, because in particular origins human choice is a frequent constituting fact; human voluntariness, in both origins and conservation, a necessary element, is an error, the source of much, if not of all, modern social disorder. "In things irrational it is proper that, through the excellence of their virtue given them by God, those of the higher order should move the lower. So from the power of authority divinely ordained it is proper that superiors should move subjects by their will." Nothing is more certainly evident than that obedience is natural to man. We obey rules and ordinances without an effort. When through some perverseness we disobey we perceive within ourselves an interior conflict. When an order is clearly wrong the painfulness of protest, of passive resistance, does not come from fear of the superior's vengeance. Such a fear may be concomitant; but, on the other hand, there often is little or no reason to fear. We resist painfully because God creates us social. He creates society because in all things He will lead his creature to its appointed end, not drive it. In administering His creation He acts through the natures of things, not violently, but sweetly.

Error regarding government arising from the denial of the Creator is a fecund source of social disorder. The disorder is recognized. But a world that rejects the Creator, will not correct it in its true cause. It sees that the evil springs too often from an assertion of personal rights on the part of subjects, and the ignoring, even the violation of them by the State. A favorite remedy is to assert the State to be the origin of every right, and in consequence its absolute power over them. "There is no right,

however sacred, which parliament can not extinguish," says Bryce, whom unaccountably and to the serious injury of the Republic our publicists and professors have accepted as their mentor. Socialists, Communists and Nihilists go further, each in his own way denying the existence of private right, a conclusion following of necessity from the Hegelian Evolutionary Idealism; of which the various modern philosophies are but successive expressions, each in turn more daringly adequate. Nothing is more certain, no human conviction is more universal than that the individual, though social, has his personal rights; nothing in this world is so intimately bound up with the Creator and the creature and the eternal destiny of the rational creature to be accomplished when this world shall be no more. The lower must be subject to the higher. The temporal is for the eternal. The things of this world are given to man as means to attain his end beyond this world; and he is bound to use them exclusively according to this law, manifested to all in the natural relations of things among themselves and to their Creator. From this come private possessions in the broadest sense, and the moral power of making them our own so as to generate in others the obligation of recognizing and respecting the fact. This is the very substance of social life. Only for social man living in society can right and obligation have any meaning. Take away the ideas, and with them human society vanishes, to be replaced, if possible, by the herding together of rational beings under the omnipotent, unmoral State, the god on earth of Hobbes.

Some who would like to be Christian Socialists, or what would be still more abnormal, Christian Communists, quote against us the doctrine of St. Thomas at the head of this chapter. "Community of goods is attributed to natural law." "Distinction of possessions does not follow natural law, but rather human agreement." To use words so separated from their context to support any communistic or socialistic theory can be the act of only a deliberate special pleader. St. Thomas does no more than amplify the text, self-evident to all: "The heaven of heavens is the Lord's: the earth He has given to the children of men." (Ps. cxiii. 16). He has given it primarily neither to be possessed in common nor to be divided amongst individuals; but to be so the abode and support of man, that each must have his place in it and his sustenance from it. Had He made common possession the law, there

could have been no private possession. Had He made partition the law, each human being would have received his portion, and there could have been no common possession. He has so given it that though private possession, as more conducive to efficiency in the use of things, will be the general rule, common possession in particular cases is not excluded. Were private possession excluded, many of man's best qualities, such as initiative, prudence, frugality, thrift, industry, would be without adequate motive; the capabilities of nature would be inadequately exploited. Were common possession prohibited, religious orders, partnerships, civic and national organization would be impossible. Hence it is left to human agreement to add by way of complement to natural law the conclusions of rational investigation.

Wherefore in saying: "It is not good for man to be alone," God was not expressing any utilitarian conclusion; but was summing up in one brief formula the social nature He had created, with all its necessary consequences.

Does the perfecting of man's social nature belong to the natural order only? Is the State, the highest expression of civil society, the last perfection of man's social nature? There is, we know, a natural society which in its care for man's eternal things goes far beyond all the State can do. The domestic society, the family, antecedent in its nature to all civil society, generating its multitude, not receiving it otherwise than from God; generating its multitude so that the generation viewed adequately is but a mode of creation, in which parents are but instruments of the principal cause, the Creator; this society is so intimately connected with the first origin of every human being, as to have necessarily a very special function regarding his last end. Its function is to sustain, instruct and educate the child with a view to the beatitude of the future life, to which everything of this world must be subordinated.

Such is the perfect providence of the natural order. A question yet remains. Since God in His goodness, restores man to the supernatural order in which He created him, does He leave each as an individual to attain his supernatural end unaided and alone? Is this so high as to transcend our social nature? Can it be that the social in man is incapable of elevation? The idea is too absurd to be entertained. There could be no heaven for the individualistic man. Celestial bliss can not be other than the perfection of

social nature in the supernatural order. In it we come to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, to the company of angels, to the Church of the first born written in heaven, to God, the Judge, to the just made perfect, to Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant, and beyond all this, to the supreme society of the Triune God, seen face to face. We shall see Him as we are seen. We shall love Him as we are loved. In this is the consummation of the society of the saints, for in that celestial country God is all in all.

With respect to this new life the natural man is lifeless. He must be born again in a new creation of supernatural life. In such a rebirth the wisest, the strongest is but an infant. The natural family foreshadows the supernatural, that household of faith in which the children of God have their sustenance, instruction, education for eternal life, the Holy Church. With this conviction we pass to the Creator operating in the supernatural creature.

CHAPTER XI

THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER— SANCTIFYING GRACE

"Amen, amen I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he can not enter into the Kingdom of God." *John* iii, 5.

"The first man Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam, into a quickening spirit. Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual." *1 Cor.* xv, 45, 46.

"If then any be in Christ a new creature, the old things are passed away, behold I make all things new." *2 Cor.* v.17.

"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us." *Rom.* v.5.

"God sent His Son . . . that He might redeem them who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." *Gal.* iv. 4-6.

"The spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God and joint heirs with Christ." *Rom.* viii, 16.17.

" . . . This disposition or preparation is followed by actual justification, which is not the remission of sins only, but both the sanctification and the renovation of the interior man by the voluntary receiving of grace and of gifts; whence from the unjust, man is made the just, and the enemy becomes the friend, that he may be 'heir according to hope of life everlasting.' (*Tit.* iii, 7.) Of this justification the causes are these: the final cause, the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life; the efficient cause, God merciful, who freely 'cleanses and sanctifies' (*1 Cor.* vi, 11.), 'signing and anointing with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance' (*Eph.* i, 13 seq.); the meritorious cause, His most beloved Only-Begotten Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, who, 'when we were enemies, (*cf.* *Rom.* v. 10) for His exceeding great charity wherewith He loved us,' (*Eph.* ii, 4) merited for us justification by His most Holy Passion on the wood of the Cross, and satisfied God the Father on our behalf; the instrumental cause, the Sacrament of baptism, which is the Sacrament of faith, without faith no one was ever justified; lastly the only formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just. Endowed with this by Him we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and not only are reckoned just, but are truly called so and truly are just, receiving in ourselves justice everyone according to his measure, which 'the Holy Ghost divides to each according as He wills,' (*1 Cor.* xii, 11.) and according to every one's own disposition and cooperation." *Conc Trent. Sess.* vi, c 7.

"It seems that there is no need of any preparation or disposition on man's part to receive grace—But *Amos* (iv. 12) says the contrary: "Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel"; and in *1 Kings* vii, 3. we read: 'Prepare your hearts unto the Lord.' I therefore answer: We must say that grace is spoken of in a two-fold sense. Some-

times it is the habitual gift itself of God; sometimes it is the aid given by God moving the soul to good. For grace taken in the first sense some preparation of grace is required; for there can be no form unless in matter disposed for it. If, however, we speak of grace as signifying aid coming from God who moves to good, no preparation on man's part is required as going before the divine aid; but rather whatever preparation can be in man is from the aid of God moving the soul towards good. From this point of view the good movement itself of the free-will, whereby one is prepared to receive the gift of grace, is the act of the free-will moved by God. And to this extent a man is said to prepare himself, according to *Prov.* xvi. 1. 'It is the part of man to prepare the soul.' It is principally the work of God moving the free-will; and under this aspect man's will is said to be prepared by God and his steps directed by the Lord." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 1, 2, cxii, 2.

"It seems that to one preparing himself for grace, or doing what lies in his power grace is given of necessity . . . But, on the other hand, man is compared to God as the clay, to the potter. Thus *Jerem.* xviii, 6. 'As clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand.' But how much soever the clay is prepared, it does not receive its form from the potter of necessity. Therefore neither does man receive grace from God of necessity, however much he disposes himself. I reply that we must say, as above, that man's preparation for grace is from God as from the mover, from free will as from the thing moved. Hence preparation can be viewed in two ways. In one it is considered inasmuch as it comes from free-will; and from this point of view it has no necessity as regards the obtaining of grace, because the gift of grace exceeds all human power of preparation. In the other way it can be considered inasmuch as it comes from God, the mover; and then it has a necessity regarding what is ordained by God, a necessity, however, not of compulsion but of infallibility; because the intention of God can not fail.

In this sense Augustine in *Praedest. Sanct.* Book ix, says that, 'whoever are set free, are by the favor of God set free most certainly.' Wherefore, if it is from the intention of God moving him that man, whose heart he moves, should obtain grace, he obtains it infallibly according to *John* vi, 45: 'Everyone that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me.'" *Ibid.* 3.

In discussing miracles we passed from the natural order to the supernatural. Whether in the natural order God would ever have transcended its limits, is a question one might discuss forever, only to find the categoric solution impossible. It would be a useless discussion, since all miracles regard the actual supernatural order to which man has been elevated and restored. By miracles God confirms the mission of those He sends to carry His message to men. So He confirmed the mission of Moses, of Elias, of Eliseus. So He confirmed the mission of the Apostles. So above all He confirmed the mission of His Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ, in Himself not only the foundation of the supernatural order but its very essence also and sum. By miracles He establishes the fact that not a few who served Him with all their heart on earth, are

now reigning gloriously with Him in heaven. By miracles He declares that they are to be honored and invoked, not so much because they are in heaven, as because, though in heaven, they constitute with the faithful on earth one indivisible supernatural Kingdom complete in all its social order and hierarchical degrees; wherein each individual has his function, the lower depending on the higher the earthly on the heavenly, under one King, Jesus Christ. Indeed were there on earth, no real Kingdom, but only an unorganized multitude of the elect invisible to men, known to God alone, entrance into heaven would be indeed that separation from earth in death which all Protestantism takes for granted, and the Communion of Saints would be but an empty expression. By miracles God indicates those places on earth where the saints are to receive in a special way the honor He has allotted to them, and to reward with celestial favors those who pay it. Above all He declares by miracles where He sets the Name of the Mother of His Divine Son, where she is to be worshiped, where she is to multiply her beneficence beyond the ordinary measure.

As we have seen, the miracle is worked in the natural order; but its very nature requires it to transcend every natural force or virtue, at least in its mode. But this transcendence must not be confined to the work itself. It must pass over to the end of the work. A miracle is not wrought that men may simply wonder. They must see in the wonder the hand of God, who thus gives evidence of the things that appear not. A miracle is not wrought that a man may regain his natural health in a way beyond the power of nature. It asserts the claim of a higher power requiring him and his fellows to learn from the one through whose ministry he is cured, what otherwise they could not attain to. The miracle reaches out beyond the goods of man's natural life, to the supernatural life, to its goods, to its supreme end. What is this supernatural life? How does God create it? How operate in it?

In our first chapters we found our life so bound up, as almost to be identified with the dynamic movement to universal good created in our nature by God, who, unmoved Himself, is thus the prime mover of all. Of that universal expansion the first consequence is the intellectual apprehension of external things as participating in the universal good. Then follow the determination of the universal movement according to particular objects, and the distinction of faculties apprehensive, expansive, locomo-

tive. But no particular object is adequate to the universal movement, which can rest only in the apprehension of the universal good. On the other hand, the intellect, rising above particular things, may perceive in each its participation, according to its degree, in the actually existing universal good, the Creator of all. Thus could be attained that apprehension of the absolute Good, which in the natural order would satisfy man's capacity, give the term to dynamic movement and so change the constant progression of unsatisfied craving into the eternal rest in good possessed. Thus would have been obtained natural beatitude, God, the absolute True, known in His creatures as the absolute Good with a fullness of apprehension satisfying every natural appetite. The instrument of such beatitude would be natural reason so illuminated as to perceive readily, constantly, adequately to its capacity, the unseen Creator in the visible creature. The progression of the creature in time to this eternal beatitude would be the adequate movement of its dynamic expansion in the operations of the intellect, so illuminated as to salute in present finite goods the far-off infinite good, and of the will, moved by divine impulses to turn from present to future joy. Such would have been the natural human life. For this would God have created it. Thus would He have operated in it, moving it from its beginning to its appointed end.

The supernatural order differs from the natural in this, that in it man's last end is not God known in His creatures, but God seen and known in Himself. In this elevation of man's destiny he, the chief of mundane creatures, able to grasp all creation in his intelligence, was enabled to carry on all by his will to a corresponding end. Thus the destiny of all creatures was raised. They were no longer reflections only, in which some glimpse of the Creator might be caught. They became a ladder whereby man might rise to the presence of God, and consequently in them might anticipate on earth the nobler face to face vision of the future.

This new destiny of man demands an elevation of the powers of his nature and faculties. The universal expansion to natural happiness, his vital activity whereby God moves him to his natural good, must receive a new force, a further direction, a dynamic activity of which the term is supernatural beatitude in the vision of God. The faculties which would have found their perfection in the possession and enjoyment of the Creator in His creature, must

now go further. What would have been their natural perfection, must now be made a means to the supernatural possession and enjoyment of God by intuitive vision. Thus man receives a relation to God entirely new. In this new relation he regards creatures in an entirely new light. If, as we have seen, the recognition by reason of man's natural relations to His Creator, the reaching out of the will for the good perceived in them, the final apprehension of that good by the intellect, are all functions of the natural vital expansion towards universal good, it is clear that the new supernatural relations demand an analogous supernatural expansion.

As in the natural order the Creator moves the creature by a general dynamic activity tending to its full specific good, which in man is the universal good to be found only in the Creator Himself; and as this dynamic principle is distinguished only notionally from the nature, as vital activity is distinguishable from the life; so in the supernatural order God moves man by a supernatural dynamic principle, distinguishable only notionally from his elevated nature and supernatural life, to his universal supernatural good, the beatific vision. Here we must remember that a universal movement is determined to its universal object, not by the object itself, but by the one imposing the movement. Thus an electric motor in motion is in potency to a hundred different kinds of work. To any particular effect it is determined by the material presented under proper conditions. In this way it will fuse metals, produce light, move a car, and so on. But its universal potency is determined, not by all possible effects taken collectively but by the artisan who in designing it gave it a universal relation to such effects. So too, though the sense of sight is determined by the object to this particular act or that, the power of seeing is determined to things visible in general by Him who places the power in the creature. In like manner the universal movement towards good as such is determined to its object by Him who impressed it on man directing all things to Himself. This is why in man we call it dynamic in contradistinction to its particular acts in its different faculties determined by particular objects. The same is true with regard to the supernatural movement towards the beatific vision. This is not the place to ask how man knows its term, anymore than when first discussing man's universal movement in the natural order did we ask how man first knows the

universal good as the term of his dynamic movement. For this it sufficed to understand with St. Thomas that to create intelligent life is to create the fundamental movement whereby the Creator moves the creature to universal good; it is to create the intellectual faculty, not passively stored with innate ideas, but in perfect proportion with the dynamic movement, active and ready to act and acquire; since, a participation of the Divine Intelligence, its activity is included in that impressed movement, which is a participation of the Divine Being. Having seen the movement impressed substantially in proximate first act, become in the second act operative through faculties determined by their objects, we then investigated how by reflex action the natural universal good is known. So too, is it in the supernatural order. At present we only say that the impressed movement to the beatific vision is the formal elevation of nature, the communication of supernatural life. The infused entity accomplishing all is sanctifying grace.

Since the operation is supernatural, its effect, a new nature, it is a creation. As it is superadded to the first creation in an order entirely different, it is a new creation. Since it finds its term in individual men already born into the first creation, it is for each a new birth. Therefore St. Paul speaks of the new creature, of the old man and the new, of the first and the second Adam, and Our Lord tells Nicodemus of the new birth by water and the Holy Ghost. Let us now see how God effects His work.

This the Council of Trent explains by following out the category of causes in its decree prefixed to this chapter. "The final cause is the glory of God and of Christ, and eternal life." Here are indicated the end of the work, God's glory; the end of the Worker, eternal life; and the glory of Christ participating in both. The work itself procures in a marvellous degree God's extrinsic glory, that is, the recognition of His supreme excellence, and its acknowledgment most widely diffused throughout His intelligent creatures, angels and men. Nevertheless, it adds nothing to His intrinsic glory, which is His infinite knowledge of Himself, of His infinite Being and perfections, and of the infinite possibilities of their participation to creatures. This infinite intrinsic glory so transcends the finite extrinsic glory as to be, like everything in the infinite God, absolutely unaffected by the existence or non-existence of any finite being. Wherefore, though God's extrinsic glory be the necessary end of the work, it could not be that of the divine

Worker. On the other hand the diffusion of His own goodness; the giving to the creature an operation natural only to Himself, beyond the nature of any other however elevated its being; the making the creature a sharer in His divine nature—in two words, eternal life—this with regard to man is included in the end of the Omnipotent Worker, which adequately must remain unfathomable. Lastly the glory of Christ is the end both of the Worker and of the work. As with the Father and the Holy Ghost He is the Triune Worker of man's justification, that intrinsic glory of the Godhead is His which no extrinsic glory can affect. As such, therefore, the diffusion of the goodness of the Divinity is His end. As Man He is in the supernatural order what Adam was in the natural. He is the sum of human nature elevated and restored, as Adam was its sum dragging it down in his fall. By the Hypostatic Union human nature shares with the divine an incomprehensible intimacy, of which the closest union in the greatest of saints is but a pale reflection. All the splendor, therefore, of restored human nature before angels and men, for us identified with eternal life as the formal elevation is in us identified with justification, is concentrated in the Humanity of the Incarnate Word, blended, so to speak, with that of His salvific work of hard-won royalty. Wherefore to Him is ascribed properly and supremely by the Holy Apostle the Psalmist's words of prophecy: "Thou hast made Him a little lower than the angels: Thou hast crowned Him with glory and honor." (*Heb. ii, 7.*). Thus He alone gives the Triune God that adequate extrinsic glory, the end of the work, which is possible to mankind only as summed in Him its Head.

"The efficient cause is the merciful God, who freely cleanses and sanctifies, signing and anointing with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance." Here we see that justification is no mere figure, no mere external attribution. It is a real *making just*. God operates interiorly in us, taking away the real stain of sin and restoring us to the original justice lost in Adam. It is no mere referring to man of the fruit of Christ's merits, so that under His satisfaction for sin man's guilt may be hidden, and the sinner, unchanged in his nature, may be reputed just. It is a real transformation, a real washing away of sin, a real cleansing of sinful nature, so that the "blotting out of the handwriting of the decree against us" (*Col. ii, 14.*) is the necessary consequence of our justification, not the essential justification itself.

It is an essential purification, not a removal of, as it were, superficial stains only; for it is in the restoration of fallen nature to the supernatural state in which He created it, that God not only cleanses by washing away guilt, but sanctifies also by infusing grace. This He does freely. We have no title against Him originating in ourselves. We contribute nothing of the work itself. We are clay in the hands of the potter. But we are a rational clay, a free clay, a clay that by yielding to the potter, does all that in it lies towards the accomplishment of the work; yet a clay able to refuse to receive the potter's forming. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas says, no preparation such as we can give can necessitate the gift of grace. In all such preparation God is the mover, man is moved; and as what is moved cannot originate the movement, neither can it necessitate the term. Grace comes to those doing what in them lies, because the Divine Mover moving man freely must be true to Himself.

On this crucial matter, the nature of justification and of God's operation in it, the Council of Trent amplifies its doctrine in the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians. God cleanses and sanctifies "signing with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance." Here signing means marking permanently, stamping as with a seal. This is the sense of the Greek text, and is the general meaning of the Latin *signo* which our English version of the Scriptures renders, *sign*. In exactly this sense the term recurs in the Apocalypse: "Hurt not the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, till we sign the servants of our God upon their foreheads." In sealing, the matter is the application of the seal to the wax; the form is the seal itself communicated in its impression. So by analogy the matter of this signing is the giving of the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost cannot, like the applied seal, be given as an exterior, momentary accession to leave only a facsimile behind Him. He is the Spirit of promise. But He is also the Creator Spirit—*Veni Creator Spiritus*—the Spirit of life. As such He gives His life to men as the creature can receive the Creator. There is a real indwelling, a union permanent in its nature. The form of this signing is not the impressed image of the Holy Ghost, but the Holy Ghost Himself. It is therefore necessarily interior justification by supernatural elevation.

To make perfectly clear this sense of signing, the Council introduces after it the words "and anointing." To anoint was a sacred

rite of consecration establishing between the anointed and God new relations, new capacities and powers. The tabernacle, the altar and its appurtenances were anointed. The priesthood was anointed. Kings were anointed to become in a special way God's representatives; and as such were recognized as "the anointed of the Lord." Those, therefore, signed and anointed are thus made a kingly priesthood, a holy nation. Like Christ their Saviour, the Anointed in the supreme sense, they are holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners. Such they are through grace expelling sin: He is such because He knew no sin. Thus the vision of God becomes for them with Him a common inheritance; His by nature, theirs by the adoption into that nature effected by the Holy Spirit in the signing and anointing, which at once makes them heirs and remains the title of their inheritance.

"The meritorious cause is God's beloved only-begotten Son, Our Lord Jesus Christ; who, when we were enemies, through the exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, merited for us justification by His most Holy Passion on the wood of the Cross, and satisfied God on our behalf." Having accomplished the wonderful work of the first creation, God saw all things He had made and they were very good. He would not have His second creation less than that. Indeed, because it was of a higher order and its capacity for good, greater, there was, so to speak, an incitement to make it good in the very highest degree. The first creation called creatures out of nothing into being. The second might have been absolutely new; the annihilation of the first in its failure, the substitution for it of another which should not fail. Instead of that God would recall the first, not now from nothingness, not from physical death—in death there is nothing antagonistic to Him who is Lord alike of life and of death—but from moral corruption repugnant to the infinitely Holy, from moral evil to moral integrity and moral good. The new creation was to be a restoration in rebellious man of that supernatural grace which he had cast away and trampled in the mire. The restoration might have been a gift absolutely free, analogous to an annihilation of the prevaricating creature and a substitution of the just. But as this would have fallen short of supreme perfection in the work, so also would the unmerited gift. Harmony replacing discord; reconciliation, enmities; order evoked out of disorder; the building up into a nation of what was not a nation—these the work demanded. Such

a demand required in God the full exercise in their supreme perfection of attributes which in the finite order seem mutually exclusive. Here below we temper justice with mercy. But the consequence is that neither exhibits its perfection. That the restoration of sinful man might in God's eyes be supremely good, mercy and justice had to meet in their supreme excellence. That they did so, David saw in prophetic vision when he cried concerning the work of redemption: "Mercy and truth have met each other: justice and peace have kissed. Truth is sprung out of the earth; and justice hath looked down from heaven." (*Ps. lxxxiv, ii 12.*) With no less splendor of diction the prophet Malachias looking to the Saviour in His Kingdom, calls Him by inspiration as wonderfully as gloriously: "The Sun of Justice, rising with healing in His wings." (*Malach. iv 2.*)

Here we deal with old-world notions. The necessary imperfection of a restoration without the satisfaction of justice has become more than obscure today, when the idea of vindictive justice is scouted. Yet this is one of the very fundamental ideas of mankind. Offence and punishment have always been correlative terms. Punishment includes correction, inasmuch as it offers the offender the opportunity of changing his disorderly life. It includes prevention since it deters from future transgression. But its primary and essential end is the satisfaction of justice. The transgressor contracts a debt, which, when specified by the law and individualized by the sentence, becomes, as St. Thomas says, matter of commutative justice. By undergoing the penalty imposed he pays the debt. These are universal ideas. In Latin and in Greek, however "*to punish*" and "*to be punished*" be expressed, the expression includes, as a rule, explicitly, ideas familiar to us today, the exacting of the penalty as an obligation contracted by the offender, and in the same sense the payment of it. "He has paid the penalty: Justice is satisfied."

The foundation of this universal idea is the profound conviction of an external moral order to which man is subject. What it commands, he must do. What it forbids, he must shun. It is a law. In the Greek mythology it was personified, though the personification is vaguer than those of the Olympian divinities; while in the tragedians *Dice* seems sometimes an awful presence, associated with a purer Zeus, the lawgiver, rather as an attribute than as a daughter. This is in conformity with the unchanging rule.

We trace backwards fallen man's concepts of the eternal verities and find them always the purer and the loftier as we draw to their primal source, God the Creator of man, the Author of the law.

This moral order, then, is no abstraction, but a reality. It is the law of the Creator imposed upon the creature, manifested in the universal relations of rational creatures among themselves, with irrational creatures, and through both relations with the Creator. Among these relations the most important is the social, springing from the social nature of man. Human society, then, with its authority, is charged with the enforcement of order in this world. The debt contracted by the violation of order, though ultimately due to the divine Lawgiver, is due immediately to society which through it has been wronged. The wrong is four-fold. By rejecting for his private gratification his obligation to the common welfare, the offender separates himself from his fellows, depriving society of his obligatory service. By diverting to his personal and exclusive service material things which, used by their legitimate possessors, would have conduced to the common good, he attacks society in the material order. By violating individual rights, he tends to weaken public authority, the protector and vindicator of those rights; and in defying his moral obligations he attacks the very bond of social union, namely that common recognition of the obligation of order, and that ready submission to it yielded by all, whereby alone can be effected a durable union of wills. This his contempt of order tends to destroy, necessitating the substitution of physical force for human obligation.

To heal this four-fold wound the offender should recall his act by another quite the contrary, which would bring his will to reenter into the union of wills for the common good; which would restore the relation between material means and their legitimate functions; which would recognize in common with the other members of society the obligation of a willing observance of order; and, by putting the execution of the act under the direction of public authority, would recognize this as the protector of order, the guardian of private rights in the procuring of the common good. Such an act must be *exterior*. It deals with exterior relations violated by an exterior action. For this no interior repentance and resolutions of reform could suffice. It must be *visible*. Society at large has been wronged by the malicious will; society at large will be righted by means of the evidence of a will now orderly. It must

affect the sensitive nature. The offence comes from yielding to the passions of the one nature, sensitive and rational: it will be recalled by the evident subjection of those passions to the rule of order. *It must be accepted by public authority.* The offence set public authority at defiance; public authority must be satisfied for the wrong. Such is the solid foundation of vindictive justice. What the offender will not do of his own initiative, social authority, as the guardian of order, promoting order in all its subjects according to their need, prescribes for him; aiding him, as far as it can, to supplement the restoration of order with his own interior amendment. Should he, however, prove obstinate, which is often too probable; should others fail to be deterred by the solemn morality of such exemplary punishment, which is less likely, vindictive justice, will nevertheless have attained its essential end. For those who fail to profit by it, their destruction is from themselves.

We said that, when the generic obligation of paying the penalty of an offence has been specified by the law and individualized by the sentence, it comes under commutative justice. It is therefore, like all such obligations, a debt binding the offender in conscience to pay it according as it is exacted by public authority. This may appear hard doctrine. Nevertheless it has its advantages. Once a debt is paid, the inequality between debtor and creditor is removed. They stand once more as men and citizens in an equality of relations. So, theoretically at least, when the offender has paid the penalty of his offence, he re-enters his social relations on terms of perfect equality with his fellow-citizens. If in practice the case is otherwise, the chief reason is that public offenders, as a rule, are far from that willing payment of their debt which would make it, not only in itself but also on their part, a full and complete restoration of violated order. They yield to compulsion: they do not put off their evil will.

The one offended cannot reject a satisfaction, full and complete, coming from the offender. To do so would be to maintain the existing disorder due to the offence, with, however, a change in those involved, the one offended becoming the offender, the former offender now suffering the offence. He may accept from another a vicarious satisfaction. He is not bound to do so, unless on account of a common subjection of both to a superior power requiring its acceptance. Moreover vicarious satisfaction supposes

some special tie, identifying in some way the offender, and the one willing to satisfy for his offence. Thus a father could satisfy for a son; and a son, for a father. A brother could pay a brother's penalty, a vassal could take the place of his lord. A prince could bear the punishment of his people; a friend, that of a friend. But a particular offence could hardly be satisfied by a casual passer-by. The vicarious satisfaction could be refused because the offence is personal. This too is the reason why there must be a personal bond between the offender and the one substituting for him, to give, as it were, a title to have the substitution accepted. Lastly, because the offence is personal the satisfaction vicarious, the substitute, having no obligation, does not strictly pay the penalty. What he does by removing with the other's consent the material injury, thus restoring the one offended to his pristine state, is to merit on behalf of the offender the condoning of the offence.

Applying all this to the question we are discussing, we find that the enduring of sin's penalty should repair the relations between the creature and the Creator violated by the transgression; that it should reunite the wills of men to the will of God; that it should heal the offence suffered by the Divine Majesty; that it should do so visibly, since the offence was visible; that it should touch with pain the sensitive nature which had its share in the sin. This justice demanded: this man could never pay. To simply condone the offence would be human mercy: a mercy not destructive of justice, since all mankind, involved in the universal transgression, justly forgives each his neighbor, as a sacrifice to divine justice, that he may receive mercy from a just God. Still such a condoning must infringe upon the pure notion of justice, and, however laudable among men compassed about with infirmity, was not the mercy chosen by God. In His infinite wisdom God would combine perfect mercy with perfect justice. The mercy is perfect, because, as far as man is concerned, the offence is forgiven which he could never repair, the penalty remitted which he could never pay. The justice is perfect, since the penalty is paid in the absolute equality of commutative justice. He who pays it is God, equal to the Father and the Holy Ghost in all things. He pays it in our human nature, which for that purpose He takes to Himself. The substitution is intimate beyond all possible human intimacy, for in Him is all human nature elevated and restored. Lastly, because in Him there was no shadow of sin, the satisfaction was purely meritori-

ous beyond any human possibility. The very bond which makes substitution possible amongst men, implies in the substitute some participation with the offender in the offence. They are of the same guilty blood, of the same offending race, of the same hostile nation. The bond that makes possible the substitution of Jesus Christ is a purifying bond, an elevating, sanctifying bond, lifting up the offenders from their sin to a participation in the pure sanctity of Him who takes upon Himself their penalty.

"The instrumental cause is the sacrament of baptism, the sacrament of faith—without faith no one was ever justified." In executing His providence in the visible order of the world, God makes use of visible instruments. He is always the principal cause. He uses instruments, not as we do, to supply any deficiency; but because the invisible God wills so to move a visible creation to its term, that the lower may serve the higher and the higher may move the lower, until all things combine to serve man. God, therefore, in using instruments gives them all their efficacy, so that, being, as the Prime Mover of all things, always the Creator, His use of instruments or not, but defines the mode whereby as Creator He externizes His operation in its term. This is the constant theme of the earlier chapters of this book.

What is true of the natural order, is true also of the supernatural. Our Lord's mission was to men, not to disembodied spirits. Men, therefore, are to be His followers or His foes. He gathers them into a visible Kingdom, with its visible authority and its promulgated law, controlling visible activities. In it they give Him visible worship; and He sanctifies them by visible sacraments administered by a visible priesthood. The opposite doctrine is logically Gnosticism; and this is why in most heresies, especially in Protestantism, the sum of all the heresies, there is found the gnostic taint.

Justification, regeneration, supernatural elevation, different terms to express the same thing as viewed from different standpoints, are necessarily interior. What they express, God works in the soul, and God alone. But the one thing worked by God has also other names corresponding to other points of view. It is membership in Christ and in His visible Kingdom on earth, the Catholic Church. To be justified, to be regenerated, to be raised to the supernatural order, all are comprised in becoming a member of the Catholic Church, the Kingdom of Heaven here below, from

which alone can one pass to the triumphant Kingdom of eternity. Hence the instrument of justification, the instrument of regeneration, is the instrument of adoption into Christ in His Church.

"Baptism is the sacrament of faith." "This is eternal life, to know Thee the only true God and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent." (*John* xvii. 3.) As the life in heaven is supernatural, the vision of God; so its preparation, the life on earth, must be supernatural, founded on the supernatural knowledge of God. In every possible sense the just man lives by faith. So we are asked in coming to Baptism: "What dost thou seek from the Church of God?" We answer: "Faith." Again we are asked: "What does faith give you?" and the answer follows: "Eternal life." We shall speak of this faith at greater length later. Here we must note that, besides the habit of faith infused in baptism, there is an act of faith which in adults is the necessary condition of its reception. "Here is water," said the Ethiopian, "what doth hinder me from being baptized?" Philip answered: "If thou believest with all thy heart thou mayest." Then came the confession of faith: "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." (*Acts*. vii 36, 37.)

This faith comes by hearing, says the Apostle. Its initial step is belief in the existence of God. This may be the conviction, merely natural, drawn with divine aid from the existence of contingent beings, strengthened by tradition and the general social acknowledgment of the truth. Usually, however, among the heathen the idea of God is so corrupt that the first care of the preacher is to purify it. This he may do by inducing a natural process of reason and will illuminated and moved by the aids due to nature. Nevertheless, in practice, grace usually begins the work of enlightening the understanding no less than that of moving the will. In the case of those coming from the hardness of modern scientific atheism, one can hardly conceive even this first step otherwise than as the work of grace.

The second step is to believe that God is a rewarder of those that seek Him. "Without faith it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." (*Heb.* xi 6.) Here the catechumen begins to pass from a belief that may be purely natural and speculative, to what is practical, touching his own supernatural destiny, and to the need of seeking its attainment in God, who is never sought in vain. Here then must begin the super-

natural stirring up and assistance of grace, whereby man is with his free consent moved towards God. The full course of this movement is beautifully described by the Council of Trent. He believes "those things to be true which have been divinely revealed and promised, and first of all, that the sinner is by God justified by means of His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus." Then, "recognizing that he is a sinner, by turning to consider God's mercy he is raised from the fear of divine justice, whereby he is profitably terrified, to hope; believing that God will be gracious to him on account of Christ. Thus he begins to love God as the fount of all justice, and consequently turns against his sins through a hatred and detestation, that is, through the penance which must precede baptism. Lastly, while he proposes to receive baptism, He commences a new life and begins to keep the divine commandments." (Coun. Trent. Sess. vi, Chap. 6.)

"The one exclusive formal cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He is just Himself, but that whereby He makes us just." The formal cause is the active principle which determines the matter, the passive principle indifferent to all forms, to be this or that specific thing. It is the very reality of the thing. A statue, however dexterously wrought, however cunningly colored, is a statue, not a man, it is marble or wood, not flesh and blood. If with almost superhuman skill the artist had given it movement and speech, it would be a wonderful automaton; it would not be a man. If one of the evil spirits which surround us were to take possession of it, imitating in it every human function with all their spontaneity and voluntariness, it would not be a man. Were there several such figures we might call it a man; saying, this is a man, that is a horse, this a woman, that a lion or an ape. But obviously we should be speaking of representation, not of reality. In only one way could such a figure become a man, by the reception, namely, of a human soul which, infused into it, would effect in the matter the perfect organization of a human body through its union with it to form one substance, a real man.

These realities constituting the very being of things, are founded in the absolute Being, God. Possibilities, infinite in the abstract, are but the infinite imitability of that infinite Reality. Creation is their external actualization, determined in number, measure and weight. It is a participation by the Creator of His own Being; not indeed of Himself existing in Himself, the sole

reason of His own existence—this would be Pantheism—but of Himself the sole sufficient reason for the existence of creatures, giving being to those that of themselves are no being, conserving them in their being, moving each, as the Prime Mover of all, to the universal good according to the nature in which He has created it. In a word, creation is the external participation of the Infinite Being to the finite. This is its unfathomable mystery. It is clear, nevertheless, that, though the creature is distinct in its own individual being from the Creator, yet the distinction is not the same as that between the generator and the generated, the maker and the thing made. Here matter is the principle of individuation. The matter of the son is not the matter of the father. It does not depend on him. This is the necessary condition of generation. Were it otherwise generation would be impossible. I can externize my idea of a ship or a house because I have matter not my own in which I can operate to produce a ship wherein to sail, or a house wherein to live. I can externize my idea of St. Peter or St. Paul, because I have canvas and colors, marble and chisel distinct from myself, by means of which I can make the picture or the statue. Here there is some participation of being from generator or maker, but it is analogical only. In creation there is nothing in the creature that is not the externization of the exemplary idea of the Creator, there is nothing that can be said to be more externized or less. For the sufficient reason of the smallest element we must go back to the will of the Creator decreeing the external realization of what can be real, only because of His own substantial reality. He does, therefore, in an ineffable way, communicate Himself to the creature; the being of the creature is really, in a way beyond the grasp of our thought and the power of our words, a participation of the Being of the Creator.

Transfer these ideas to the supernatural order. Here by no figure of speech is justification a new creation, but in all sober truth. In the natural order we are not said to live, or to be reputed living, because God lives. Such doctrine would be either sheer nonsense or flat pantheism. I live with my own individual life, a living substance, complete in myself, distinct from all others. Yet if I seek the sufficient reason absolute and complete of my individual life, I must find it in an ineffable yet certainly real participation of the divine life. So in the supernatural order, the justified sinner is not, as the Protestant heresy held, called just, or reputed

just, because of the atoning justice of Christ. He is just in his individual justice, distinct from that of all others, complete in itself, the character and seal of his citizenship in Christ's Kingdom militant on earth, his title to his place in that same Kingdom triumphant in heaven. Yet the sufficient reason of that justification is found not in his own works, not adequately in the merits of Christ, not in the Divine decree, transferring him from darkness into light. What is my natural life in itself, that is to say what is its formal cause? It is a definite participation of the Divine Life, not inasmuch as by it God lives, but inasmuch as by it He makes me live. What is my supernatural life in which, raised from sin I live to Justice? It is the participation to me of God's justice, not inasmuch as by it He is just, but inasmuch as by it He makes me just. The idea is clear. The doctrine is evident. The inadequacy of language so baffles expression as to be overcome with no multiplication of words.

CHAPTER XII

THE ACT OF FAITH IN AND AFTER JUSTIFICATION

"Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." *Heb.* xi, 1.

"We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." *1 Cor.* xiii, 12.

"For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty to God . . . bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ." *2 Cor.* x, 4, 5.

"Since man depends entirely on God as his Creator and Lord, and since created reason is utterly subject to the uncreated Truth, we are obliged to yield by faith the full obedience of intellect and will to God revealing. This faith, which is the beginning of human salvation, the Catholic Church declares to be a supernatural virtue by which, with the influence and aid of God's grace, we believe to be true what He has revealed, not on account of the intrinsic truth of things penetrated by the natural light of reason, but on account of the authority of God Himself revealing, who can neither be deceived nor deceive.

"Nevertheless, that our faith should be a 'reasonable service' (*Rom.* xii, 1.). God willed that with the internal aids of the Holy Ghost should be joined external proofs of His revelation, namely divine facts, and first of all miracles and prophecies, which, since they carry with them a luminous demonstration of God's omnipotence and infinite knowledge, are signs of divine revelation, absolutely certain and suited to every intelligence. Wherefore Moses and the prophets and especially Christ Our Lord performed miracles and uttered prophecies, many and most manifest; and we read of the Apostles: 'But they going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed' (*Mark* xvi. 20.); and again it is written; 'We have the more firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend as to a light shining in a dark place.' (*2 Peter* i, 19.)" *Vatican Council*, Sess. iii, c. 3.

"In all natures ordered among themselves two things are found concurring to the perfection of the inferior nature; one of which accords with its own proper movement; the other, with the movement of the higher nature. Thus according to its own proper movement water moves to the centre, while according to the movement of the moon it moves about the centre in flow and ebb. Similarly by their own movements the planets move from west to east, by the movement of the first sphere they move from east to west. The created rational nature alone is ordained immediately to God; since other creatures do not attain to anything universal but only to the particular, sharing the divine goodness either simply in being, as inanimate things, or else in living and in knowing single objects, as plants and animals. The rational nature, inasmuch as it knows good and being in their universality, has an immediate ordination to the universal principle of being.

"The perfection, therefore, of the rational creature consists not only in what it is capable of according to its nature, but in that also which comes to it from a certain supernatural participation of the divine goodness; whence man's final beatitude

consists in a certain supernatural vision of God. To this vision man can attain only inasmuch as he becomes a learner learning from God, the teacher, as is said in *John* vi, 45. 'Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me.' But man receives this teaching, not at once, but successively, according to the mode of his nature. Every such learner, then, must believe in order to reach perfect knowledge; as the Philosopher also says (*Post-Analyt* 1. 2.) that the learner must needs believe.

"Wherefore, to reach the perfect vision of beatitude man must of necessity first believe God as the scholar believes his master." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 2, 2, ii, 3, 0.

"Though the will moves the understanding to understand, and we can will nothing that is not understood, it does not follow that we thus fall into an indefinite series, but the process terminates in the intellect, its starting point. Apprehension must precede every willing, but the movement of the will does not precede every apprehension. Higher than every intellect is the intellective principle, the principle of considering and understanding, which is God." *Ibid.* i, 82, 4, ad 3m.

By the act of faith all understand, the firm assent of the mind to the truths revealed by God because of the authority of God revealing them. In it therefore are involved the truth itself, the fact of its revelation, and the authority of the Revealer. It is equally true that, however the fact and the authority are involved, the act of faith is one simple assent. Those who assume that these enter intrinsically into the act as constituting with the truth revealed its adequate material object, suppose the act to be implicitly complex. The formula becomes: I believe the truth, because I believe that it has been revealed by God, whom I believe to be the infallible truth; or else, omitting *because*, I believe the truth and that God the infallible Truth reveals it.

Two great theologians adopted that view. De Lugo following the first formula made the explicit act of faith the conclusion of a syllogism, formal or virtual: God is infallible Truth: God has revealed this truth, therefore I believe it on God's authority. The major premise is analytical. The notion, *God*, contains necessarily the attribute, infallible Truth. The minor premise is evident from the signs of credibility. The conclusion follows necessarily. But if this is to be anything more than the result of natural reason, both major and minor, in the assumption that they enter into the act of faith intrinsically, must be believed supernaturally, not known naturally; an exigency for which De Lugo, according to some, does not provide.

Suarez taught that God revealing a truth explicitly, in the very act of revealing, reveals himself as revealing and necessarily to be

believed. His doctrine is certainly sublime, worthy of a master who had added to the theology of the schools an experimental knowledge of mystic theology. Nevertheless if in connection with his primary assumption Suarez' theory be subjected to such an analysis as De Lugo made in rejecting it, difficulties appear that seem insuperable. Why do you believe the truth? Because I believe God has revealed it. Why do you believe God has revealed it? The only answer is; because I believe Him who proposes it to be the infallible Truth. Why do you believe Him to be infallible Truth? The vicious circle seems inevitable.

Before admitting such charges against men so eminent let us examine the case more closely. What act of faith had they in mind? Were they considering that which the child makes on reaching a sufficient use of reason, or that of the savage hearing from the missionary the word of power? They were the champions of the Church against the Protestant heresy then in its first vigor. One may safely say, what the whole tone of their discussions confirms, that they had in view the act of faith with which the true Catholic would meet the prevailing error; the repentant apostate abandon it.

In speaking of that belief in God which is required in all who come to the Faith, we said that it might be a conclusion of natural reason, supported by tradition and its social acceptance by the society in which one lives. Something similar may be said of the act of faith contemplated in the polemics of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It was to be elicited by those having, or regaining the supernatural habit. They had given again and again their formal supernatural assent to the existence of God, the infallible Truth; to the fact of revelation demonstrated by evidences of credibility; to the fact that the truth in question, e. g. the constitution of the Church, the nature of justification, is contained in that revelation. All these acts of faith we therefore included in their habit of faith, so that in making the formal act, they entered into it necessarily though implicitly. Hence De Lugo's syllogism was supernatural in both premises and in conclusion. Suarez' doctrine of implicit revelation was absolutely true.

Substantially, then, the doctrine of both these great men is true. We surely do believe the fact of revelation and the infallible veracity of God who reveals it. Each of these propositions: I believe the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, I believe that

God has revealed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, I believe that God is the infallible Truth who can neither deceive nor be deceived, express an act of supernatural faith. However, if asked *why* I believe the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, I find a double answer presenting itself. I may say in the well-known formula of the act of faith consecrated by the Vatican Council: "Because God has revealed it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived." Or I may say: "Because I believe that God has revealed it." In the first reply I deal *directly* with the *act*, of faith, giving the reason of my subjective assent; in the second I deal reflexly with the *reason* of assent, considering in it objectively the motives of credibility. In the *adequate* act of faith of the ordinary Christian who believes all that God has revealed, including the infallibility of the Church proposing the matter of the deposit of faith, there is the implicit complexity of Suarez and De Lugo. For the *essential* assent of faith we have all that is necessary in our catechetical doctrine founded on Councils and the older theologians. Here it is most important to observe that the direct assent of faith not only precedes the reflex analysis, but is also its necessary foundation. I must give a supernatural assent before I examine whether there is a supernatural assent to its motives. If, before making an act of faith, I begin at the other end, I operate in the direct order only; that is, I ask why I *should* yield assent, a process that will never take me out of natural reason. Sooner or later, if I am to believe, I must come to the essential assent.

To understand this matter more clearly, let us consider our natural assent to human testimony. Why do I believe what people tell me, what I read in books, and so on. The reason is simple enough. Such is my natural impulse. But this impulse is not a blind force. It is an element in that universal movement whereby the Creator moves the creature towards its end. God has created man social. This means that by the dynamic movement towards our universal good which we term our natural activity or our life, He moves us, not as solitary individuals self-contained and self-sufficient, but as men in relations with our fellow-men, needing their assistance and giving them necessary aid. "To do without all assistance absolutely," says St. Thomas, "is beyond man's power. Every man needs first of all, divine help. In the second place he needs human aid; because he is naturally a social animal,

since he is unequal to the providing for his own life." (2, 2, cxxix, 6.) At the very foundation of this natural law of mutual aid in all the things of life, lies that necessary mutual confidence of which the credence given to another's word is the universal expression. We examine it is true, in *Major Logic*, the reasonableness of such assent and the conditions under which human testimony gives certainty. But this is reflex scientific investigation. In practice it is rarely recurred to, unless in the case of a formal criticizing of the evidence alleged for some fact. The vast majority of men, if they know anything about it, hardly advert to it. Indeed, were they habitually to suspend the assent to which the fundamental movement of nature impels them, until they had affirmed by a judgment, at least implicit, the speaker's credibility, human society would come to a stand-still. This is tantamount to saying that the operation in man of the Prime Mover of all things would fail. Men accept the assertions of their fellow-man as a matter of course. They hesitate only when there is obvious reason, drawn from experience, to suspect him to be a liar. They are occasionally deceived, because occasionally even good men will prevaricate; not because in believing others according to the nature given by God men fail in the prudent conduct of life.

We may illustrate this by a modern example. Why does the receiving radio say just what the broad-casting instrument is saying? One may respond theoretically, scientifically, explaining all the causes; or one may simply state the practical fact; because the receiver is tuned up to the wave-length of the transmitter. There is a natural harmony between the two, so that what the one expresses the other receives; and will do so spontaneously till something comes to break the harmony. When this happens—for instance should the broadcaster change the wavelength—there will be no response in the receiver. Similarly, when natural relations are maintained, man believes his fellow-man. Should he suspect a violation of those relations he begins to doubt and to verify assertions by facts. But as for the formal investigation of the motives of credibility, this is practiced only in the critical processes of science.

Turning now to the supernatural order, we know that He who otherwise would by the universal movement impressed on man's nature have moved him naturally to his last end, the perfect knowledge of the Creator in creatures, now designs to move him,

regenerated and elevated by grace, supernaturally to his supernatural end, the beatific vision. This supernatural movement takes in the whole rational nature and all its operations. The knowledge of God in creatures which in the natural order would have been man's last end, becomes in the supernatural order a means to the nobler end now his. Thus all his relations with creatures are fundamentally supernaturalized. There is not one which does not acquire a new relation, which has not to be viewed in a new light.

In the natural order creatures speak proclaiming infallibly the invisible Creator. "For the invisible things of Him from the Creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, His eternal power also and divinity." (Rom. i, 20.) Whence St. Paul argues the inexcusability of those who, detaining the truth of God in injustice, give themselves over to the idolatrous use of the creature. The visible things speak naturally, never rising above the fundamental rational principles of contradiction and sufficient reason. Nevertheless they speak of things invisible, things that in the natural order would be ever invisible, the invisible things of God. Why then are men inexcusable for not knowing the invisible things? What is the root of their obligation? Perhaps you will say the light and impulse God gives them. Not so; the foundation of the obligation lies deeper. The light to see the obligation, to understand the clear testimony of creatures witnessing to the invisible things of the Creator; the impulse to accept it and follow it to its last conclusions, would be the aid given by God, a natural aid, because without divine help man could not attain even his natural end. But the foundation of obligation, the reason of inexcusability rest not upon the condition, but upon that which demands the condition, the essential ordination of the natural activity of man's life, the dynamic movement impressed upon him by the Creator, whereby he lives but to return by the exercise of his natural powers in the creatures God gives him, to the knowledge and love of Him by whom all things are. God operates in His creature inasmuch as He "not only gives forms to things, but also confirms them in being and applies them to act and is *the end of all actions*." (1, cv, 5, ad 3m.)

The knowledge of the Creator in the creature, since it is the knowledge of Him invisible in the natural order, may well be called "the evidence of things that appear not." Yet, being

knowledge to be acquired naturally, it is not faith. Hence the Apostle puts two elements in his definition: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." In creatures, he says purposely, the *things* of God are seen, not God Himself, His attributes as our human mind conceives them, not as they are identical with His infinite Being. We perceive, as it were His shadow on land and sea and sky, His footprints in irrational life, His image in man. We do not see Himself. The knowledge is analogical, not substantial. Faith touches the substance in the most intimate way possible on earth, the substance of things to be hoped for. Hope is the anticipation of possession, a real taking beforehand of what at some future time may be actually possessed. But the hope that goes with faith is a hope that only God can give. Faith is the substance, not of things that *may* be hoped for, but of things that *must* be hoped for. For mankind in general these are decreed irrevocably. The individual may miss them, but only through his own fault. Let him hope as he should and he shall attain. Should he not attain, his failure will be due to his own free act incompatible with hope. Understanding this, we see that the second element of the definition taken in connection with the first indicates also substantial possession. We look not at present on the things to be hoped for; but faith is their evidence that they will surely be seen as they are, according to His appointment who prescribes hope to all.

Faith is then a vision, not science. It is a perception of things in themselves; not a deduction from others. It is simple and direct; not a reflex knowledge of things in their causes. It is obscure—We see as through a glass in a dark manner—but the acknowledgment of obscurity is the assertion of vision. Therefore God must reveal what no human method could attain. He is the master. We believe as does the scholar, not reflexly, but directly. The scholar does not reason; he sees. He does not advert to motives of credibility; he believes. He does not see independently of the master; neither does the receiving radio start the tune independently of the transmitter. His vision, compared with the master's, with what he himself will attain to eventually, is obscure. He believes what his master says, because God has created him a social being unable to attain otherwise to the knowledge necessitated by his social condition. In thus creating man, God, as it were, tunes up human nature, so that in each individual the wavelength

is ordinarily the same. Knowledge and veracity are presumed, not investigated. Presumption and belief come, each in its own way, from the vital movement towards good. Behind it is nothing but the Creator, unmoved Himself and moving all things.

Not otherwise is it in the supernatural order. This, we must repeat, is a new creation, not figuratively but really. Our elevation is not accidental but substantial. It is not something superadded to nature; it is nature transformed. It is a participation of the divine nature utterly different from that which constituted the first creation. Natural man is not the matter out of which the new creature is formed, as the slime of the earth was the matter of Adam's body. Natural man is not in the strictest sense even the subject in which the supernatural is received, since, the natural as such no longer remains, but is entirely transformed into the supernatural when God speaks the word that makes all things new. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." (*Gal.* vi. 15.) As in the natural man the sensitive operation is not of a nature purely sensitive, but of the rational animal; so analogously, though the natural operation remains in the supernatural man, it is no longer that of the purely human nature, but of the human nature raised to the new order of grace. The purely natural end is lost in the supernatural end not only unattainable by the natural powers of any creature whatsoever, but inconceivable also by any natural process of a created intellect, unseekable by any natural expansiveness of a created will. It can be known by revelation only. "For what man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received . . . the Spirit that is of God, that we may know the things that are given us from God." (*1 Cor.* ii, 11, 12.)

By the spirit of God, that is, by grace, our whole nature is elevated so as to be able to attain the end manifested by revelation. Our faculties are perfected by the theological virtues which have for their object God revealing Himself to the Creature, God moving the creature to Himself, God the term of the creature so moved. "No man can come to me except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him." (*John* vi, 44.) As in the natural order, so in the supernatural, God the unmoved Cause moves all things towards their end. As in the natural order man believes his fel-

low, the scholar believes his master because of a natural necessity, not from a criticism of veracity; so in the supernatural order man believes God in compliance with a supernatural demand.

But besides the supernatural demand of the universal movement to beatific vision, there must be for every act of faith, however direct, an added movement. The Thessalonians heard from St. Paul "the word of the hearing of God," receiving it, "not as the word of men, but as the word of God, who worketh in them that have believed." (1 *Thess.* ii, 13.) It was, indeed, "the engrafted word" intimately proportioned to their supernatural vocation. Nevertheless the God whom they believed was unheard by the ear of flesh. Their act of faith followed the law of every supernatural act here below. The special illumination of the intellect, the special impulse of the will were needed; for "no man can come to me except the Father, who hath sent me, *draw* him." Yet in this essential act of faith, an act simple and direct, neither light nor impulse touched formally the motives of faith. It was the act of the scholar believing his master.

This faith is God's gift. St. Paul prays God to so strengthen by the power of the Spirit the inward man, that Christ may dwell by faith in the hearts of the Ephesian converts; and today each one brought to baptism answers the question: "What dost thou ask of the Church of God?" with one word: "Faith." The matter of this faith is all that God has revealed through His Son. Since faith comes first in the supernatural order, and this has its roots in the Incarnation, the matter of faith revealed through the Incarnate Word is not only what was proclaimed by the Redeemer Himself, or committed to His Apostles to be taught after Pentecost, but also whatever was contained in the first revelation to Adam of the Redeemer to come, or in view of Him was communicated to the patriarchs and prophets. Hence the well-known distinction between explicit faith and implicit. The former reaches doctrine directly: "I believe in One God in Three Persons." The latter implies ignorance of some definite dogma which it reaches indirectly by the universal act: "I believe all that God has revealed." Thus in the centuries of persecution when the sum of Christian doctrine was declared gradually, much faith was implicit. This was still more the case before the coming of the Redeemer. Every faithful child of Israel believed the Prophets. In them he read the Passion, the foundation of the Church, the call of the

Gentiles. Yet how little did he understand. He accepted all as God's infallible truth. He therefore believed implicitly what for him was hidden, the fullness of revelation in Christ.

This distinction so simple and so obvious seems to be a stumbling-block to those outside the Church. They have no idea of the true nature of faith. For them it is mixed up with reason. One might call it a mode of reason. When this is not sufficiently apodictic to cause certainty, faith can come in; not to supply the deficiency, but in some way to relieve the discomfort of doubt. Again the natural order is confounded with the supernatural; the finite with the infinite. Men will discourse glibly of the infinite and its functions in mathematics, taking as a matter of course its divergences from the simpler mathematics of finite quantities. Transfer the consideration to the universal order of being, and their density of mind becomes impenetrable. Hence for them implicit faith is no longer the logical complement of the explicit act of faith, but such a closing of the mind against reason as will enable one to swallow any priest-invented tale. One need not go very far to find this obsession even in pretentious discussions of men supposed to be learned.

The material part, the communication of the matter of the act of faith is, as a general rule extrinsic and mediate. "Faith comes by hearing. But how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall he preach unless he be sent?" (*Rom. x, 15-17.*) This is, therefore, a necessary condition preliminary to the act itself. Of the credibility of the medium, that is, of the preacher or of the Catholic Church, there must be some preliminary understanding; which, however, is reached differently by different persons. On Pentecost its motive was the miracle of tongues. For the Ethiopian it was the adequacy of St. Philip's exposition of the prophecy he could not understand. For the jailer of Philippi it was the miraculous earthquake, the magnanimity of Paul and Silas and, perhaps, the unexpected immobility of the other prisoners. For the heathen it is often the social superiority of the preachers and the purity of their doctrine. Thus from the testimony of men, from the report of other tribes, the Indians of the Rocky Mountains were ready to hear the Black-robcs.

The motives of credibility are as a rule adverted to only when faith is challenged. Why do you believe that God has revealed that dogma? Then each evolves the process of natural reason

that leads him up to the act of faith: "I believe the Holy Catholic Church to be infallible"; but quite distinct from it. It is distinct in the one formulating the argument of credibility. It is distinct in him who, hearing it, surrenders to the argument of reason, yet is conscious that in making his act of faith he passes from the natural to the supernatural, from logical conviction, to the operation of grace. As in the natural order the scholar believes his master according to the exigency of human nature, so in the supernatural order, according to the exigency of nature elevated by grace and of His operation, who moves it and draws it to Himself, man believes simply because God reveals.

CHAPTER XIII

ACTUAL GRACE IN SUPERNATURAL ACTS

"I am the vine, you are the branches. He that abideth in me and I in him, the same produceth much fruit; for without me you can do nothing." *John* xv, 5.

"The Spirit also helpeth our infirmity. For we know not what we should pray for as we ought, but the Spirit Himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings." *Rom.* viii, 26.

"It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." *Ibid.* ix, 16.

"With fear and trembling work out your salvation; for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish according to His good will." *Philip.* ii, 12, 13.

"Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." *2. Cor.* iii, 5.

"We ordain that the sentence from the most blessed Apostolic See, pronounced by the venerable Bishop Innocent against Pelagius and Caelestius, shall remain until they confess publicly that in every single act we are aided by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, not only to know justice, but also to do it. So that without that grace we are powerless to have, think, say, do anything of true and holy piety." *Council of Carthage, (apud Prosper. contra Collat. 10.)*

"It is a mark of divine favor when we think rightly and withhold our feet from falsehood and wrong; for as often as we do good actions, God, in order that we may work, works in us and with us." *II Counc. Orange.* Can. 9.

"To say that one can abstain from sin, is one thing. To say that one can persevere in abstinence from sin to his life's end, is another. In the first case the potency is asserted of a negation only, namely, one is able not to sin; and this, when there is question of mortal sin, is within the power of anyone in the state of grace; since in such there is no habitual inclination towards sin, but rather to avoid sin. Wherefore when he recognizes in some object matter of mortal sin, he refuses consent through his habitual inclination, unless in following his concupiscences he effectually goes contrary to it. Nevertheless he is not bound by any necessity to yield to concupiscence, even though when some movement of concupiscence arises entirely antecedent to the act of free-will, he can not avoid it. For this reason he can not avoid all venial sins. But because no movement of free-will drawing to evil as it were, by the inclination of habit, precedes full deliberation, he is able to avoid all mortal sins.

"When it is said that such a one can persevere to the end of his life in abstinence from sin, the potency is carried to something affirmative, namely that one can put himself in a state such that sin can not be in him. For except by rendering himself impeccable a man could not by an act of free-will effect his perseverance. But to make himself impeccable does not fall under the power of man's free-will, because the motive power executing the decree of free will does not extend to this. Consequently man can not be to himself the cause of his perseverance, but must necessarily beg perseverance from God." *1 St. Thomas, de Verit.* xxiv. 13.0.

Nothing acts beyond its own species; according to the exigency of its own species each thing can act, since nothing lacks its own proper action.

"There is, however a double good, a good proportionate to human nature; a good exceeding the faculty of human nature. These two goods, speaking of them as acts, do not differ as regards the substance of the acts, but as regards the mode of acting. Thus the act, to give alms, is good; and, inasmuch as man is moved to it from a certain natural love and benignity, is proportionate to human powers. It exceeds the faculty of human nature, inasmuch as one is moved to it out of charity which unites man's mind to God. To this good which is above human nature it is clear that free-will can not avail without grace; because by this good man merits eternal life, which without grace he can not merit. That good, on the other hand, which is proportionate to human nature, man can fulfil by free-will. Thus man can cultivate the fields, build houses and do many good things without the working of grace. Yet although man can perform good deeds of this nature without sanctifying grace, he can not do them without God; since nothing can go out into its natural operation unless by divine virtue; because the second cause does not act, but by virtue of the first cause. This is true both in things acting by their nature, and in agents acting by their free-will. Nevertheless this necessity in each case differs in mode. God is the cause of operations by nature, inasmuch as He gives and preserves that which in the thing is the principle of operation by nature, whence follows necessarily the determined operation. Man's will on the other hand is not determined to one operation, but holds itself indifferent to many. Hence in a certain manner it is in potency unless moved by something active, either represented to it from without, as is an apprehended good, or operating in it from within, as is God Himself. But Divine Providence guides all exterior movements according as He judges that by these actions or those some one is to be stirred up to good. Wherefore, if we wish to call grace of God, not some habitual gift, but the very mercy of God whereby He operates the interior movement of the mind and ordains exterior things to man's salvation, from this point of view man can do no good work without God's grace. Ordinarily speaking, however, we confine the term, grace, to the habitual justifying gift." *Ibid.* 14,0.

"Human nature can be considered from a two-fold standpoint. We may view it in its integrity as it was in our first parent before his sin, or as it is in ourselves corrupted after the sin of our first parent.

"In both states, human nature needs divine aid, as its prime mover, to will and do anything good. But in the state of integrity, as far as the sufficiency of operative virtue is concerned, man could, by his natural powers, will and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as is the good of acquired virtue; but not the good surpassing his nature, such as is the good of infused virtue. In the state of corrupted nature man falls short even of what he is capable according to his nature, so that by his natural powers he can not fulfil such good entirely. Yet because human nature is not utterly corrupted by sin, so as to be deprived of the whole of its natural good, it can even in the state of corrupt nature by the virtue of its own nature perform some particular good, as to build houses, plant vineyards and such like, but not its entire connatural good, so as to fall short in nothing. So a sick man can have of himself some movement; nevertheless he can not move perfectly with the movement of a healthy man unless he be healed with the aid of medicine.

"Thus man in the state of integrity needs in addition to natural virtue a gratuitous virtue for but one thing, namely, to do and will supernatural good. This in the

state of corrupt nature he needs for two things, to be healed, and then further, to perform the good of supernatural virtue, which is meritorious. Moreover in both states is a further need of divine help, so that by it man may be moved to act well." *Idem. Summ. Theol.* 1.2. cix. 2.0.

"As is said above (Art. 2) man to live rightly needs a twofold aid of God, one an habitual gift whereby corrupt human nature is healed, and being healed is raised to perform works meritorious of eternal life, which exceed the proportion of nature; the other a help of grace so that he may be moved by God to action.

"So far as the first is concerned, man in a state of grace needs no other help of grace, as some other infused habit.

"He needs the help of grace in the other way, namely to be moved by God to do what is right, and this for two reasons. The first is the general reason mentioned in Art. 1 of this question, that no creature can pass into any act whatsoever unless by virtue of the divine movement. The second reason is particular, the state in which human nature finds itself. This, though healed by grace so far as the mind is concerned, retains as regards the flesh that corruption and infection whereby it serves the law of sin, as is said in *Romans* vii, 25. There remains also a certain obscurity of ignorance in the understanding, on account of which, as is also said (*Ibid.* viii, 26.). we know not how to pray as we ought . . . Therefore we need to be guided and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things." *Ibid.* 9, 0.

In questions of grace it must be remembered that the terms, actual grace and sanctifying grace, belong to the theological development following the Council of Trent. Older theologians knew the thing: the questions they discussed did not call for the formal distinction of the terms. For them grace was the habitual gift restoring man dead in sin to the supernatural life. What we call actual grace was for them an aid, demanded necessarily, even by nature elevated and restored, to perform its own supernatural acts. They did not exclude the term grace absolutely. Nevertheless they would term it when employed, as St. Thomas does in the last passage we quote, "a help of grace," transient in contradistinction to the habitual gift.

This help of grace was distinguished from such aids as the purely natural order would call for to enable man in this mortal life to know and love God as he should. As in the natural order God would have been known, not in Himself but in His works, He would in the progressive life of man have been known as the supreme Good, to be attained only as the term of its progression. Hence such helps would have been necessary, at least in any conflict of sense with reason, to enable man to use creatures, not according to their own desirability in the present moment, but according to their relation to the future Good. They would there-

fore have entered into the natural order of Providence, as conditions generally required in natural human life, including essentially no more the idea of grace than any other gift of God in nature. Their accidental variations, however, as we have seen, would have been gratuitous.

In the state of integrity, in which Adam was created, man could perform all the good of acquired virtue, such as natural acts of temperance, under all conditions. The reason is that his state included, not only the essential elevation by sanctifying grace, but also the additional gift implied in the term, integrity, whereby his passions were bound in subjection to reason. Thus the transient aids of the state of pure nature were supplied for habitually and in a way far more excellent. Since, however, man fallen in Adam, has not, though restored by grace, regained the gifts of his former condition, he stands in need of all such aids as the natural order demanded.

Speaking objectively and in the abstract only, actual grace is equally demanded in the supernatural order. It is given, not to render the supernatural act easier, but to make it possible. Though thus demanded, it is nevertheless grace, because, that order with all it includes is purely gratuitous. We speak, indeed, of our natural life and its faculties as God's free gift, and we use the same term with regard to our supernatural life and its infused virtues; still we do so in senses widely different. In the strict sense a gift supposes a preexisting subject to receive it. Natural life and its faculties are the effect of creation, the very definition of which excludes such a subject. Wherefore we call our natural life a gift analogically, because it comes exclusively from His free will, who calling the things that are not as the things that are, loved me when as yet I was not. Supernatural life, on the other hand, is strictly a gift. It is received by one existing in his natural immortality, yet supernaturally dead in sin. Had God not created me, I should not have existed to receive or not to receive. Had He not restored me, I should have existed capable of receiving what I had no claim to, what He alone could grant me; without which I should have continued in my natural immortality to endure the misery of supernatural death.

Actual grace is necessary says St. Thomas for two reasons, one, general; because nothing passes into action unless moved by the Prime Mover. The other, particular; to overcome obscurity

in the apprehensive faculty, and concupiscence in the expansive. That is to say in more familiar terms, to enlighten the understanding and to move the will. Because the subject is the same, the rational creature, there is a perfect analogy between man's life and activity in the natural order, and in the supernatural. Let us trace it out. Thus we shall grasp the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we may then apply to some modern questions.

In each living being God creates the life, indistinguishable otherwise than notionally from the substantial form. It is the dynamic principle of the creature's universal activity, moving it, so that the very movement is termed life, itself unmoved except by the Creator, who through it moves His creature in every action, however, insignificant. Its object is the specific good in its most universal sense.

To the creature God gives as organs of that universal movement specific virtues, that is, faculties apprehensive, expansive, locomotive, sometimes peculiar to it alone, always of a specific character corresponding to its nature. These faculties or virtues are vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, and are limited and defined according to the limits of the universal good of the particular creature. In hay the ox perceives something eatable, the dog, a dry warm bed, the bird, material for its nest. The ox will notice it only when hungry; the dog, when tired and cold; the bird, at nesting time. Ants have in their antennae a peculiar, to us inexplicable, virtue of communication. Bees, an equally inexplicable virtue of direction, whereby after wanderings most intricate they take the shortest line to their hives. The same virtue is found in birds, directing their migrations; in fishes, bringing them back to spawn in their native streams; in homing pigeons, and in some animals, especially in cats.

These virtues are with regard to their objects active potencies, not passive. They can not act without something about which to act. Therefore to pass into second act they need a suitable object adequately presented. This determines their activity in its individual circumstances of time, place and object. It does not set them in motion. It is not the nature of the stag to excite in wolves the sense of smell, to fix their gaze, to stir their appetite, to set the pack in full career. It is the nature of the wolf to perceive by its active sense of smell the scent of the stag, to fix its gaze as the stag appears, to go out to it by appetite, to combine with fellow-

wolves and with them to take up the chase. One may reply that this is a particular case only. There are others that contradict it. The flower, for instance, draws the bee. Here we answer there are two vital activities at work, so that, far from weakening our doctrine, the example confirms it. The flower does not move the bee to seek honey. This is the function of the bee's dynamic vital principle. It simply determines the honey-seeking activity to this particular time, place and flower. On the other hand, that the flower yields honey produced within it in a way peculiar to its species comes from its own vital activity. It is an element in its reproductive activity, whereby fertilization is procured by the carrying of pollen to stamen through the busy activity of the bee. Thus through its vital activity the bee goes to the flower for honey, and the flower, analogously, to procure its own fertilization draws by its vital activity the bee. But the flower does not draw the bee to give it honey; nor does the bee visit the flower in order to fertilize it.

These conclusions are drawn from the very essence of life. They are necessarily true of man, though by reason of the complexity of his operation they are perhaps not so easily perceived. Actuated by the dynamic vital movement to its universal good, the dog notices the bone because in *a* bone there is a specification of that universal good and in *this* bone, its individualization. Determined in their activity by this individualized good to this individual action, the other virtues or faculties do their part in seizing the bone. But by far the greater number of things the dog ignores. It sees them mechanically, hears them, smells them; yet for it they are practically nonexistent. To account for this discrimination we are compelled to have recourse to the vital energy of the dog; and immediately its universal dynamic nature is revealed, moving every canine operation, but moving canine operations only.

In man we find no such essential distinctions of objects, because there is nothing which is not under some relation included in his universal good. Nothing escapes his notice. His nature impels him to investigate everything. His investigations are limited by individual character, by his subjective conditions, especially by the impossibility of doing more than one thing at a time. Hence we come to the practical conclusion that there is nothing which, if suitably presented, man will not view in relation to himself as in

some way good; and so reach out to at least the understanding of it. So far we are right. Our next step might be to view our faculties as passive potencies to be *actuated* by their object, not as active, actuated by the universal dynamic principle of life, with a passivity to be merely *determined* by their object. Here we should be wrong.

In man, as in every living creature, life is a dynamic activity reaching out to his nature's universal good. In his soul, the principle of life, God has created as instruments of the operations of that activity, specific virtues or faculties, namely, the intellect and the will. In the intellect, conscious of that vital activity and so of its universal object is, as we have already explained, the habitual concept of the Good as the True, and the consequent immediate apprehension in every particular reality of its participation of the True and the Good. Hence man perceives each as exhibiting in its own degree the good of his nature. Thus the will goes out to each, imposing on all other faculties the exercise of their functions necessary for the attainment of the good in question. All these operations have their principle in the dynamic expansion, the activity of life.

Man now reflects on himself, his ideas and the world in which he lives. He sees that, as he is a real being animated with a vital principle which moves him to universal good, this universal good can not be a mere transcendental idea, a primary subjective form. It must have an objective reality outside himself, distinct from himself, attainable by himself as the term of his progressive existence, so that in its attainment the whole capacity of his being will be fulfilled. To admit the contrary would carry him into the extremest Idealism, contradicting all the facts of experience, namely, his own individual existence distinct from things not himself, the external objective existence of these, his physical liberty in their use, the immutable standard of right and wrong, and so forth. This universal good really existing as the last end of all his activity, he sees to be no other than the Creator, the sole sufficient reason for all contingent beings, which must, each in its own way, find like himself the fulfilment of all their substantial activities in returning to the infinite Author of all being. Man, by knowing God and loving Him, must return directly to God his last end, carrying with him the irrational creature given him as a means whereby to attain that end. Thus there is a definite rule in the use

of creatures, which, if observed, brings man to God in the natural order; if neglected, cuts him off from God forever.

Having his natural dynamic activity tending to the Supreme Good; having also as its organs the corresponding virtues and faculties, in the first place the intellect and the will, and then the expansive, apprehensive, locomotive powers of the sensitive nature, man lacks nothing intrinsically for the attainment of his perfection. To this his nature is fully competent. Extrinsically however a condition must be supplied, without which the whole human machine is at a standstill. There must be the adequate presentation of the object of its operation.

In the lower animal the nature is sensitive only. Its objects, specified by its nature, are adequate to its natural activity. Under this single aspect are they perceived, and perceived immediately. Once taken hold of they complete their single function in the satisfying of that activity. Hence, the mere occurrence of the object, apprehended as actually obtainable, sets the animal in orderly movement. Man has a composite nature. He is an animal, with his sensitive appetite; he is rational with his natural tendency to universal good, to which the sensitive appetite must be subject. He has then a double tendency to things about him, the *direct* tendency, inasmuch as they can satisfy the immediate appetite of his rational nature, and the *reflex*, inasmuch as their appeal to the immediate appetite may be used to carry him on to the adequate term of his nature, the Supreme Good.

This means that for orderly activity in the natural order man must perceive in other creatures a double relation, that which they bear to himself alone and to his natural appetite in existing circumstances, and that which, as such, they bear to him as a creature moving onward to a future good according to the Creator's law imposed on him. In other words, man must see creatures as themselves a present good and as a means to the attaining of a future good. He must recognize the latter as their proper function, and that they can be used as present goods only in subordination to it.

Here a difficulty appears. Of present goods the effect is direct and immediate. Adequate to the actually existing appetite of the rational animal, their mere occurrence determines the universal tendency inasmuch as that appetite is its organ, so that the whole man goes out to them spontaneously, ready to use his intelligence to search out the means to attain them, and by his will to direct

towards them his corporeal locomotive and apprehensive faculties. Still the appetite is rational, that is, of one endowed with reason, and reason implies reflection, to which must be subject even the simplest conscious apprehension or tendency. Hence, such a rational process as we have described must be compenetrated with reflection having its root in synderesis, that intuition of moral responsibility, which, according to St. Thomas, links the rational nature with the angelic. In a word, with human acts go *pari passu* the consciousness of their morality, according to which they are to be approved and prosecuted, or reproved and reformed.

This is nothing else than conscience, of which the function is intensely practical. A philosopher in the retirement of his study might, from the relation of man to his Creator, and of creatures in general to man as he is affected by that relation, think out a moral theory to be a rule of conduct. Indeed this has been done; and the theory, as elaborated and perfected by the thought of ages constitutes the science of Ethics. As regards its end Ethics is practical; as a science it is speculative. It demonstrates the rule. To apply the rule in practice is another thing. This calls for a judgment not speculative but practical. It calls for the subordination of a present good, actually appealing to the appetite, to a future good that can not of itself be adequately presented. It calls often for a formal choice between the two, for the rejection of the present clamoring for acceptance, in order to secure the unseen future, which never can in this life be known by experience. That the two goods may be placed on equal terms so as to make free choice morally possible, an illumination of the intellectual concept is needed whereby the Creator as the absolute good may be clearly perceived. But this is not enough. However clear the idea may be, the Creator can be perceived only as an absent, future good, of which in this life no experience can be had; for which, nevertheless, a present good to which the human appetite is already going out, must be perhaps renounced, to which it must be, at least, subordinated. Hence, to counteract the tendency of the appetite, to bring the whole matter back to as it were, the even-balanced middle necessary for a calm choice, an impulse of the will is also required. These two aids man's very nature demands. Given man the creature, they could not be refused. They would in an order merely natural be a part of God's ordinary providence; being His free gift, not in themselves, but only in the measure of

their distribution. According as they were rightly used natural virtues would be acquired. Thus would man be perfected in the course of his mortal life until it should end in that full and, therefore, perpetual possession of God by the understanding; in that resting of the will in God known in His works, which would be natural beatitude.

Now the supernatural order, the new creation, is the analogue of the natural. In it man, born again of water and the Holy Ghost, is made a new creature. In the natural order the formal term of his creation is the simultaneous creation of the soul and its infusion into the material body, now become capable of human animation, in obedience to the word that "spoke and all things were made, commanded and all things were created." "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life; and man became a living soul." So too in the supernatural order. The principle of life, sanctifying grace, simultaneously created and infused into the natural man capable, in obedience to the Creator's word, of being animated by it, makes him the new creature. Like the natural life, sanctifying grace is a dynamic principle, essentially active, reaching out to the universal good in its own order, the beatific vision. As instruments it has its virtues and faculties. The intelligence is supernaturalized by faith so that God, as He is to be hereafter seen, is perceived to be the object of our present love. The will is supernaturalized by hope and charity, whereby, through love of Him we hope to see, our supernatural activity is ordered and directed to the attaining of Him. These are perfected by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. With them are infused all other virtues drawing to good and to the overcoming of obstacles in its way. Thus the supernatural man is by sanctifying grace perfect and complete, capable *in himself* of all supernatural operation. Therefore St. Thomas says, "a man in the state of grace needs no other help of grace, *as some other infused habit*."

But in the supernatural order man experiences obstacles to the attainment of his destiny, at least as insuperable by his own efforts as in the natural. In his fall man was despoiled of the gifts of grace, and wounded in those of nature. (*Summ. Theol.* 1, 2, lxxxv, 1, 0.) In his restoration he receives again the essential elevating grace of the supernatural order; he does not regain the preternatural gifts which had perfected his natural faculties. As

for these, he, at the very best, was left in his natural condition, subject to the antecedent movements of concupiscence bound up with his composite nature. To attain his end he must have aids analogous to those we have seen that the purely natural order would have required, illumination of the understanding, impulse of the will. These, however, inasmuch as they are called for by a supernatural end, and operate in an understanding elevated by faith, and a will supernaturalized by grace, are of their nature supernatural. Therefore St. Thomas grants them the name of grace. Since the new discussions opened by Protestantism, they are recognized as actual graces, and as such transient, as distinguished from sanctifying grace, a permanent habit.

But this does not exhaust the matter. All we have shown is that, though nature elevated by grace, is by its vital activity and its virtues and faculties in itself capable of supernatural operations, it meets on account of concupiscence such external difficulties, that without actual grace it can not pass into action. No one will say that in the natural order man could have performed no act of natural virtue without helps demanded only in times of temptation. Hence, up to the present point our argument goes to show only this, that in temptation man elevated to the supernatural order needs the aid of actual grace, leaving untouched the question whether the aid of actual grace be necessary for any supernatural action whatsoever.

Yet this is the very essence of the matter. Against Pelagians, and Semipelagians of every shade the Church re-echoes the divine words: "Without me you can do nothing. It is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." The doctrine is, therefore, explicit: Without actual grace enlightening the understanding and moving the will man though elevated by sanctifying grace can not perform even the least action meritorious of eternal life.

In discussing the question St. Thomas views human nature in its integrity as it was in our first parents and as it is corrupted in them and in their children after the first sin. Laying down the principle that everything moved by God the Prime Mover according to its nature, can by virtue of that nature perform its natural acts, since nothing lacks its own proper action, he concludes that, so far as the sufficiency of operative virtue is concerned, man in his primal integrity, that is elevated by sanctifying grace, and endowed with the gift integrity implies, could by his natural power,

will and do the good of acquired virtue, that is acquire natural virtue by the repetition of good acts, and through that virtue acquired perform such good acts more easily and more frequently. In the state of corrupted nature man can by his own powers perform some things naturally good because his nature is not wholly corrupted. Nevertheless, his capacity falls far short of that of human nature in its primal integrity. But the good of infused virtue is beyond the power of human nature altogether. Hence for supernatural operations meritorious of eternal life man needs first of all *sanctifying grace* whereby his nature is healed; then *gratuitous infused virtue*, the instrument of a nature raised to the supernatural order; lastly *divine help*, so that he may be moved to action. Yet for this aid there is another special reason. "Though healed by grace so far as the mind is concerned, human nature retains as regards the flesh that corruption and infection whereby it serves the law of sin, as is said in *Romans* vii, 25. There remains also a certain obscurity of ignorance in the understanding, on account of which it is also said (*Ibid.* viii, 26) we know not how to pray as we ought . . . Therefore we need to be guided and protected by God, who knows all things and can do all things."

Here St. Thomas indicates clearly that for every supernatural act whatsoever, man in the state of grace needs a distinct actual grace, and that this actual grace is of its nature an illumination of the intellect, and a movement of the will.

To complete the demonstration, however, let us go further in the analysis of the analogy between the natural and the supernatural. In the first place let us note that however capable of action an agent be in itself, unless an object be adequately presented in which or concerning which to act, there can be no action. In the natural order any congruous object coming within the scope of an apprehensive faculty is adequately presented. The order is natural, the object is natural, the relation of congruity is natural, the presentation is natural. Nothing is lacking for action. In every natural object presented to human intelligence, man perceives the thing itself, its insufficiency for its own existence. As a social being aided by his fellows, he perceives with all the clearness necessary for a right practical judgment the Creator in the creature, the creature's relation to himself as a means to attain to the Creator. As far as mere action is concerned, he needs no further movement on the part of God, as St. Thomas says, than

the general movement of the entire nature to its universal good, which is its life, created and conserved by God whereby He as Prime Mover moves His creature. The need of further actual aid of enlightenment and impulse would arise only when concupiscence, antecedent to rational action, should obscure that adequate perception of the object.

But such aid, contingent in the natural order, is absolutely and universally necessary in the supernatural. During this life the creature can not be adequately presented, so that the mere presentation will suffice to determine the supernatural activity of elevated human nature. This is reserved for heaven; and the fact is expressed by the Apostle's formula: "Now we see as through a glass in a dark manner; but then, face to face." Here we see God in His creatures; there we shall see creatures in God. Yet this is not quite the exact equivalent. The antithetical "to see God in creatures," if taken as utterly excluding the other member expresses only man's natural operation, imperfect during life, to become perfect as his natural beatitude. On the other hand, if to see God and in Him the creature be the fullness of beatific vision, evidently, since the life of grace is the life of glory in its beginning, the supernatural perception of God and His creatures on earth, must be the beginning of the vision of the creature in God, the vision perfect in heaven. Thus faith is the *substance* of things to be hoped for. As it is the virtue perfecting the intellect of supernaturalized man, its act is the supernaturalizing of merely natural perceptions; it is the knowledge in part, to be done away when that which is perfect shall have come.

We must not think that faith perfects natural knowledge intrinsically as its complement any more than that the supernatural so perfects intrinsically the natural. This would imply in the natural a natural capacity for the supernatural, a contradiction. The supernatural is a creation. It is received in man not by his natural potency but *obedientially*, that is, in obedience to the creative word, as matter receives life beyond any active potency of the inanimate creature. Therefore the Gospel says: "As many as received Him, He gave them power to be made the sons of God"; that is, He created in them a new capacity to receive an elevation outside all nature. The supernatural, then, transforms rather than perfects man. The transformation will be complete only in heaven, when this mortal shall have put on immortality.

This being so, it is sufficiently clear that the purely natural operations of intellect and will, connatural to this present existence, are the very shackles of our imperfect supernatural operation, and to be included in that partial knowledge which is to be done away in the coming of the perfect. Here we could, if left to our natural powers, know God and love Him in his creatures. But between the true knowledge and love of creatures in God proper in even its lowest degree to the supernatural order, and the natural exercise of our faculties proper to this mortal life, there is an impassable gulf. For every action meritorious of eternal life, an actual grace of illumination is essentially necessary, to illumine not only general relations, but also the particular act. But because even this illumination leaves the object still obscure compared with the beatific vision, of which it is not even a ray except by that participation whereby all creatures have their being; and because the beatific vision, future and unseen, is incomprehensible to mortal mind—eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive what God hath prepared for them that love Him—there must be an impulse of the will towards the supernatural good; not as would be the case in the natural order, to make a difficult act morally possible, but to make the supernatural act possible at all.

Here, however, a serious difficulty presents itself. St. Thomas says in our quotation: *De Veritate* xxiv.13, that anyone in the state of grace can abstain from mortal sin by virtue of the habit of sanctifying grace. But abstention from mortal sin is a supernatural, meritorious act. Consequently some supernatural acts are possible without actual grace.

To solve the difficulty will be to expound briefly yet adequately the Saint's doctrine. His question touches the difference between avoiding mortal sins individually as the occasion presents itself, and the freeing oneself from all possible sin; so that final perseverance should consist, not in the mere attaining of the term, but in a habit of impeccability in the will fixed unalterably on good. To avoid sin in the first sense is an omission only, something negative. This, if we consider human nature elevated by grace with its supernatural expansion to supernatural good, with its virtues and faculties, we see to be within its power. Mere omission of an act, as we saw when speaking of physical liberty, with which this question is closely connected, calls for no special faculty. On

the other hand, one may yield to concupiscence, but one is not necessitated to do so, either physically or morally.

But perseverance is something positive. If it could be effected by the act of the will, one would by such an act make himself impeccable. But we find no such power as this in nature elevated by grace. There is the supernatural inclination to avoid sin, a habit. Impeccability would demand more than a habit in this ordinary sense. It could call for an enduring act of the will, impossible in this state of progressive existence.

"Abstention from sin is a supernatural meritorious act," says the objector. Here there is need of distinction. Inasmuch as it is in itself a mere omission and something negative, it is not an act at all. Therefore it is neither supernatural nor meritorious. Inasmuch as it connotes its correlative, the going against concupiscence in order to obey God's law, and so attain our supernatural end, it is indeed positive, supernatural, meritorious. From this point of view, it lay outside the question at issue. In the article following that on which the objection is based, which we also quote, the Saint explains his mind. Man inasmuch as he is free, remains in potency unless moved either by a good represented from without, or by God operating from within. Now Divine Providence moves us to good actions. If therefore we choose to extend the term grace beyond the habitual gift to the very mercy of God, whereby He operates the interior movement of the mind, and ordains exterior things to man's salvation, man can do no good work without God's grace. Here St. Thomas expresses exactly what he called aids, as distinguished from sanctifying grace, but what since the Protestant Reformation has been termed actual grace in its division into interior and exterior. The same doctrine is contained in the passages quoted from the *Summa*. 1.2, cix,2 and 9.

This chapter has reached a length that demands its close. The application of the doctrine to modern questions shall be the subject of a new one.

CHAPTER XIV

QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE PRECEDING

"In adults justification begins from God's preventing grace through Jesus Christ, that is, from His call whereby, without any merits of their own, they are called, so that they who were by sin turned away from God, now through His grace, stirring them up and aiding them to apply themselves to their own justification, are by freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace, so disposed, that when God touches man's heart by means of the illumination of the Holy Ghost, man receiving that inspiration is neither entirely inactive, since it is in his power to reject it, nor can he, on the other hand, by his own free will without God's grace set himself in motion to justice in God's sight. Wherefore, when it is said in Holy Writ: "Turn ye to me and I will turn to you," we are admonished of our liberty. When we answer: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee and we shall be converted," we confess that we are prevented with God's grace.

"But they are disposed to justice itself when stirred up and aided by divine grace, taking in faith from hearing, they move freely towards God, believing to be true what He has revealed and promised, and first of all that the sinner is justified by God through grace, 'through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.' Next, when, understanding themselves to be sinners, by turning from the fear of divine justice, whereby they are profitably alarmed, to consider the mercy of God, they arise to hope, trusting that for Christ's sake God will be merciful to them; begin to love Him as the fountain of all justice; and therefore to turn against their sins with a hatred and detestation, namely, with that penance which should be exercised before baptism. Lastly when they propose to receive baptism, to begin a new life and to keep the commandments. Concerning this preparation it is written: 'He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him'; 'Have confidence, son, thy sins are forgiven thee'; 'The fear of the Lord drives out sin'; 'Do penance, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the Holy Ghost'; and: 'Going therefore teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you'; lastly: 'Prepare your hearts unto the Lord.'" *Council of Trent*, Sess. vi, c. 5 and 6.

"The term, grace, is used in a twofold sense. Sometimes it expresses the habitual gift of God; sometimes, the help given by God in His moving the soul to good.

"Taken in the first sense, grace demands some preparation of grace, because no form can be otherwise than in matter disposed to receive it. If we speak of grace inasmuch as it signifies the help given by God as He moves to good, no preparation on man's part is required as coming before the divine aid; but rather whatever preparation can be in man, results from the help given by God as He moves the soul to good. According to this the good movement itself of the free will, whereby one is prepared to receive the gift of grace, is an act of the free will moved by God. To this extent man is said to prepare himself according to *Proverbs* xvi. 1. 'It is

man's part to prepare his soul.' And it is principally from God, moving the free-will. According to this man's will is said to be prepared by God and man's steps to be directed by the Lord.

"Against this may be urged that any preparation on man's part must be by some operation. But as the Apostle says (*Rom. iv. 4*) the recompense of operation is a debt, not a grace. Therefore to suppose preparation on man's part destroys the very nature of grace.

"To this is answered. There is a preparation on the part of man for grace, that is simultaneous with the infusion of grace. Such operation is indeed meritorious, not of grace which is already possessed, but of glory, not yet attained. There is another imperfect preparation of grace preceding sometimes the gift of sanctifying grace, which nevertheless is from God moving to good. Yet this avails not for merit, man not yet being justified by grace; for there can be no merit otherwise than from grace.

"Since man can not prepare himself for grace unless God anticipates him and moves him to good, it makes no difference whether one reaches a perfect preparation suddenly or by degrees. For in *Ecclesiasticus* (xi. 23.) we read: "It is easy in the eyes of God to make on a sudden a poor man rich.' But it sometimes happens that God moves man to some good not, however, perfect; and such preparation precedes grace. But sometimes He instantly moves him perfectly to good, and man suddenly receives grace according to the text of *St. John* (vi, 45.): 'Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned, cometh to me.' Thus it happened to Paul, because suddenly when he was moving in the way of sin, his heart by hearing, learning and coming was moved perfectly by God; and thus he suddenly obtained grace." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol. 1, 2, cxii, 2.*

"In justification four elements are found, sorrow for sin, remission of sin, movement of the free will towards God, infusion of grace. Since justification is instantaneous, these must all be instantaneous and simultaneous. The question arises: What is their relative order in the nature of things?

"The four aforesaid required for the justification of the impious are simultaneous as regards time; since the justification of the impious is not successive. In the order of nature, however, one is prior to another; and first among them in the natural order is the infusion of grace; second, the movement of the free will towards God; third, the movement of free will against sin; fourth, the remission of sins.

"The reason is because in every movement the first element in the nature of things is the motion of the one starting the movement; the second is the movement impressed on the thing moveable; the last is the end and term of the movement at which the motion of the one starting the movement terminates. The motion of God starting the movement is the infusion of grace; the movement or disposition of the thing moveable is the twofold movement of free will; the term or end of the movement is remission of sin. Wherefore in the justification of the wicked infusion of grace comes first in the nature of things; the movement of the free will towards God follows; in the third place is the movement of free will against sin. He who is justified detests sin because it is contrary to God. For this reason, therefore, the movement of free will towards God precedes naturally the movement of free will against sin, since the former is the cause and reason of the latter. In the fourth and last place is the remission of sin, to which, as to its end, this transmutation is directed.

"It must be said that departure from a term and approach to a term may be considered in two ways. One views it from the side of the thing moved, and from this viewpoint the departure from the term precedes in the order of nature the approach to the term. In a moveable subject the opposite which is rejected comes first in the nature of things, while what the moveable attains by movement comes after. But from the viewpoint of the agent the reverse is the case. The agent, through the form which preexists in it acts for the removal of its contrary. So the sun by its light acts to remove darkness. Thus on the part of the sun, to illumine is prior to the dispelling of darkness. On the part of the air, to be illumined, to be purged from darkness, precedes in the order of nature the acquisition of light; though as regards time both are simultaneous. And because the infusion of grace and the remission of sin are spoken of from the side of God justifying, in the order of nature infusion of grace is prior to the remission of sin. If, however, we take those things which are from the side of man justified, the case is reversed. Liberation from sin precedes in the natural order the obtaining of sanctifying grace." *Ibid.* cxiii, 8.

"Divine Wisdom joins together the last in what comes first with the beginning of what follows; for natures mutually ordained are as contiguous bodies, of which the lower in its highest part touches the higher where it is lowest. Whence also the lower nature in what is highest of its own, reaches to something proper to the superior nature sharing in it imperfectly. If the means of knowing natural to the human soul and to the angel be considered, the nature of the former is lower than that of the latter. The mode of knowing natural and proper to the angelic nature, is to know the truth without searching into or reasoning about it. It is proper to human nature to reach the truth by looking into it and by reasoning from one thing to another. Wherefore the human soul in what is highest attains to something of what belongs to the angelic nature, so that it has a knowledge of some things suddenly and without examination. Nevertheless, since man can know the truth only by receiving it from sense, he is in this respect found inferior to the angel. In the angelic nature a double cognition is found, speculative and practical; speculative, whereby it contemplates simply and absolutely the very truth of things; practical, according to philosophers, who held the angels to be the movers of the spheres, and that all natural forms preexist in their knowledge; according to theologians, who teach that angels are God's ministers in spiritual things, and that thus their orders are distinguished. Hence also in human nature, inasmuch as it borders on angelic, there should be a knowledge of truth without examination, in both speculative things and practical, which should be the principle of the entire consequent knowledge, speculative or practical; since principles should be more stable and certain. This knowledge, which man knows as a kind of seed-bed of his entire consequent knowledge, should be in him naturally, since in all natures preexist certain natural seeds of consequent operations and effects. It should also be habitual, so as to be ready at hand when needed for use. Moreover, as the human soul has a certain natural habit, called intelligence of principles, whereby it knows the principles of speculative science, so in it is a natural habit of the first principles of human action, the natural principles of natural law." *Idem De Verit.* xvi, 1, 0.

There is no question but that the preparation for justification is supernatural. This the whole conflict with Pelagianism established. The very remotest, the most transient movement looks to justification as such. This is clear from the Council of Orange. Thus we have in its fifth canon: "If any one says that the beginning of faith and that disposition of willing belief, whereby we believe in Him who justifies the sinner . . . is in us naturally and not by the gift of grace, that is by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which sets our will, withdrawn from infidelity and impiety, in the right way of faith and piety, is proved to be an adversary of the doctrine of the Apostles; since St. Paul says: "We are confident that He who has begun in us a good work, will perfect it even to the day of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc."

The steps in this preparation as enumerated by the Council of Trent are: the beginning of faith from the hearing of the gospel whereby we freely move towards God, believing especially that God justifies the sinner by His grace; secondly, the profitable fear of divine justice; thirdly, the consideration of God's mercy, whereby we rise to hope; fourthly, the beginning of love for God, the fount of all justice; fifthly, the movement of the will against sin by a hatred and detestation; lastly, the resolve to be baptized and to begin a new life. All these are evidently supernatural, surpassing man's natural powers. Yet, as evidently, they are not supernatural in the very same sense as are the meritorious works of one in the state of grace. We will devote a brief space to the determination of the matter.

In the first place, the whole process is supernatural because its very foundation is supernatural. The disposition to believe willingly which is the beginning of faith, comes from what St. James calls "the receiving of the ingrafted word." The gospel heard is a supernatural revelation. It is said to be ingrafted, because it is received, not for any agreement with reason or natural demonstration, but as something outside man's native exigency: "Not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God, who worketh in you that have believed." (1 *Thess.* ii, 13.)

Again, these different acts are primarily divine operations. "God worketh in you." "God who hath begun a good work in you." It is a work uncalled for by mere human nature, granted gratuitously to excite a response of which unaided nature is incapable.

One may ask, are not such acts of their nature and in themselves supernatural? Certainly they are not supernatural, in the same sense as acts educed by one elevated to the supernatural order by habitual grace. These, though not educed without actual grace, must nevertheless correspond to the nature from which they spring. This being supernaturalized, the actions coming from it are such; actual grace, as we have seen, being needed principally for extrinsic reasons, to present the unseen supernatural good adequately, to move the will to what is at best perceived obscurely, and to reveal in natural objects their supernatural relations, which, depending entirely on man's obligation to use them as means to his supernatural end, they could never manifest of themselves. On the other hand, we may not say that the acts in question are intrinsically natural; receiving as they do a supernatural denomination from their exciting cause and from their relation, not so much as means as disposing acts, to the supernatural end of justification. Perhaps we may use the analogy of a miracle to explain them. They are transient acts operated by God in human nature beyond all natural human powers. Nevertheless, these have their part in them by virtue of a very special obediential capacity they have received of responding according to God's will to the divine operation. This obediential capacity will perhaps be better understood if we remember that fallen man is not purely and simply in the state of nature. He is fallen. He is deprived of the supernatural grace in which God created him in the beginning. He has that need of restoration which all privation implies. He has nothing that can in any way suggest a right. Nevertheless when God deigns to restore him, the need at least suggests an obediential capacity more intimate than what would be in purely natural man.

Another and perhaps a clearer reason for the supernatural character of the preparation for justification may be drawn from St. Thomas discussing the natural relations of the simultaneous elements of formal justification. This is one operation with four distinct though simultaneous elements, viz. infusion of grace, movement of the will towards God, movement of the will against sin, remission of sin. In the preparation for justification the steps are not simultaneous. Nevertheless, they are not a mere series of distinct operations crowned in the end with justification. The preparation is rather one complex operation in which the elements blending imperceptibly one into another lead up by divine ordina-

tion to the infusion of sanctifying grace. Nay, the operation does not stop here. "It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish," says St. Paul (*Phil.* ii, 13); and again: "Being confident that He who hath begun the good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus." (*Ibid.* i, 6.) Justification from the first beginning of its preparation to its accomplishment by the infusion of sanctifying grace and then to its perfection in final perseverance, is one good work, complex indeed but complex in unity. There is in it progress in grace, the passage from grace transient and actual only, to grace permanent and habitual, from sin to justice, from death to life; but the supernatural character of the whole, is the character of each element, even the least. In it the least is charged with life. Apart from it each is as nothing. Unless they abide in the vine they are but fuel for the fire. (*John* xv, 6.)

Actual justification consists formally in the infusion of habitual grace, whereby man is justified with the justice of God, so that renewed in the spirit of our mind we not only are accounted just, but are such also in very truth. Nevertheless, if it be taken adequately justification can not be purely passive. It is the passage from death to life, from evil to good. It must, therefore, include the perfection of the acts which constituted its preparation. These acts, contained in justification are, according to St. Thomas, the movement of the free will towards God in love, the movement of the free will against sin in hatred and detestation. As acts of their nature subsequent to sanctifying grace, they are of their inmost nature supernatural.

These acts are necessarily such. Were the love of God and the hatred of sin in the instant of the infusion of sanctifying grace not entitatively supernatural, justification would be a matter of words only. That justification is complex, a divine operation whereby man also operates, need cause no difficulty. The elevation of nature is for supernatural operation. There is no reason why man should not respond in the very moment of his elevation. In case of justification he must do so. Considering, then, the order of relation, we see that infusion of habitual grace comes first, otherwise the human acts would be of an unregenerated nature, and could not be entitatively supernatural. The love of God must precede the hatred of sin, otherwise this would be servile, springing from fear of punishment. Indeed even in the preparation

itself the sinner who first conceives servile fear, advances, as the Council tells us, to the beginning of love and its consequent sorrow for sin. Finally, as sorrow for sin is the condition of forgiveness, remission of sin holds the last place in the relative order of the elements of justification.

One objects immediately: How can I receive sanctifying grace and love God while as yet not only is there no detestation of sin, but this remains still unforgiven? The question comes from our incapacity to grasp fully the notion of instantaneous operation. As long as we live in time we are essentially progressive. "We look before and after." We recognize time as a continuity of flow. We reflect on what is past. We anticipate what is to come. We do not perceive the *now* connecting past and future, those indivisible moments to which Martial's words are so splendidly applied: *Pereunt et imputantur*. We talk about the indivisible moment and of its flow indifferently, just as in mathematics we speak of the point without magnitude generating the line by its progressive movement. Our perception of line and flow is experimental. Point and moment elude the intellect, however laborious its efforts to grasp them. The objection then assumes progression where there is but simultaneousness, succession where only relation is to be found.

However, St. Thomas comes to our aid. Justification in its intimate reality is not something *divided* between God and man. It is God's operation in man. God infuses sanctifying grace. God operates in man giving him to love. God operates in him the hatred of sin. God remits the sin. God makes the sinner pleasing to Himself. This is the Catholic doctrine, never to be forgotten. Whatever, therefore, be the conditions of receptivity in the creature, the intimate nature of the operation comes from God, in whom there is neither change nor succession. This St. Thomas illustrates from the rising sun which, constant in its brightness, pours its full brilliance upon the darkened earth. In it there is no recession from darkness, no growth towards light; but, pouring its light upon the earth, it produces simultaneously the effect of day in the scattering of the shades of night. The earth, on the contrary, enveloped in shade, must with gradual progression recede from darkness, until the full splendor of the rising sun falls upon it and the progress from darkness to light is terminated in the simultaneous effect of that light in which there is no darkness at all.

So is it with the work of justification in man. As by the gradual approach of the sun earth's darkness is gradually dispersed, so by the operations of helping grace man is prepared gradually for justification. As the dispelling of darkness is progress towards light; so the operation of helping grace is progress towards justification to which it is ordained. As the rising sun brings the day, not by terminating, the progression from darkness to light with something entirely new, but by perfecting the progression in the very point it had attained; so the infusion of habitual sanctifying grace perfects by justification, the preparation of helping grace, at that very point to which it has carried the sinner. It finds him believing, hoping, beginning to love and consequently turning from sin with a certain hatred and detestation, proposing to receive baptism for the remission of sin. It elevates not a nude nature, but a personal nature, the subject of these acts effected by supernatural aid, ordained to supernatural life. In elevating the nature it simultaneously elevates and perfects these acts rendering them supernatural; not only in their origin, their subject, their end, but in their very being also; and this according to the natural order in which they were elicited, which corresponds perfectly to the order of relation indicated by St. Thomas.

Nevertheless, St. Thomas says: "If we view the matter from the side of man justified, the case is reversed. Liberation from sin precedes in the natural order the obtaining of sanctifying grace." Here let us notice in the first place that St. Thomas no longer uses the word *infusion* but substitutes for it *obtaining*. One may say that this makes no difference. Infusion and obtaining come to the same thing. Grace to be obtained must be infused. It may *come* to the same *thing*. But in the order of ideas the *infusion* of sanctifying grace and the *obtaining* of sanctifying grace differ greatly. The former expresses the instantaneous divine act; the latter man's attainment as the term of his progressive preparation. It turns the regard to the preparation for justification, as corresponding to the purification of the air from obscurities so as to be illumined by the sun. This being understood, let us view the whole operation from the side of man. His end is the attainment of sanctifying grace. For this purpose he must leave his sins, the last step in which is to obtain their remission. Thus the obstacle to grace is removed and grace is obtained. In a word, to examine the matter as expressed by "infusion of grace," is to analyze the

instantaneous transition effected by the divine act. To examine it as the "attainment of grace" is to analyze that transition as the term of progressive preparation. Wherefore St. Thomas concludes the passage quoted at the head of this chapter, as follows: "Or one may say that the *terminuses* of justification are *sin*, as that from which the process begins, and *justice* as that towards which it tends; while *grace* is the *cause* of the remission of sin and of the obtaining of justice."

In conversions sudden and perfect, such as that of St. Paul who, while moving in the way of sin, from his undertaking to persecute the Christians of Damascus to its accomplishment, was struck by God, and in an instant converted into an apostle, there is a double aspect. Viewed as a divine operation, it was the instantaneous infusion of sanctifying grace, with the simultaneous response of the regenerated will. The response was an act entitatively supernatural of the love of God and hatred of sin. With this the remission of sin was equally simultaneous. But whatever is received is received as philosophy tells us and experience confirms, according to the mode of the receiver. Man in this world is essentially progressive, moving continuously from starting-point to finish. If therefore, we consider the divine operation as received in the apostle, we must resolve it *virtually* into distinct operations of preparation and justification, corresponding to man's progressive nature. Similarly the infused grace is to be resolved *virtually* into the impulse of helping grace corresponding to the *virtual* preparation; into the infusion of habitual grace, corresponding to justification, virtually distinct from preparation; and again into helping grace for the supernatural acts *virtually* distinct among themselves and *virtually* consequent to the infusion of justifying grace. But all these distinctions are notional only founded in natural relations, not in actual successions. The actual reality was the indivisible instantaneous act of divine mercy with the simultaneous indivisible instantaneous response of the object of that mercy.

A question now arises: Is every human act of one in the state of grace supernatural, so as necessarily to be either meritorious of supernatural reward, or the reverse. Its foundation is the principle generally admitted in Ethics that in the natural order, though most human acts are indifferent if considered objectively only, or, in other words, speculatively and in their mere nature, nevertheless

taken subjectively, that is as reduced to action in some agent, they are necessarily either good or bad carrying the agent on to his last end, natural beatitude, or impeding him in his course. It is asked then, does the same rule hold in the supernatural order? Is every act naturally good, supernaturally salutary? Of this, if answered in the affirmative, the corollary would be that every act not supernaturally salutary is an impediment to our salvation, and therefore sinful in some sort of way, at least negatively and by omission.

It is important to note that the question is one of contingent fact, not of antecedent necessity. St. Thomas tells us that man in his original integrity could have practiced natural good and acquired natural virtue; and there is no reason why in his restored state he should not be able in many cases to do the same. Hence it is not a question of must or must not, but whether God wills that every human act should be also supernatural and in consequence, gives the necessary grace? Secondly, the question is universal, not particular. Certainly God gave the saints the grace to make each human act supernatural and meritorious of eternal life. The question, then is, whether in His ordinary providence He offers all in the state of sanctifying grace the same actual grace?

Before answering the question we must examine more closely the ethical principle just quoted. For every operation there must be an answer to the question, why? Why did you do this rather than omit it? Here there is question of right or wrong, involving the intention to observe the law of God or not to observe it. As in the natural order there is only one criterion of right, namely conformity to natural order, every human action must be subject to it. For man elevated to grace a double standard is possible, conformity to natural order or to supernatural. The question then comes to this: May men in general use in the minor things of daily life, the natural standard, or must they direct their intention always to the supernatural?

This brings us to *intention*. We said just now that the greater number of human actions are objectively and in themselves indifferent. They become good or bad in the subject according to the intention. If this be good the action becomes good; if it be bad, the action is bad. There is no medium between good or bad in the intention. This either directs the action as a means to the last end, according to the clear teaching of reason concerning the Creator, the intelligent creature and his use of irrational creatures; or it

does not. Not to so direct creatures in our human use of them is to depart from the known law; and, therefore, it is evil.

There would be no further difficulty if in all our operations we could have an actual intention, that is a constant conscious direction of the will to the last end, governing the operation to its last detail. But this the very progressiveness of man's nature and operation forbids. Both are complex, admitting many transient things to distract the mind and to render impossible the unbroken attention which actual intention requires.

But the very progressiveness of human nature provides a remedy. Every instantaneous force producing continuous motion communicates to the body moved an energy proportional to itself. Between this energy, as communicated by the force, and as received in the body moved there is a difference. The communication is instantaneous. The energy is received to be expended gradually. The movement of the body is not instantaneous, but progressive from start to finish. Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. This is seen exemplified in a football. The impact of the foot is instantaneous. Its *virtue* or energy is expended gradually carrying the ball through its flight. So too the actual intention sets one in movement to a place a mile away. Passing through the street he meets many things to distract him. The actual intention vanishes with the first distraction. Yet its virtue remains carrying him on in the direct road to the place to which he is going.

Again, if all our actions in the natural order could be governed by such an actual intention with its continuation in the virtual, the discussion would stop here. A moment's reflection on our consciousness tells us that the supposition is morally impossible. We must therefore find another intention sufficient to render human the direction to our last end of that multitude of daily actions which apparently terminate in the immediate end for which they are performed. This is found in the habitual intention.

Habitual intention is sometimes viewed as an intention made and not retracted. Thus, one saves my life. Out of gratitude I promise to give him five hundred dollars on the receipt of my dividends some four months later. Some will say I have now an habitual intention, and that my payment of the five hundred dollars corresponds to it. A little reflection shows two things here, the *substantial promise* made and accepted which binds me to pay

the money, and its *mode*, the gratitude in which the promise is made, which may easily disappear to be replaced long before the time of payment arrives, with a regret that I had allowed sentiment to carry me so far from discretion. I can therefore with a single act of intention bind myself to the *substance* of some future act. I can not bind myself with a single intention to the *mode* of its performance.

Yet an habitual intention availing to direct all my actions to my last end is occupied exclusively with their mode. What the future acts will be, I can not tell. My intention is that whatever they be they are to conform to the first principle governing the activity of the rational creature. This intention therefore is something entirely different from the actual intention and its necessary continuation in the virtual. These regard present individual acts; the habitual regards possible future acts. They take the substance of the act—and clothe it with the mode; the object of the habitual intention is the mode, the norm according to which possibilities are to be governed, should they become realities. The intention, actual and virtual, is an act. The habitual intention is a habit in the strictest sense, and nothing more.

A habit is an inclination of the potency to this activity rather than to that. It is not the motive-principle of action. Nevertheless, given the necessary conditions for action, it has its effect in determining what will follow; inasmuch as, inclining the potency, it makes one course easier than another. It may incline to a particular action or to its mode. Thus music as a habit inclines one who sees a fine grand piano to sit down and play, and, after sitting down, to play easily and even brilliantly. For the beginner it is easier to strike a wrong chord than the right one, and expression is unattainable for the time being. When the habit is acquired the striking of a wrong note becomes almost impossible and expression is, as they say, a second nature. The habit is acquired and conserved by repeated acts. It is lost by the continued omission of its acts. But it can not be acquired by a single act; it can not be lost by a single omission. Moral habits deliberately acquired have the same morality as the acts acquiring them. If acquired indeliberately they draw their morality from the act of the will deliberately accepting them. The habitual virtuous intention, then, is an inclination acquired deliberately by repeated acts, whereby when action is imminent one follows for the most part the way of

virtue. Thus his actions are directed to his last end by the deliberate intention with which he acquired the virtuous habit that now directs his operation. We say "for the most part." Habitual intention is not infallible. The action agreeing with it will be virtuous. But man is always free to act in accordance with virtue or not. On the other hand, single lapses do not take away the habit. If, however, lapses are multiplied the habit is destroyed, and its opposite is gradually contracted.

Let us see the working of the habitual intention. As St. Thomas, expressing the general philosophic mind, tells us, the whole line of creatures from the lowest to the highest, exhibits a continuity, the lower species in their highest functions entering into the lowest functions of the higher. The biologist knows that vegetative life and sensitive are quite different. There is no possibility of confounding the life of an oak with that of an elephant. Metaphysically we can define them accurately. Yet the biologist knows too that in the physical order it is probably impossible to draw a sharp boundary between the two kingdoms. There are between them species of which no one can say absolutely whether they are the lowest forms of animal life, or a higher vegetative life, imitating in some respects, what belongs to the lowest animal functions. In the passage from sensitive to intellectual life is found, too, the imitation of the higher by the lower. To perceive relations is of its nature an operation of the intellect. This all admit, since the highest science consists in tracing them out. Yet the animals perceive in some way by what we call the estimative faculty concrete relations inasmuch as these affect their individual welfare. The bird recognizes in this particular twig or tuft of wool, or piece of string, an adaptability to the nest it is actually engaged in building. The lamb perceives its individual danger in the actual howl of a wolf. A dog perceives in a chair standing by a table the means to reach a particular piece of meat. Man, too, has the same sensitive perception of utility in concrete things. When I get on a chair to reach a high shelf there is no formal reasoning. Nevertheless, though the act is of the sensitive nature, it is a sensitive act of a rational animal. Reason descends, so to speak, from its high station to play a humble, though necessary part in the sensitive act of a sensitive-rational nature. Hence what in animals is the estimative faculty, we term in man the particular reason. The act of the estimative faculty enters into its confines.

It does not coincide adequately with it. The dog will jump on the chair if it is near the table; if it be not at the book-shelf the man will cross the room to get it.

We now take man in comparison with the angel. St. Thomas reminds us that angelic knowledge is intuitive, simple perception without analysis of terms or process of deduction. Human knowledge supposes both of these as the ordinary means of its attainment. Nevertheless, the human intelligence enters the field of angelic intelligence. Man has a certain immediate perception of principles. If these regard speculative science it is called intelligence of first principles. If they regard human action it is intelligence of natural principles of natural law. Inasmuch as with these principles there is an apparently spontaneous sense of right and wrong with remorse should one yield to the wrong, it is termed *synderesis* of reason. It does not occupy adequately the angelic field. Its nature is essentially human. It can be perfected by repeated acts, nevertheless it is a habit natural, not acquired. It is not an inborn idea of right and wrong, for all ideas come through the senses. It is an inclination perfecting the potency so that when through the senses any concrete action is presented as possible, the intellect perceives immediately, as a sufficient foundation of rational operation, its character of right, wrong or doubtful.

This in common language is called the voice of conscience, since it dictates the course one is morally bound to follow. Whether it will be followed or not, is another question.

This voice of conscience declares an action presenting itself for choice to be right or wrong in itself, or else, in itself indifferent, right or wrong under actual circumstances. It varies for various people. When some positive precept is involved, it is for the greater number of mankind quite distinct. It happens, however, too often that sensitive appetite tends to what conscience declares to be wrong; and, because, this appetite is but an element of the indivisible human nature's appetite for its entire good, the first tendency of the will is to yield. Hence a conflict. If the will yields continually, it acquires an habitual inclination to follow spontaneously the solicitations of sensuality, to pay no heed to that natural perfection of reason, the voice of conscience; which then becomes, if not actually, at least practically extinguished. Thus, though there will be no advertence to the moral law, every such action incurs the guilt involved in the acquisition of the evil

habit. If, on the contrary, the will, embracing as a rule the dictates of reason, resists evil and obeys conscience, there follows an habitual inclination to conform spontaneously to the moral law. Thus conscience, strengthened by the acquired habit, is heard and followed almost mechanically; and every action receives the same voluntary direction to the last end, as that under which victory over passion was gained in the actions whereby the good habit was formed.

There remain the multitude of actions in which the sole substantial reason of morality is the referring of them or not to the Creator in the spirit of dependence looked for in the rational creature. Without question conscience declares the law contained in the relations of the creature to the Creator. Equally unquestionable is it that the moral delinquency of mere omission is comparatively slight in any ordinary particular case. It is no less certain that in each of the day's actions positive advertence to the law is morally impossible. One might conclude, then, that the solution of the problem these facts involve, would be to ignore it, as no law can oblige to the practically impossible. This would be to wrong the Creator, depriving the first principle of His law of its most lustrous perfection. It would wrong the creature, persuading him that the highest merit of service is unattainable.

The true solution is found in the habitual intention. It supposes, of course, in the subject that habitual subjection to the law, which an habitual intention to avoid all transgression implies. This inclines the will to listen to the voice of conscience prescribing an adequate worship of the Creator, the formal recognition at stated times of dependence on Him for all things, and of the obligation of using them according to His will. These times, should be so frequent as to coalesce in amplifying the habit, which now becomes the virtue of natural religion; and common consent fixes the necessary frequency at twice daily. In a word, the full observance of the law demands morning and evening prayer. The duty recognized, opportunities of practice in affairs of moment follow. There is a lawful pleasure one can sacrifice to obtain a more perfect self-control, an opportunity for charity in almsgiving or some other service. These lead on to the formal direction of small things from time to time to the end appointed by the Creator. Thus the habit is acquired by repeated acts affecting unconsciously the whole course of our life; nevertheless affecting it really. This

occasional experience proves. A habit does not necessitate the agent. He may in isolated actions go contrary to it. So one who has reached the habitual intention of directing all his operations to his last end may fail occasionally. But how small in itself be the deviation, how apparently harmless the creature attracting him, one so failing will find in himself an opposition to be overcome, a resistance to disorder not to be accounted for but by the natural disposition of the will to virtue perfected as an inclination by repeated acts; which is the habitual intention.

But let us not forget that we are speaking hypothetically, in the supposition that man had not been raised to the supernatural order. All that we have explained is taught by reason. It deals with a rational creature's rational service of the Creator in the use of natural creatures. Whatever obligations it implies are natural obligations. The purely natural man could as such fulfil them. The difficulties involved would in great measure be not insuperable by his natural powers, supposing God's Providence leading him into conjunctures exciting him to virtue. Should he need divine aid in more arduous things, this, inasmuch as necessary to fulfil a natural obligation, would be granted to a nature so created.

Is the same true of the existing supernatural order? Once a man has been regenerated by sanctifying grace, must all his human actions be supernatural, helping him on to the beatific vision; so that should they not do so, they would impede him in his course? The supernatural order, as we have seen differs greatly from the natural. The need of actual grace for any supernatural action is absolute. It is intrinsic, as we have seen, coming from the very nature of the act, not extrinsic, depending on its relative difficulty. The nature elevated by grace, is capable of any supernatural act. The virtue of faith inclines it to its particular acts. But the matter of the supernatural act must be presented adequately, both as regards the intellect and will. Moreover in the supernatural order such helping grace is not *due* as it would have been in the natural. The elevation of human nature, much more its restoration to the supernatural order, is purely gratuitous, received in a subject without the shadow of a right. It is a free gift as is everything implied in it. Nothing of the kind is to be seen in the natural order. The creation of man as such was a mere fact. The antecedent nothingness of human nature itself and of any subject in which it could

be received, or from which it might be made, precludes the notion of gift. Still in the supernatural order God's will is our sanctification; and it is hard to suppose that the relative sense of sanctification in the supernatural order should be inferior to what it would have had in the hypothetical natural order. On the contrary, since the end to be attained in the supernatural order is so much nobler than that which would have been reached in the purely natural, the way to it should be more excellent. Supernatural habitual intention would be the perfecting of the supernatural conscience. It would demand actual grace for every act entering into its acquisition, for the resolving to acquire it, for the accepting of it as acquired, for the resolution to perfect it. Unless there were for every human act an enlightening and an impulse of actual grace, to which ordinarily in the distractions of life one would not advert, there could be no supernatural habitual intention; since in no other way could it pass into the act. But on all this grace we can count, St. Paul, gives as the process in terms of triumphant security: "We know that to them that love God all things work together unto good, to such as, according to His purpose, are called to be saints. For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first born among many brethren. And whom He predestinated, them He also called. And whom He called them also He justified. And whom he justified them He also glorified. What shall we then say to these things? If God be for us, who is against us? He that spared not even His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all, how hath He not with Him given us all things?" (*Rom.* viii 28-32.) For us then the great difference is this—in the state of pure nature, the habitual intention, noblest of all means to attain man's end, would have been a natural acquisition. In our present state of supernatural elevation, the habitual intention, nobler far than anything conceivable in the natural order, is the absolute gift of God.

But one may say, it seems to involve an incredible spiritual waste. To all in the state of sanctifying grace must all those actual graces the habitual intention implies, be offered. Yet how few would use them. This is a strong argument inducing us to covet the better gift, to enter into the more excellent way. But against the doctrine it has no force, since these are the days when God fulfils His promise of lavish grace. "In the last days," said St.

Peter, quoting the prophet Joel, "I will pour out my spirit on all flesh, saith the Lord." If graces of signs and wonders abounded apparently to excess in the first age, may we not hold that helping grace of illumination and impulse abounds, apparently wasted, in the latter age? But may it not also be that we exaggerate the waste beyond the realities known to the Omniscient God alone?

Nay, more, is there any real waste? Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. How insignificant a part of the sun's light and heat falls upon the planets! Do we therefore speak of waste, as if the Creator's work was inefficient for his purpose? Of all the rain that falls on the earth how small the part that actually nourishes existing vegetable and animal life! How much is at once taken up again into the air by evaporation, how much flows off into the sea! How often must a drop complete the circuit from rain to rain, before it accomplishes its primary function! Yet no one even thinks of waste. On the contrary we admire the fullness of God's work, the abundance of His bounty, whereby is accomplished sweetly, without shock of intermission, His divine purpose. And so, having made man what he is, God accommodates to man's nature the operations of grace given with a real, universal will for the salvation of each individual soul.

Because God brings out of His treasures things new and old; that is because He presents us the treasures of His grace in different ways adapted to different exigencies of time and place, so that they are ever ancient, ever new; we find the doctrine of intention, as we have explained it, taking its definite form in the theological mind after the Protestant revolt. This is but one example out of many manifesting God's providence in the government of the world. Protestantism corrupted the Christian doctrine with an exaggerated fiction of grace, excluding all free-will. Of this the logical consequence is modern Rationalism, varying from the admission of free-will into its earlier forms, to an utter exclusion from the later evolutionary determinism, but always constant in regarding grace as an imposture. Hence in the Catholic Church, were revived the investigations begun in earlier ages when Pelagius and his disciples were propagating their errors. The harmony of grace and free will had to be set forth clearly. The great post-Tridentine theologians devoted themselves to the task.

It was not a work of mere speculation. The errors of Protestantism were not speculative only. In its doctrine of grace works

supernaturally good and meritorious of eternal life were made impossible. Thus charity grew cold. A slackness, a lethargy in religious life began to enter society at large; so that even those who kept the faith did not escape the contagion. "Whether you eat or drink or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God," said St. Paul; and by the very instinct of faith his hearers understood the precept and reduced it almost unconsciously, certainly unanalytically, to practice. The Reformation spirit would explain it away as a pious exaggeration, meaning only: "In eating avoid gluttony, and in drinking don't get drunk. It would be well too not to omit grace before and after meals." It became necessary therefore, not only to remind men and women of the doctrine, but also to show them how to practice it.

Among the first to do so was St. Ignatius. Humility, as a virtue distinctively Christian, had been treated abundantly by ascetic theologians. They had analysed its nature, marked out its degrees, explained its practice to generations untainted with Protestantism. St. Ignatius looked out over a new world; and, starting from the principle received from St. Augustine and St. Thomas, that humility is necessarily a subjection of man to God, proclaimed in the Book of the Spiritual Exercises its intimate nature as such. He said that with regard to the Creator man is under three laws: the positive law of Mount Sinai, binding under pain of mortal sin; the natural law of indifference to creatures in themselves, since they are to be viewed only as means to the end appointed for man—a law to be observed if one would avoid venial sin; the supernatural law of charity inscribed by the Holy Ghost in our hearts, binding as to unite ourselves to Jesus Christ, by imitating Him in His life, the only road to Christian perfection. Humility is a virtue. It is therefore a habit. Consequently its first degree corresponding to the first law, is such a subjection to that law, as to be habitually disposed so to observe it that for no worldly good, not even to save life itself, would one deliberate concerning the commission of mortal sin. The second degree corresponds to the second law. It is again an habitual disposition of soul. Here it establishes one in indifference, midway between worldly goods and their contraries, between riches and poverty, honors and contempts, the desire of a long life or the acceptance of untimely death, as the condition of an habitual resolve not to deliberate on the commission of a venial sin. The third degree

corresponds to the third law. It consists in such an habitual love of Our Lord Jesus Christ, as will keep one ever disposed, the glory of God being in either case equal, to choose poverty rather than riches; contempts, than honors; to be considered foolish and useless, rather than prudent and wise in this world; so as to be more like Him who chose these things for our sake.

Here we have not only a general ascetic doctrine of Christian perfection, but also its practice for all Christians. As a moment's consideration will show, it is a summary of the doctrine of an habitual intention that will not only color, but give their formal morality also to all the actions of life. The development of this doctrine of their Founder has always held a front place in the ascetical teaching of the Jesuit theologians, as it is the very heart of the Spiritual Exercises, of which their ascetic is but the amplification. This we can best show by an example.

In the scholasticate of the French Jesuits at Vals, among the young religious there preparing to labor for the conversion of souls apparently blinded and hardened by modern errors, and for the reestablishment of the Christian Faith in a society poisoned with revolutionary doctrines, Father Gautrelet, about the middle of the nineteenth century founded the Apostleship of Prayer. Its object was to engage the students to aid by prayer and good works the apostolate in which as yet they had no active part. The idea was noble. It appealed to the lay mind. It offered the Christian people a definite function in the evangelization of the modern world. It soon spread beyond monastic walls and the consecrated life; and not in France alone, but throughout the Catholic world, the Apostleship of Prayer became the popular form of the devotion to the Sacred Heart.

Good works offered for the intention of the Apostleship have all the impetratory powers of formal prayer. This became one of the principles of the Apostleship, as the building up of the Kingdom of Christ became the concrete object of its apostolic spirit. As with the lapse of time the work grew, a reorganization became advisable; and towards the end of the century its result appeared in the League of the Sacred Heart with its motto: "Thy Kingdom come!" its badge, the image of the Sacred Heart as revealed to St. Margaret Mary Alacoque; its three degrees, its specified works; the Apostleship of Prayer being retained as the sub-title,

to indicate clearly the origin of the League, which is but the necessary development of Father Gautrelet's idea and foundation.

Among the specific works of the league is the Treasury. The League takes to itself Our Lord's precept to the first Apostles: "You are the light of the world. So let your light shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your Father who is in heaven." The members are urged, not only to *do* good works for the intentions of the League but to record them also, to hand the record in to the local director, that the sum total may be published by the central director in the Messenger of the Sacred Heart, the organ of the League of the whole country. Those who began the work of the Treasury expected it to grow. It has grown beyond expectation.

Now arose the vital question: what intention was necessary and sufficient to admit good works to the Treasury? The more rigid interpreters held that an actual intention for each one was necessary. To more liberal minds this seemed to render useless the morning-offering. If this were not sufficient for the purpose, its specification of "my prayers, works, and sufferings of this day" would be ineffectual. Hence the greater number of directors taught their promoters that an habitual intention sufficed. Unfortunately some made this intention to consist in the unretracted offering. But such, if it could be rightly termed an habitual intention, could reach only such things as were foreseen, as morning and evening prayers, the regularly recurring duties of the day and such like; while, as a matter of fact, most of our daily actions as expressed in the catalogue of good works are casual, calling, therefore, for some definite connecting link with the morning-offering. Some imagined that virtual intention might be introduced. But psychology proves, what experience confirms that virtual intention comes only from a very definite actual intention. If I resolve to go to New York I may have a virtual intention lasting for days governing all my activities negatively, that is to say, excluding spontaneously anything incompatible. But with regard to the principal positive acts of the journey, packing-up, arranging tickets, settling business, changing trains, etc., the virtual intention always becomes actual. A virtual continuation of an indefinite intention, e. g. I will go somewhere, must be of very brief duration. Hence a virtual intention arising from the actual intention of the morning offering would, if it persisted, have to become actual in the par-

ticular actions coming up during the day. Experience tells us that such is not the case. Therefore in ordinary people there is no enduring virtual intention whereby their casual good actions are directed to the ends proposed by the League.

The difficulty vanishes before the right understanding of the habitual intention. The serious recitation of the morning-offering day by day lays the foundation of the habit of referring all prayers, works and sufferings, as regards their impetratory efficacy, to the intentions of the League, especially to the monthly intention. The actual intention in some of the more important, confirms the habit; of which the consequence is that the will goes out easily to such actions as more conformable to the spirit of the League; praying more fervently and admitting its crosses with patience. Thus the spirit of the League is acquired gradually and deliberately to color the whole life. One becomes a true child of the Kingdom. The King and His interests, His service and His wrongs, come uppermost in the mind. One lives for Him to serve Him. Thus, as an ordinary rule, all that makes up life is directed to Him. Whatever is opposed to the restoration of His Kingdom amongst men, is spontaneously avoided. This habit is the habitual intention in its perfection; and according as one grows in it, the right is acquired of inscribing the casual things of each day in the Leagues Treasury of Good works.

From this we see how efficacious is the League in forming the Christian spirit. It is indeed an easy and sure way of perfection for people living in the world. All directors of any experience have seen souls sanctifying themselves by its means. Many more would do so, had they directors with the zeal and the knowledge equal to the task of pointing out the way.

CHAPTER XV

THE SACRAMENTS IN THE SOUL

"Sacraments are necessary for man's salvation for, a threefold reason. The first is drawn from the condition of human nature, the characteristic of which is to be led to things spiritual and intelligible by means of things corporeal and sensible. It belongs to Divine Providence to provide for each thing according to its peculiar condition. Wherefore Divine Wisdom suitably grants man aids to salvation under certain corporeal and sensible signs. The second reason is taken from the state of man, who in sinning subjects himself by affection to corporeal things. For the medicinal remedy should be there applied to man, where he suffers the disease. Wherefore it was suitable that God should apply to man spiritual medicine by means of some corporeal signs; for had he offered remedies purely spiritual, the soul, given up to corporeal things, could not have applied them. The third reason comes from the particular inclination of human action, taken up principally with corporeal things. Lest, therefore, man should find it hard to be withdrawn entirely from corporeal acts, corporeal exercises which he may practice profitably, are set before him in the sacrament. Thus he avoids superstitious practices contained in the worship of devils, or others harmful, of whatever sort, consisting in acts of sin. In this way through the institution of sacraments man is taught agreeably to his nature by means of sensible things; he is humbled, knowing that he is subject to corporeal things, since by corporeal things his evils are remedied; he is preserved from harmful practices by the wholesome practices of the sacraments." *St. Thomas Summ. Theol.* 3, lx, 1, 0.

"There are two ways in which an effect can be produced; one by the means of the principal agent, the other, by means of the instrument. In the first God alone works the interior effect of the sacrament; both because God alone glides into the soul, where the effect of the sacrament exists, while nothing can operate immediately where it is not; and also because grace, the interior effect of the sacrament, is from God alone. The character also, an interior effect of some sacraments, is an instrumental virtue which flows from the principal agent, God. In the second way man can operate to the producing of the interior effect of the sacrament, inasmuch as his operation is ministerial. For the nature of minister and of instrument is the same. Of each the action is from without and applied exteriorly. It is allotted its interior effect from the power of the principal agent, God." *Ibid.* lxiv, 1, 0.

"As regards the interior effect of the sacraments, Christ operates both as God and as man, but differently under each respect. Inasmuch as He is God He operates in the sacraments by authority. Inasmuch as He is Man He operates to their interior effects meritoriously, also efficiently, but instrumentally. We have explained that the passion of Christ, which He endured in His Human Nature is the cause of our justification both meritoriously and effectively, not indeed as if it were the principal agent, that is, by authority, but as the instrument, inasmuch as the Humanity is the instrument of the Divinity. Nevertheless, because it is the instrument united to the Divinity in Person, it has a principality and an instrumentality of its own with

respect to extrinsic instruments who are ministers of the Church. Therefore as Christ, inasmuch as He is God, has in the sacraments power of authority, so, inasmuch as He is Man, He has the power of principal ministry; that is, power of excellence. This consists in four things. First in this, that the merit and virtue of His Passion operates in the sacraments. And because the virtue of the Passion is united to us by faith according to the text; "Whom God has proposed to be a propitiation through faith in his blood" (*Rom.* iii, 25.), which faith we profess by the invocation of the name of Christ; therefore, in the second place, it belongs to the power of excellence which Christ has in the sacraments, that these are sanctified in His name. And because from His institution, the sacraments, obtain their virtue, it comes in the third place, that He who gave them their virtue, could also institute the sacraments. And because the cause does not depend on the effect, but rather the reverse, it therefore, in the fourth place, belongs to the excellence of Christ's power to be able to confer the effect of the sacraments without any exterior sacrament." *Ibid* 3, 0.

It is hard to realize in the world today the tremendous change induced by Protestantism into man's ideas concerning the relations of the creature to the Creator. For ages faith had held supreme sway. The intimacies of the Gospel, in which God is our Father and we, His children, were the common-places of life. "Every good gift and every perfect gift was from above, coming down from the Father of lights." "God made His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sent His rain upon the just and upon the unjust." "He fed the ravens, clothed the lilies and made the sparrow's fall His care." Man was under His special providence. Each one He moved to good. Each He drew to salvation in Jesus Christ. One after another He regenerated them to the supernatural life. In each He began, continued, perfected and crowned the work of grace; so that none could attribute anything to himself as of himself, since "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." Apart from God existence and life were inconceivable. "In Him we live and move and are," was the foundation of all science. The Creator's operation in the creature was the universal guiding principle, making intelligible, luminously so, the doctrine of the Fathers, of St. Augustine especially. It was the harmonizing element, taking from the theologians, who made that doctrine the matter of their demonstrations, obscurities and apparent contradictions inevitable without it.

All this Protestantism rejected. It took God our Father out of human life, banishing Him to the gloomy precincts of the begin-

ning of time. The Gospel truths expressing His ever-operative care in His creatures, were thus made empty hyperbole. The Creator operating in the creature, no longer accepted as expressive of the intimate reality of things, faded into the remotest and most expressionless of figures. The reality of regeneration and of the supernatural life was denied. Justification was an attribution purely external that left the sinner intrinsically unchanged. Fathers and theologians went out of use. To men denying their first principles, their doctrine became unintelligible. One exception was made. St. Augustine's language, so vigorous and expressive, taken, as the Saint expressed it, in the light of that first principle of all Christian philosophy, the Creator ever acting, ever operating in the creature to which He is ever present in the infinite instant of eternity that embraces eminently all durations, is the most marvellous human expression of profundities divine. Separating it from that light, pouring upon it the darkness of heresy, Protestantism made the Doctor of Grace, the father of impious error. For it the providence of the ever-present God moving all things sweetly, became the hard predestination of a God hidden in darkness behind the curtains of time. Between that remote divinity and mankind corrupted by the primal sin, was asserted an enmity in itself unextinguishable, yet capable of being disguised. Still this poor device to rescue out of the mass of mankind condemned to external torment a few for the glorifying of God's mercy, could be attained only by making the Incarnate Word the object of the Father's anger; so that hidden beneath His vicarious punishment the unchangeable sinfulness of the chosen few might pass unobserved. Thus as a religion Protestantism substituted for the loving God revealed in Christ, a fetich borrowed from the worst paganism.

Into a world so prepared entered easily the idea so prevalent today, of a Creator who, far removed from our daily life, started, so to speak, the machinery of the universe, provided for an automatic supply of fuel and water, or of energy in some other form, and then left it to run itself, coming in or, as it is termed, interfering, only when something is about to go wrong. Holding such a theory—whether definitely and explicitly or vaguely and implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, it matters not—one cannot but blunder sadly in undertaking to elucidate the apparent obscurities of Fathers and theologians to whom the Creator ever operating

in the creature was the most obvious of realities. That this banishment of God by the Protestant Reformer is no calumny, not even an exaggeration, the patent fact, unmistakable in its significance, that the Sacraments simply dropped out of their system, proves most clearly. Even the two they pretended to retain, lost their character of operations intimately divine, of acts creative in their nature appertaining to the new supernatural creation of grace. For the Reformer man could not be born again in baptism of water and the Holy Ghost, a new creature, because the cornerstone of Protestantism was the total and irremediable corruption of human nature. Hence despite the clinging of a few to some remnants of Catholic doctrine, Protestants at large accept the necessary consequence, that baptism is but an official act whereby the minister receives the child into the congregation; an act purely human, since no visible congregation can be identified with the only Church of God acknowledged by Protestantism, the invisible company of the elect. Next, pushing on to logical conclusions, the opinion grew that infant Baptism was a Popish superstition; since none can be received into a congregation but one willing to become a member. Then came a corollary. Infant Baptism rested upon the necessity of the rite. According to Protestant principles they should not be baptized. For them, therefore, baptism is unnecessary. If so, it cannot become necessary as they grow older. The only condition of salvation, therefore, is to lay hold by faith of the righteousness of Christ as the covering of one's wickedness.

This was the one sovereign remedy of all sin actual no less than original. Indeed actual sin added nothing to original, since, as fruit follows the nature of root, every act of corrupt nature was held to be sin. The Lord's Supper became a bare commemoration of an event long past. It was a pious act whereby one professed a saving faith that he was of the number of the elect. If he had not got that far, it could help him somehow to the supreme laying hold of Christ's righteousness, the assurance of salvation which once attained can never be lost. How it could help was not clear. It had no sacramental character, for it gave no grace. Such a notion would be popery. Give Our Lord's words a true sacramental sense and you are back again in the Mass. It had no merit condign or congruous. The very terms were popery. It did not nourish the soul with the Body and Blood of Christ. This would suppose in the soul a supernatural life. Again popery. It was a

remembrance in the heart that Christ died to save sinners, an appropriation of salvation by faith. The supper was an adventitious extrinsic occasion, aiding unnecessarily to the accomplishment of an act which without it could be accomplished—must be accomplished by A, because he is one of the elect, chosen for salvation in the far distant dimness of creation's dawn; useless to B, because for him that act is impossible, never to be accomplished. His life is apparently exemplary; it is really a mass of sin. He may pray: his prayer is sin. He is a child of wrath, predestined from all eternity to the flames of hell.

This is plain speaking and many a Protestant would read it with growing indignation: "I have been a Protestant all my life. I was brought up piously. I have been intimately familiar with Protestants of all denominations, from Episcopalians to Adventists, and never yet have I heard such doctrines." That is perfectly true. Indeed, one of the strongest proofs showing the essential falsehood of Protestant Christianity, and that the Catholic Church alone offers Christianity pure and undefiled, is the necessary distinction, everywhere met, between the Protestant system and Protestant practice. The system is as we have stated it: in practice there is a constant recurrence to the Catholic doctrine. For God who moves the creature moves all towards good. As St. Paul said to the Athenians, He moves all to seek God, to feel after Him, to find Him who is not far away, since in Him we live and move and are. This is why there is a constant flow from Protestantism back to the Catholic Church.

But the Catholic Church is before all things a sacramental church. It is the visible Kingdom on earth of the invisible King. In it He lives; for it is His Body; in it He operates; for He is the Husbandman, the Shepherd, the Vinedresser and the Vine. He sows the seed of the Gospel. He feeds the flock. He buds and grafts and prunes, bringing in the wild nature, making it His own member, to live with His own supernatural life. His own work is done invisibly. Its recipients are visible men. Its agents and instruments must be visible.

St. Thomas, therefore, gives us three reasons why there should be sacraments, signs efficacious of the grace they signify, in the Catholic Church. At first sight they appear so common-place as to disappoint. We approach the question in the spirit of Naaman, looking for wonders, and are disappointed at meeting what we

take to be the trivial. Yet a moment's reflection shows us that it should not be otherwise. Sacraments respond to a need purely human. The divine operation in our souls is a reality. Could we perceive it by consciousness, we should need no sacrament, since Our Lord, even as Man, is not bound to the sacrament to produce its effect. One may say that we could perceive it by faith. But unless you would throw us back upon the so-called faith of Protestantism, neither more nor less than a presumption often impious, always irrational, you must give us the testimony to which we shall assent. "You have it," one will answer: "Jesus Christ came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the chief." Here we have but a general proposition. I believe it because God has revealed it. Wherefore I seek the practical means which a Saviour, infinite, good and wise must have provided for me to become a sharer in that salvation. "You have it," is the answer. "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." True. But what is this belief? How am I to reduce it to practice? "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for: the evidence of things that appear not." Then you admit that behind faith there is a substance of which it is the evidence. How is it the evidence? It is not the substance manifesting itself. That would be sight. Neither is it blind assurance, an interior feeling of all-rightness, a sensation which only deluded enthusiasts can imagine to be intellectual conviction. The jailer at Philippi got from St. Paul more than the advice to believe. "He was himself baptized immediately and all his house." This was the universal pledge of salvation, the solid foundation of faith and hope. The Protestant doctrine of assurance is a deception. An intellectual conviction must rest on certain grounds which in case of assurance could only be direct revelation. No Protestant will say today: "God has beyond all question revealed to me that I am of the number of the elect."

As a Catholic I believe absolutely that Our Lord came to save sinners, because God has revealed it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. I believe that He has given the means of salvation to man, because He "wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 *Tim.* ii, 4.) If to be saved is the end, the knowledge of the truth, not a blind sentiment, is the means; and the elements of that truth constitute what is to be known. For in Christ the way, the truth, the life are one—Himself. "But how shall we learn without a preacher, and how shall he preach

who is not sent? (*Rom.* x, 13. 14.) Therefore Christ Himself sends me the preacher, the Church, His Body, His Spouse, His Kingdom, "The Pillar and Ground of Truth." (1 *Tim.* iii, 15.) From the Church I receive the revelation of the salvific will of the Saviour with me as its definite object, of the means in themselves infallibly efficacious, since in them God Himself operates. By using the means I have the reasonable supernatural hope of eternal life. The hope is obligatory, since its foundation is God's revelation. It is not assurance. It is not revelation. It is no guarantee of final perseverance. This God does not give in His ordinary providence. "We must work out our salvation in fear and trembling." "He that standeth must take heed lest he fall" (*Philip.* ii, 12; 1 *Cor.* x, 12). But this supposes a calm and rational confidence that, using the prescribed means, we are really in the way; and consequent upon that confidence follows the will to persevere in the use of the means.

St. Thomas begins his argument for the need of sacraments from the principle of universal application: What is received is received according to the mode of the receiver. The substance of the gift depends upon the giver; but he can not determine the mode of its reception. One gives an equal alms to ten poor men. Some receive it callously; others gratefully, others again grumble at the amount as too small, and so on. God sends upon the earth rain, which plants receive, each according to its own particular nature; animals each in its own way; man in a hundred different ways. God could, as we have said, confer the grace of justification without any intermediary. But for all practical purposes could man so receive it?

On hearing St. Peter the Jews who had crucified Our Lord were filled with compunction, and asked eagerly: "What shall we do?" Three courses were open to the Apostle. He might have imitated our Lord, had such been God's will, and answered: "Your sins are forgiven." But even in Our Lord's case the words provoked the rejoinder calling for a miracle: "Who can forgive sins but God alone?" So St. Peter might have confirmed the forgiveness granted to the repentant multitude with a great miracle. But this could not be repeated indefinitely so as to become the ordinary way of dealing with sinners. Should miracles become part of God's ordinary providence they would cease to be miracles and enter into the ordinary law of things.

Again, St. Peter might have left them with the simple assurance: "Your sins are forgiven. Take my word for it. Lay hold by faith of your redemption. Conceive an interior conviction that your sins are covered with the merits of Christ." This course, which in the Protestant system has failed so egregiously as to end in banishing from modern Protestantism the very idea of sin, could hardly, notwithstanding St. Peter's singular preeminence, have quieted those who enquired so anxiously: "What shall we do, men and brethren?" You are our brethren, sons of Abraham according to flesh. You have the secret of reconciliation. Do not hide it from us. What shall we do? Even were we to admit that in this particular case St. Peter's authority proclaiming free salvation in the Blood of the Lamb might have sufficed to assure the earnest seekers that they had indeed conceived the necessary saving faith, such a guarantee as this could not be given by the ordinary preacher. Behind St. Peter was the miracle of Pentecost.

But even he gave the answer provided by Our Saviour adequate for all men and for all time. "Do penance. Be baptized. Receive the Holy Ghost." The sacrament of regeneration is the entrance to supernatural justice. In it sanctifying grace with the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, the gift of the Holy Ghost and the long train of supernatural moral virtues, is infused into the soul, making man the child of God by adoption, as Jesus Christ is His Son by nature. The answer satisfied universal mankind for centuries. That it is God's revealed truth is proved by the sudden translation through it of nations from the kingdom of darkness and the bondage of satan, into the glorious Kingdom of Light.

The second reason brought by St. Thomas reaches deeper than many would think. It is no mere rhetorical argument, an antithesis, rounding off with a fullness satisfying the imagination rather than the intellect, a parallelism between a composite malady and its composite cure. It is the practical conclusion of St. Paul's precept: "As you have yielded your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity, unto iniquity; so now yield your members to serve justice, unto sanctification." (*Rom. vi, 19.*) The body has been joined with the soul in sin. Through the corruption of the flesh the soul has been drawn into sin. If the soul is purified the body must share in the purification; and in the ceremonial purification of the body, the substantial purification of the entire nature must reach the soul.

This is a law. It is drawn from a truth contradicted by the darkest error of the mystery of iniquity. The war between good and evil in the world is evident. Two explanations of it are offered. The true explanation coming from heaven shows the prince of evil, a creature perfect in his origin, corrupting himself utterly by his will, becoming a rebel against his Creator, and as such striving with all his might to draw to himself God's creature, man. This God allows for man's probation, providing him, nevertheless, with efficacious means of victory. The other, brought from hell, is the false doctrine of two independent principles; one, the principle of good, the creator of the invisible spiritual world; the other, the principle of evil, creating all visible, material things. These two systems, the true and the false, have existed in the world from the beginning, side by side. Upon the false doctrine have rested all idolatries; for in every idolatry appear two worships, that of divinities benign and good, and another with cruel and bloody rites, often secret, to propitiate the evil and hostile.

As idolatry passed away, Gnosticism, perpetuated the impious error. The Albigensians professed its dualism without reserve. Lollardism in all its forms was permeated with it. It lurked, hardly concealed, under the Protestant doctrine of the total and irremediable corruption of man's nature, the source of successive manifestations of Gnosticism, from the Anabaptist licentiousness down to the Christian Science of today. In the Church it appeared as Quietism. Jansenism with its two prevailing loves, was a form of it. The modern obliteration of moral bounds is its consequence. Attributing shamelessly to the grossly material a factitious spirituality, it asserts itself boldly in the formula: "Art for art's sake," proclaiming the essential purity of the artistic instinct, a formula invented to veil the independence of artistic sensuality; so that in painting, sculpture, literature, music, drama, there may be no question of morals. The wide-spread doctrine of the same essential purity of sexual appetite, dignified as love, comes from it, to make that appetite the sole sanctifying principle of marriage; and to teach that its extinction, rendering wedlock immoral, demands imperatively the breaking of the marriage tie, and imposes the obligation of seeking a recrudescence of lust in new connections, which it designates by a lie, as shameful as it is patent, the mating of souls.

Regarding material things as evil, Gnosticism seems to prescribe absolute abstention from them. But all Gnosticism is a lie. In fact it encourages unbridled sensual indulgence. Only the true religion demands the subjection of appetites to the divine law; to reason elevated by grace, by a will moved by grace. This is the supernatural life of faith. Unless the appetites are so controlled, it is worse than folly to talk of an interior faith that saves from hell and opens heaven. However agreeable this may be to human nature, conscience will make itself heard, assuring all that it is a death-dealing deceit, in which iniquity lies to itself. Conscience, therefore, to be pacified demands a sign that the old order is reversed; that he who yielded his members to serve uncleanness and iniquity, now yields his members to serve justice unto sanctification. Hence in His mercy Our Lord instituted the exterior sign signifying the grace it effects.

The essential evil of all material things was at the foundation of Gnosticism. The perfect who would live up to such a doctrine were always few. For the multitude there had to be a mitigation. In this concession the minimum of departure from principles had to be secured. To the Gnostic mind a succession of single acts gratifying concupiscence unlawfully, was preferable to the recognition of a state of life in which a temperate satisfaction of natural appetites directed to the propagation of the human kind, should be legitimate. The propagation of the race involved the generation of the material, in itself evil. For the gratification of concupiscence, concubinage, still better promiscuity, was preferable to marriage, especially to Christian marriage, that life-long bond, including the hateful sacramental idea, from which there was no escape. Hence the shameful disorders in which the so-called sacred rites of Gnostic sects terminated.

Their views of the relative morality of marriage and license in matters sexual passed over to the other appetites. A frank surrender of oneself to the solicitation of the moment, though in itself to be reprehended, was to be preferred to a moral system providing for a deliberate constant use of God's gifts controlled by that temperance the divine law prescribes. For the generality of Gnostics therefore, there was nothing to check the utmost cravings of license. On the other hand there was a very definite encouragement of indulgence; as we learn from the Albigenes.

Two conditions only were essential to membership in their sect, determination to persevere in it till death, and to receive in the end the *consolamentum*. This was a diabolical parody of a sacrament, in which material things had a *negative* part only. It consisted in the laying on of hands by the so-called bishops, who accepted the dying man's pledge to do what hitherto he had not done, to separate himself during the brief time remaining from material things, thus to purify himself from evil. The pledge in one slow to die would mean suicide by starvation or the preventing of possible future relapses by poison.

The inroads of Gnosticism was an evil well-known in the time of St. Thomas. Therefore, he dwells on the essential goodness of material things and their *positive* use in the sacraments.

"Destroy what you have adored, Sicambrian; adore what you have destroyed," said St. Remi to Clovis. And this is the external act of every sinner coming to be reconciled to God. In baptism he renounces the service of the devil and adores on bended knee Him whom he has defied. He who followed proudly his own will, now bows his head under the yoke of Christ. He who profaned his body and with its filthiness stained his soul, is now washed with water that he may be cleansed in the blood of Christ. In penance he, who gloried in his physical liberty, now kneels before God's minister and confesses with shame as grievous sins the fruits of that liberty, actions once his daily boast. He renounces them in formal terms, promises amendment, accepts the penance imposed. He goes forth to destroy what he had made his idol, to adore Him whom he had forgotten. In extreme unction the members that had served iniquity are anointed with holy oil, that God may forgive the sins committed in them, and man, in himself so frail, meets the inevitable hour, strong in divine grace, destroying for the last time what he had adored, adoring Him at whose judgment-seat he is about to appear, hoping through the Precious Blood applied to his soul to receive the sentence of peace and pardon.

St. Thomas, in his last reason, touches another phase of human nature. The conviction of the intimate relation between the seen and the unseen world is so universal as to forbid the doubt that would challenge its foundation. It appears in all places, in all times, amongst all nations. The material civilization of the twentieth century can no more shake it off, than could the nomads of the Asian steppes, the Islanders of the Pacific, or the Fetich worship-

pers of Africa. However, loud may be the profession of disbelief, signs of at least a suspicion of the truth turn up most unexpectedly. All the speculations of spiritualism, all the so-called psychic research rest upon it. That one rejects Christianity, denies the personal God, is no guarantee that he is not entangled in some occultism. The antichristian secret societies often take their form from some mystery of pagan times, saturating their initiatory rites with signs expressive of relations with the invisible world.

There is, then, a world around us which we can not see; so real, nevertheless, that only with relation to it has this visible world an explicable reality. There is the Kingdom of Light, in which Jesus Christ reigns as Head of the whole human race. There is the kingdom of darkness where satan, the adversary of Christ, plots evil things for men. With one or other every human being must cast his lot; and each has its own ceremonies and signs, whereby he is drawn to them, whereby he expresses his deliberate choice. Indeed many of the ceremonies of secret societies may rightly be termed diabolical sacraments. They are outward signs effecting in the soul the extinction of grace, of the Christian character, as far as this is possible, and with it all hope of a renewal of the supernatural life. For this very purpose are they instituted by the prince of darkness. Their very existence bears witness to the existence in the Kingdom of Light of signs instituted by the King in response to human needs, signifying grace and life, and effecting what they signify. The kingdom of darkness is in everything the blasphemous parody of the Kingdom of Light.

Here we may glance at one of the many shallow arguments urged against the Catholic Church by Protestants; by infidels, who see clearly that the old religion of Christ can have nothing in common with the novelties of the sixteenth century, against Christianity itself. They compare Paganism with Christianity. They perceive similarities of worship. In each there are temples, altars, sacrifices, priesthoods, processions, flowers, lights, festivals, images, consecrated persons, both men and women, shrines, pilgrimages, votive offerings, incense, salt, water. Paganism preceded Christianity. Therefore Christianity is but a kind of purified paganism. The fact is that human worship is something as specific as human nature. All those things are the matter used in worship by unsophisticated man. The unliturgical worship idealized by Protestants is impossible in the concrete for human nature. The

Bible in the lap and the hunting up of texts, is as much a sacred rite as the taking of holy water; the jumpings and tremblings and contortions of meetings and revivals, as the procession of Corpus Christi; the bare wooden table, as the altar with its crucifix, lights and flowers; the clerk's: "Let us sing to the praise and the glory of God," as the priest's: "*Orate fratres.*" The difference is that one category consists of acts devised by man to contradict the Catholic Faith; the other, of acts prescribed by divinely instituted authority to affirm it. Protestantism took fifteen centuries to become possible; it perished in less than four. It was always a nascent scepticism. Its formula was: "I deny the faith of ages." To abolish the outward expression of Christian faith was possible only when men began to doubt the belief of fifteen hundred years. The very pagan, then, was to be preferred to the protagonists of Protestantism in this, that he used to the full the material of worship provided by God in nature. His sin was the abuse which turned what God had ordained for the worship of Himself to the worship of devils. In this was the essential malice of idolatry. To pretend that it consists in the use of what every instinct of nature proclaims to be the material of worship; to assert as the purification of religion that the devout use of such matter in the worship of God is forbidden; to maintain that such a use can only be an immoral condescension to pagan superstition; are puerilities unworthy of even the weakest intelligence.

The sacraments effect the grace they signify. This efficiency is, of course, instrumental only. Grace is the moving vital principle of the new supernatural creation. It is, therefore, the work of the Creator who, alone unmoved, is the mover of all. No creature can receive the power of effecting grace as the principal cause, any more than in the natural order it can be the principal cause of life. Whether natural or supernatural, life is the direct effect of creation. In the sacrament, then we distinguish the *sacrament* in its proper and exclusive sense, that is, the sign; *the thing*; which is the grace effected; and the *sacrament and the thing*, which may be taken as the relation of efficiency in the sign to the effect. This we can illustrate by an example. One sees a chisel, and from its appearance gathers that the maker designed it, say, to cut square holes in wood. As such it is a *sign* that such holes are possible, and of the possible holes themselves. These holes are the *thing* to be produced. The chisel has received a particular

form, the foundation of a relation of efficacy to certain square holes, but not to any round hole, or to the driving of screws. This is the foundation of the notion of the *sign* and the *thing*. So far, however, there is only abstract relation to possible holes, which, while the chisel remains in the tool-chest, may never be actuated. As soon as the carpenter takes it out of the chest for use the relation becomes concrete. It is the particular efficacy of this chisel with regard to a certain particular hole, to make which the carpenter is about to employ it instrumentally. In the relation, then, of concrete efficiency of this particular sign applied instrumentally to this particular person to effect its particular grace, is found the *sacrament* and the *thing*. Since the prime mover is God Himself it is clear that the effect must infallibly follow the sacrament and the thing, unless some extrinsic obstacle be placed by the recipient of the sacrament. It is also clear that the sacrament, having been received under that relation, the removal of such an obstacle will, in general, render possible its full effect. Wherefore we say that the sacraments are efficacious *ex opere operato*; that is from the intrinsic efficacy of the work performed.

In the effecting of sacramental grace God, the principal cause, uses men as His instruments. As the administration of the sacraments is part of the visible ministry of the hierarchical Church, the minister of the sacraments must be in the sacred order corresponding to the sacrament; he must use the appointed form of words, uniting it to the matter of the sacrament, and must have, at least, the virtual intention of doing what Christ instituted. That a virtual intention suffices, is clear from its very nature which is to carry on and complete a progressive action according to the actual intention formed in its beginning. As we have seen, the virtual intention is the efficacious continuation of the actual intention. This continuation in *efficacy* man's nature demands, since the continuation in act is impossible. On the other hand that such continuation exists carrying on a long and complex operation to the end resolved upon, is a matter of daily experience.

That an habitual intention can not suffice, is no less clear. This we have seen differs entirely from virtual intention. The virtual intention is active. It contains all the energy of the actual intention, to be expended gradually according to the progressive nature of human operation in carrying the work begun to its appointed end. The habitual intention is potential only. It is an acquired

habit, an inclination of the potency to follow in case of action one course rather than another. But the intrinsic relation between actual and virtual intention finds no place in habitual intention with regard to the many actual intentions whereby the habit was acquired. The inclination makes it highly probable that, when action is called for, the potency will be actuated with the right kind of intention. As to the fact, there is no certainty. Man is free, notwithstanding habits. Habitual intention will give me a general certainty that my actions are morally and supernaturally good, provided I have introduced no obstacle. It can not give me more than extreme probability in any particular case. But in the sacraments one is bound to procure the highest possible certainty.

Our Divine Lord stands in a double relation to the sacraments. As God He operates in them principally with the Father and the Holy Ghost, creating in the soul the grace of sanctification, of which sacraments are the instruments. As Man His operation is ministerial, yet in a way very different from that of ministers purely human. He is the principal minister, operating as such in every sacrament. They are simply His ministers, using His power in His name. "I am the Vine; you are the branches. Without me you can do nothing." In Him His power is power of excellence. His humanity is the instrument of the Divinity. But the Divinity is His Divinity. The operation is an operation of the One Divine Person of the Word. In Him are united personally the Divine Nature through which He operates principally and the Human Nature through which He operates ministerially. Hence, as St. Thomas says: "Christ Our Lord instituted the sacraments. The merits of His Passion and Death operate in them. He can produce their effects directly without using them as means."

This doctrine is very important, not for solving, but for showing the vanity of questions brought up against the practice of the Church; such as, Did Christ baptize His Apostles? Did He ordain them? Did He consecrate them Bishops? We may have our opinions on the matter, according to our devotion. But the truth, which all must hold, is that such questions give occasion to devout speculation only. They are not vital issues at all.

CHAPTER XVI

GOD CONTEMPLATED IN CREATURES

"The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity; so that they are inexcusable. Because that when they knew God, they have not glorified Him as God, or given Him thanks, but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened. For professing themselves to be wise, they became fools." *Rom. i, 20-22.*

"For the expectation of the creature waiteth for the revelation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly; but by reason of him that made it subject, in hope; because the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." *Ibid. viii, 19-21.*

"A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways; principally, and secondarily or dispositively. What belongs to the contemplative life principally is the contemplation of divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (*De Trin. i, 8.*) that 'the contemplation of God is promised us as the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys.' This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come when we shall see God face to face; wherefore it will make us perfectly happy; whereas now we can contemplate divine truth but imperfectly, namely, 'through a glass and in a dark manner.' (*1 Cor. xiii. 12.*) It therefore bestows upon us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come.

"Since, however, God's effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself according to *Rom. i, 20.* it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God." *St. Thomas. Summ. Theol. 2, 2, clxxx. 4, 0.*

"Nor, indeed, can anyone judge otherwise unless, unmoved by the greatness of our empire, by the sun above us, by the constellations revolving with the heavens, by the orderly changes of nature, he admits neither divine power nor its exercise. There is most certainly that power; nor can there be an active sentient force in these weak bodies of ours, and yet be absent from so great and noble a movement of nature." *Cicero Pro Milone. 83.*

"Consider how God dwells in creatures, in the elements giving them being, in the plants giving them to grow, in the animals giving them to feel, in men, giving them to understand . . . how He works and labors in all creatures on the face of the earth, that is to say, how He acts as if laboring in the heavens the elements, the plants, the fruits of the earth, the flocks, etc., giving and conserving their being, giving growth, sensation and so forth." *St. Ignatius, Spir. Ex. Contempl. to obtain Love.*

We have seen how God creates; how He operates in His creature; how in all His operations He has in view His chief creature, man, in whom He works, to whom He subjects all other creatures. As man can know all this, as he can recognize his dependence, and through this the dependence of the whole creation on the Creator, he must acknowledge this dependence, and see in its specific relations the Creator's law.

God has adapted the world to man's need. We penetrate its nature and discover daily new potentialities of service. What is today a curiosity of the laboratory, will tomorrow have its useful application beyond all anticipation. We view the relation between man and the earth as that of master and servant. Indeed we often treat the kindly earth as an unwilling servant. We call it and its treasures, Nature. From Nature, "we wrest her secrets." "We make her serve in bonds." We then go on to boast of our "conquest of nature." Of all this the meaning is that, while we exploit the visible creature, we remain ignorant of the invisible Creator who gives being to all; in whom all subsist and consist; without whom all would relapse into nothingness. We brag of our achievements, not knowing that they are His gifts. We count over our discoveries, never dreaming that they are His revelations determined according to times, places and persons in His decree of creation. We tell proudly of our applications of natural forces, thinking that beyond what we have attained no notable progress is to be looked for; though all nature's secrets are open in only His sight, of whose infinite Being nature in the variety of its powers is but the finite participation.

Man stands the connecting link between two worlds, the material and visible, the invisible and spiritual. That there is an invisible spiritual world is certain. This our consciousness testifies. Man stands alone in the material world distinct absolutely in his nature from the things he dominates. Whatever he may say or pretend to the contrary in laboratory or lecture-hall, he leaves behind in passing the door. Every word, every action of his life among his fellows proclaims his unique nature. Man alone, intelligent, free, conscious of his dignity, is animated with a spiritual principle. By his material organism he belongs to the visible world: by his spiritual principle to the world invisible.

Men grasp spontaneously what we may call the industrial view of the relation the material world bears to themselves. In it they

are averse to recognizing the Creator and His will. God has given mankind all things. We may use them freely. The last assertion is not altogether true. Man may use creatures freely according to their double dependence. If he holds the first place in the material world, in the spiritual world he holds the last. If all things visible must serve him, in the world invisible he must serve. If God has given him all things, he must give an account of his use of them to God his Creator and theirs. In creating man and the world for man the Creator has not renounced the smallest element in His absolute dominion. The accounting for all at His supreme tribunal is the ultimate function of man. All things else, purely material of their nature, are so hemmed in by the limits of earth, that, however excellent, they live and die and never cross its boundaries. Man though belonging to the world cannot be confined to it. Sooner or later he crosses from the lower order to the higher to find beyond the conditions of time and space the perfection of his spiritual nature in a life proportionate to it, never-ending, and in that sense eternal, in which absolute subjection to Him, the Eternal by essence, the Fount and Origin of all life, will be his incessant glory. All other earthly life perishes in the dust from which it was called forth. Man lives and dies, only to pass the gates of death with the cry of triumphant life: "Come, let us adore the King to whom all things live!"

Man, then, may not use creatures oblivious of God. He cannot be content with a recognition of the Creator abstract only and metaphysical. "The heaven of heavens is the Lord's; the earth He has given to the children of men." (*Ps.* cxiii, 16.). But they receive it as stewards, not in absolute dominion; nor as a super-added gift of pure benevolence; but as the means of attaining to future beatitude. We may use things for our need or for our pleasure; we may turn them to the service of others; but never may we separate them from their intrinsic relation to the Creator. God does not stint man in his use of them. But whether the use be large or narrow it must carry him back to the God from whom he came forth. This is the universal law legible in the irrational creature, imprinted on the human heart.

These considerations lead us to the noblest use the rational creature can make of the rest of creation, the contemplation in them of the Creator and His operation. This use is universal in its obligation, binding every intelligence, the angels in heaven as

well as man upon earth. It is universal in its application. The creatures a person can actually employ during his brief life are few even for the most opulent; narrow fortune makes them fewer for the greater number of men. Those we see and pass by are many; but they in turn are few in comparison with the number almost infinite of those we shall never see. How slender would be the service of creatures as means to the end, were it confined within the limits of material use. By contemplation a single human mind can embrace all God's creatures and unite them with himself in one great act of praising God.

Thus, according to the divine law the irrational creature gives its noblest service to man and through man to God. It is taken up out of its own order to the higher. We might by a pious hyperbole apply to it what St. Paul said of himself, that it is caught up into heaven, to the hearing and uttering of things beyond its natural faculties. Indeed, how else did the three children in the Babylonian furnace, how else did the inspired Psalmist call upon creatures one after another, each in its own genus and class to praise God, to bless and magnify him forever. But we have a more striking justification. David in Jerusalem, and Ananias, Azarias, Misael in Babylon called on the irrational creature to join with them as the matter of their praise, in glorifying God. St. Paul puts them before us—not indeed without the figure, yet in his emphatic “we know” transcending the figure—as yearning after the praise to which God ordained them in giving them to serve mankind; as groaning in pain because man by his abuse of the gift defrauds them of the praise, compelling them to submit, not to his service, but to his sin; as toiling to extricate themselves from their subjection to vanity, and as looking for deliverance from the servitude of corruption in the final revelation of liberty in the glory of the children of God.

To view God as an origin only, however universal and necessary, is an error springing from Protestantism. To contemplate Him as such would be to labor in vain. On the other hand, to contemplate Him as we have striven to show Him existing in creatures, operating in them, giving them all they have of being, life and operation by a participation of His own absolute Being, which is essential Life and purest Act, cannot but conduce to a reverence for the creature, forbidding the abuse which follows so easily on the narrower concept. But still further, it carries us on

to the end of all contemplation, which is to love. We have seen that our intellectual apprehension stands in the highest place, because by it we take hold of supreme Good, our last end, which terminates our universal expansion in the eternal rest of perfect beatitude. We have seen too that by apprehending the True as the Good it serves the universal expansion of our nature, whereby in the progression of this life the Creator moves us to that supreme Good.

To contemplate the True is to contemplate the Good, not as a barren speculation but as a necessary element of the act of love whereby we reach out to unite ourselves to Him who is our first beginning and our last end; who, that we may pass securely from beginning to end, lives for us, labors for us, serves us in the creatures He gives us. The philosophic view, as we may call it, so common today of God remote from all the activity of the world His creature, could it prevail in the moral order, would be destructive of all love. Happily those who hold to it rigorously in the physical order, rejecting what they call any divine interference in the working out of the creature by natural laws, contradict themselves in the moral order. To call one's daily bread God's gift, to thank Him for it in receiving it, is, did one know it, to confess that the Creator is in the creature making it what it is in itself, operating in it what it is for us; so that it is a good and perfect gift from above, coming down from the Father of lights, not in vain figure, but in sober reality.

So clearly was the indwelling of the Creator in the creature understood to be not purely voluntary in God and contingent in the creature, but essentially necessary constituting the very intrinsic dependence of the creature on the Creator, that St. Thomas makes its elementary form his first and most convincing argument for the existence of God, namely, that no contingent being can act unless moved by one who is essentially pure act. Modern philosophers pretend that the proof is inconclusive. In many ways they try to get rid of the notion of God, Himself unmoved, yet moving all things, of which a common one is to substitute for the intellectual concept an absurd phantasm of the imagination. Yet in all their systems they come necessarily to a fundamental activity, which is pure act. Sometimes the materialistic pantheism is pushed forward; sometimes the idealistic. Sometimes necessary forces hold the first place; sometimes the Idea absolute and universal;

sometimes the notion of evolution, the inevitable consequence of such presumed activities, reigns apparently alone. But whatever may be the theory, there lurks in it the notion of a pure activity antagonistic to the Creator; a force of some kind working blindly through interminably successive phases towards an end never to be attained, without intelligence, without love, so identified with things apparent that what seems the world's existence, its individualities, their intelligence, their sympathies, their love, are but phases in the necessary evolution of the sole reality. This is what modern philosophy in its last word would substitute for the personal Creator, the Self-existing Spirit, infinitely intelligent, infinitely loving, infinitely free, the absolutely Pure Act, unmoved Himself in His eternal present yet moving all His creatures, to whom, though distinct from Him in their own existence, He participates from His infinite Being all they are and have; so that in Him they "live and move and are."

All that we have said, wonderful as it is, results from the contemplation of truth known by reason. Revelation opens to the intelligence elevated by faith new fields so vast as to reduce the matter of natural contemplation, really great, within limits apparently narrow. Faith expands the truth attained by reason of the one God, the Creator giving all things their being, conserving all, working in all, moving all according to their nature. It opens before us the truth of revelation, the Triune God, so acting in creatures by one will, one operation, common to the Three distinct Persons through the unity of their nature, that to each Person we must attribute what is appropriate according to their eternal relations. Thus every creature manifests the divine operation according to omnipotence in the Father, to wisdom in the Son, to charity in the Holy Ghost. Yet in the operation the omnipotence, the wisdom, the charity are of the Godhead. First of all they are an intercommunication of the Three Divine Persons themselves. Then they flow over to the creature, the term of the operation. The relation therefore of the creature to the Creator is complex, mysterious, intimate beyond anything mere reason could deduce. Man is the work of Omnipotence, according to the substantial Wisdom of the only-begotten Word. He is created according to the exemplary idea contained in the Word. As known in the Word, He is loved with the substantial Love proceeding from the Father and the Son, the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of

Charity. Thus God loved His people "with an everlasting love" (*Jer.* xxi, 3); and a deeper meaning accrues to the common-place of our Christian faith; "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting."

Coming to things nearer to our comprehension, we contemplate God in the Church, in the Sacraments, in His grace. We consider Him giving all their being, working in them for us His effects proper to each. We view His supernatural providence, whereby all things work together for good to those who love God. We love Him who first loved us. Walking by faith with our hope fixed upon the Heavenly City and its King in His beauty, we "pass through things temporal so as not to lose the things eternal."

But this walking by faith means much more than ruling our lives by a mere intellectual conviction. Indeed one may well deny the possibility of such a process. Man is moved to action by his universal expansive tendency to good. This determines to concrete acts not inasmuch as their objects are apprehended by the intellect as true, but inasmuch as in their truth they are apprehended as good. The way of faith is apprehended as good. Here again the supernatural transcends the natural. Reason tells us that despite the resistance of concupiscence the orderly use of creatures is good, because it is the necessary means to attain perfect happiness in the possession of supreme good. Self-discipline, painful in itself, is thus clothed with the good of future happiness. Faith leads us by love. We learn to love Our Lord Jesus Christ. Love is unitive. The lover goes out to the beloved one, conforming himself in all things to him. "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow His steps" (1 *Peter* ii, 21.). Love moves us sweetly to do so.

For the purely natural man such doctrine would have no appeal. Tell him that death is not the absolute end of life; that he carries within himself the spark of immortality; that perfect happiness, according to all experience unattainable in this life, is reserved for the immortal soul released from the bondage of the flesh; that his intellect dictates the law of life which he must obey; that the world and its goods must be used temperately, so that they may lead to the happiness they can not give; that they must be used justly, with due regard to the rights and the needs of others; that they must be used thankfully as the Creator's gift to

His creature; that they must be used with the conviction of the user's responsibility to the Creator for the manner of their use; all this he would understand, and to it, with the natural aids from God, he would be willing to conform his life. Bid him view as shadows the world in which he lives, the things he sees and touches; bid him be in the world but not of it, as a traveller passing through alien lands. Tell him that the highest use of things is renunciation, which sacrifices the present to a future beyond the grave; that the highest wisdom is to place all his hopes on a country none has ever seen; in a word, that life is to be found only in the glad losing of all that seems to make up life; your words would be to him but an allegory.

But now comes a serious difficulty. The very doctrine you say the natural man would receive, is rejected with scorn. The answer is simple enough. The purely natural man does not exist. Taken collectively man is raised to the supernatural state in Adam, is fallen in him, and restored through Christ. Taken individually man is either actually restored in Christ by baptism and persevering in grace; or so restored and falling through frailty; or so restored and rebelling; or called, but for the moment not hearing the call, which sooner or later will be heard; or else hearing but obstinately rejecting the call to restoration. Not one of these is directly in the natural order pure and simple. To those who without fault of their own do not hear the call, the natural law commends itself as a preparation for the call to supernatural life. It may be that they fail in its observance. But the formal rejection of the natural law is found with those only who rebel against the supernatural call; either because, having been regenerated in Christ, they deliberately fall away, or because they close their ears and harden their hearts against it. In a word, the observance of the natural law would bring men to the supernatural. To deny it is part of the war against Christianity. We will not admit the Creator lest we should have to confess the Redeemer. We will welcome any theory, however fantastic, that offers itself as an alternative to the admitting of the truth proclaimed by all nature. If we acknowledge ourselves creatures of the Omnipotent, we shall be compelled to confess His supernatural creation.

Some fancy they may avoid the obnoxious conclusion by denying the supernatural in Christianity. To support the denial a popular argument is drawn from Buddhism. As the argument is

popular it is proposed rhetorically, without much regard for that exactness which should characterize all scientific discussion. Numbers are exaggerated. Systems are confused, distinctions of time and place are ignored. Nevertheless, the fundamental fact remains, a doctrine not Christian which inculcates what we claim to be essentially characteristic of supernatural revelation, namely the principle: Die to live. Renounce the present, to enter into the fullness of the future. Then comes the assertion which begs the whole question, that the doctrine of Gautama was the work of pure natural reason.

Gautama's date is taken to be about the sixth century before Christ. There are those who would make him an inheritor of Egyptian esoteric doctrine. Others would connect him with Scandinavian mythology through its origin from Northern Asia. Others again make Buddhism the survival of a primitive Indian religion. And there are some who seeing its many external similarities to Christian worship, which certainly are accretions borrowed from the Christianity flourishing in Western Asia before Moslem and Tartar times, treat the antiquity of Buddhism as a fiction, asserting it to be but a corrupt derivation of the Christian religion. Strange to say, all, while speculating in hypothesis, ignore the certain fact that from the restoration of the race in the promise of the Redeemer, there was a constant supernatural tradition calling men to avail themselves of that restoration. Indications of it are found where least expected. The Scriptures, indeed, do not mention the tradition. But what is more convincing perhaps than explicit mention, sacred history assumes it in allusions that so call for it, as without it to be inexplicable. Who were the sons of God in contrast with the daughters of men? What the religious status of Abram when the promise of the Redeemer was renewed to him? Who was that Job, who maintained a supernatural providence leading to the vision of God, against the mistaking natural morality of his comforters? Who was Melchisedech, King of Salem and priest of the most high God? What the function of his priesthood? Abraham knew and David; to us he is a mystery. Why was the Pharaoh of Abraham's day so different from those of later times; and Abimelech, king of the Palestines in Gerara, so superior to those that fell before Israel some four hundred years afterwards? Before Gautama appeared, Elias had lived amongst men, an angel rather than a man, leaving his mantle to

Eliseus; and there is a tradition not to be despised, of a succession of his disciples. The long line of the prophets had set before men in continually growing light the lineaments of the coming Redeemer. Ezechiel and Jeremias had demonstrated in their own persons the evil of the world and the Saviour's atoning affliction. The Jews, through their captivities dispersed more widely than is commonly supposed, carried the tradition far into Asia, popularizing it as it were, through their proselytes. Not only must we hold that whatever of good was in Gautama's teaching was due to the supernatural tradition of the elevation, fall and restoration of man; but we may also believe with reason that he was not the only one restless under the call to restoration, groaning for the promised redemption. Others may not have attained as he attained, yet doubtless there were others found to embrace the life of renunciation, who, unlike him, "*carent vate sacro*" to preserve their memories. As for the pantheism, the nihilism, the Manichean dualism which in Buddhism overlies the fundamental truth, rendering it barren of fruit for eternity, corrupting those who think to find in it a higher way, these are the effects of diabolic intrusion, unfailing signs of satan's activity in turning men's highest aspirations to their ruin. Whether in this Gautama sinned, and how far, belongs to the Supreme Judge of all men to decide. But this is clear and for us of the highest importance, that within the protecting ramparts of the Celestial City the Church of God, is the supernatural tradition kept pure and undefiled. Everywhere else the corrupting hand of the destroyer has at least touched it. Too often has he displaced it with a complete system of worship, which drags down to his eternal torments men called to rise to union with God in bliss.

The supernatural life is of the first importance. The greatest evil that can befall men is to so make it of the last, as to be practically negligible. It is sustained by prayer, so that to live without prayer is spiritual death. To meditate the truth of faith is the foundation of prayer; for thus we contemplate in them Him in whom is all our life, all our movement towards the end He sets before us, our very existence. To this contemplation each is called with a divine calling that empowers him who is called to obey. Thus drawn by the Father, we come to Jesus Christ the Way, the Truth, the Life whereby we reach the Father who is thus our first beginning, our last end.

CHAPTER XVII

CREATURES CONTEMPLATED IN GOD

"In explaining the title of Psalm cxv, the Interlinear Gloss says, citing St. Augustine, that what the Greek terms *ecstasis*, the Latin, *excessus mentis*, is brought about in two ways, either by earthly fears, or by the rapture of the soul to heavenly things and to the forgetting of things below. The Ordinary Gloss on the words of the same Psalm: 'I said in my excess, every man is a liar' uses the same authority, to the effect that we employ the term ecstasy, not when the mind is beside itself with fear, but when it is carried aloft by some inspiration of revelation." *St. Thomas, Summ. Theol.* 2. 2. clxxv. 2 3m 0.

"Rapture adds something to ecstasy. Ecstasy implies only a going out from oneself, inasmuch as one is placed outside his ordinary condition. Beyond this, rapture adds a certain violence. Ecstasy, therefore, can belong to the appetitive power, as when the appetite tends to what is without. In this sense Dionysius says that love produces ecstasy, inasmuch as it makes the appetite tend to the thing loved. Wherefore he goes on to say that even God Himself, the Cause of all things, through the abundance of His loving goodness goes outside Himself in His providence regarding all earthly things. Nevertheless, though this were said of rapture expressly, it would only mean that rapture is caused by love." *Ibid* ad 1m.

"The human mind is rapt divinely to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. In one it contemplates by some kind of pictures in the imagination, as was the case with Peter in his ecstasy. In another it contemplates divine truth by its intelligible effects; and such was the ecstasy of David, in which he said 'every man is a liar.' In the third the mind contemplates divine truth in its essence. Such was Paul's rapture and that of Moses." *Ibid* 3 ad, 1m.

"When God raises the soul to union He suspends the natural action of all its powers, so as the better to impress on it the true wisdom. Thus it neither sees nor understands, nor comprehends while it remains united to God. But this time is always brief; and it seems briefer than it really is. God so establishes Himself in the soul that on coming to itself it cannot doubt but that it has been in God, and God in it. This truth remains so firmly fixed that, though years may pass without the elevation recurring, one can neither forget the favor received nor doubt its reality.

"You will ask: As during this union the soul neither sees nor understands, how can it have seen and understood that it was in God, and God in it? I reply that it in no way saw this then. Afterwards on returning to itself it saw clearly, not by a vision, but by a certitude which remains with it, and which God alone can give. I knew one who understood not that God was in all things by His presence, His power, His essence; yet who, after having been favored with the grace of which I speak, believed it most steadfastly. One of those *demi-savants*, whom she asked, who knew no more than she before she had been enlightend, answered that God was in us only by His grace. It was useless. She was so sure of the fact, that she would not for an instant give any credit to his reply. Afterwards she questioned men who really knew. These confirmed her in her belief to her great consolation." *St. Theresa, The Interior Castle, Fifth Mansion*, chap. 1, versus fin.

"No man can serve two masters," says the Redeemer, so the memory cannot be perfectly united with God and at the same time with forms and distinct knowledge. As God is without form or image on which memory may dwell, so when memory is united with God it remains without form or figure, absolutely in supreme felicity, profound oblivion, . . . the imagination being suppressed. This suspension never occurs to those who are perfect; because they have attained already to perfect union, while the suspension relates to its beginnings . . . In the beginning men forget to eat and drink. They do not remember whether they have or have not done some particular work; whether they have seen such things or not; whether such and such things have been mentioned to them. But he who has attained to the habit of union does not thus forget. He performs in much greater perfection all befitting actions by the ministry of forms and knowledge in the memory supplied in a special manner by God.

"Thus, then, when the memory is transformed in God no permanent forms or knowledge can be impressed upon it. Its operations, therefore, in this state, and those of the other powers are, as it were, divine . . . 'He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit.' (1 Cor. vi, 17.) Therefore the operations of the soul in the state of union are the operations of the Holy Ghost, and consequently divine . . .

"So it was with the glorious Mother of God. Perfect from the first, there was no impression of created things upon her soul to turn her aside from God, or in any way to influence her. Her every movement ever proceeded from the Holy Ghost." *St. John of the Cross. Ascent of Mount Carmel. Book 3, chap. 1, sub. init.*

"There have been men deeply skilled in mystic theology who held that the soul engaged in contemplation may sometimes be so suspended as to cease from every actual operation as well of the intellect as of the will; yet that it prays nevertheless . . . actually associated with God, and exercises a certain loftiest kind of contemplation. This they call the prayer of quiet or the spiritual sleep, in which the mind watches, not speaking, but hearing or waiting till God shall speak in it . . . The truth, is that there can be no actual mental prayer, properly so called, absolutely without some act of the intellect or of the will." *Suarez. de Orat. Lib. 2, cxii, 15.*

"Does the intuitive contemplation of God by the beatific vision granted to mortal man effect of its nature ecstasy in the external senses? Some answer affirmatively resting on a double principle. First, in every operation in which the human intellect is removed from phantasms, it is necessarily withdrawn from the senses; since the human intellect does not turn itself to sensible things, except inasmuch as it knows by species received from the phantasms of the imagination. Hence since in its vision of God the intellect is raised in the highest degree to know without species taken from phantasms, it follows necessarily that in visions of such nature it is removed from the sense.

"From this, however, one may well conclude that the intellect, elevated to the vision of God would need neither phantasms nor any sense internal or external. But it does not prove that from the force of that elevation a man would remain so bound as regards his senses, as to be unable to perceive anything by them. For this reason perhaps, St. Thomas adds another principle, namely, that a finite power entirely engaged in one action, cannot at the same time do anything else. But all the power of the soul elevated to the vision of God is taken up with that one action, and, as it were, so absorbed in it, as hardly to suffice for it.

"Here, however, serious difficulties occur. First of all Christ in His mortal life would have needed a special miracle to use His senses. The same would be true of the blessed after the resurrection. So also, neither angels nor the spirits of the departed enjoying the divine vision, could have naturally acts of natural science. Moreover, the light of glory is a principle of operation belonging to a higher order, than that of sensation, which has nothing in common with it. Hence the soul is as free to use the body, though seeing God, as if it were not seeing Him. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that in this vision the intellect operates, not by its natural power but obedientially." *Suarez. Ibid c. xvi. (Synopsisized).*

"God alone can give consolation to the soul without any preceding cause, because it belongs to the Creator to go in and out of the soul, to start movement in it by drawing it entirely to the love of His Divine Majesty. I say, without cause, that is without any previous perception, sensitive or cognoscitive, of any object, whereby such consolation might come to the soul by means of its own proper acts of the intellect and of the will." *St. Ignatius, Spir. Exer. Rules for Fuller Discernment of Spirits. 2.*

We come now to the last operation of God in His creature, man. By natural reason God is seen in the works of His hands. By supernatural revelation and the light of faith that natural cognition is perfected and elevated. The formula: "To know God in His creatures," is completed in the supernatural order by the phrase: "And them all in Him." This may be regarded in two ways. It may be taken to express the actual process of revelation whereby God reveals Himself as the Creator from whom all things, not only natural, but also supernatural, proceed in contradistinction to the rational process of metaphysical, physical and moral argumentation whereby in the purely natural order the Creator is reached as a logical conclusion. As a matter of fact, by the light of faith we see the relations between the creature and God in a way very different from that whereby we apprehend them by natural reason. This begins with the creature; that begins with God. In His revelation we see God redeeming us; we see Him making Himself in the Incarnation a Creature, the First Born of every creature; we see Him sanctifying us, making creatures the instrument of the sanctification. We see a thousand new relations of creatures to ourselves, and through us to God, in the new creation of the Spirit. We see God Himself as our last end, not thus to be known and loved in His creatures; but to be seen and loved face to face, with all creatures known in Him. Hence the two members of the formula taken together signify that supernatural contemplation all must use, each in his own degree.

Taken disjunctively they mean much more. Though God reveals Himself supernaturally He generally uses the creature as His instrument. The first member, therefore, of the formula, taken adequately, includes the general supernatural contemplation. The second deals with a contemplation altogether different, not only in degree but also in kind. This St. Theresa testifies. St. John of the Cross calls it an awakening of God in the soul (*Living Flame*, Stanza iv) ; since in it His movements are perceived in an entirely new way to be perfected in the transforming union wherein natural movements are replaced by the divine. What then is this seeing creatures in God? Is there any reality to which we can compare it, by which we may explain it?

The first eternal reality is God's knowledge of His creatures. These whether possible only or decreed to exist, He sees in Himself, in His Divine Word, the substantial Concept of the Divine Intelligence, the Second Person of the adorable Trinity, by whom, according to special attribution, all things were made. Even as they exist, each in its own time according to the creative decree, they are not the objects of another divine knowledge really distinct. Their existence can add nothing to God's infinite all-embracing knowledge in Himself. Because the creature exists, it becomes an extrinsic term of that eternal unchangeable knowledge. With it is created a new relation of creature to the Creator. But all relativity is on the side of the creature. The Creator is absolute in His eternal simplicity.

God's knowledge of all things in Himself is the foundation of all created reality. Intimately dependent upon it is a reality nearer to ourselves and therefore less incomprehensible, namely, the knowledge of the angels. Addressing in Job all mankind, God asks: "Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Who hath laid the foundations thereof, or who hath stretched his line upon it? Upon what are its bases grounded, or who hath laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning stars praised me together and all the sons of God made joyful melody?" Here we learn that the angelic host exulted as God created the world. God willed to be praised by them and consequently willed the praise to be perfect. He did so, not to receive from the creature what He had not, but because He would give the creature its full perfection. He gives Himself to the creature from whom He can receive no augment, and in doing so grants the creature, as its supreme

felicity, the complete employment of all its powers in the paying Him that worship and service to which it is bound. The angels are pure intelligences. Unless, then, their knowledge of the glorious creation had been adequate to their capacity of knowing, God's goodness would have been contracted; their songs of praise would have remained unuttered.

For an intelligent comprehension of the excellence of a work, three things are needed; a knowledge of its idea or plan in the artificer's mind, and of the end it is designed to obtain; a knowledge of its conformity to the idea or plan; a knowledge of the perfection of its operation in obtaining the end of its design. These three the angels had from God in a manner worthy not so much of their sublime nature, as of Himself. Let us, as far as it is allowed our feeble understanding, examine into the mode of the communication of this knowledge.

We have already explained that because we study the divine operation, not in its own absolute simplicity, but in the complexity of its effects; because in this complexity there is a real succession, for which there must be a foundation in the infinite reality of the divine operation, we distinguish in this signs corresponding to that natural antecedence and consequence which become actual in the finite creature when it begins to exist. In the present question, therefore, we distinguish three signs; the sign antecedent to the creative mandate, the sign of the mandate itself, and the sign consequent to it. In the first God granted the angels to contemplate in the Eternal Word the full idea and plan of creation, and the end for which it is designed. In the second He granted them to see by infused species creation actually existing. In the third He granted them to see by communication among themselves from the higher to the lower according to those infused species, all creatures working out perfectly by God's providence down to the last particulars, the full content of the creative decree.

From this we begin to understand more clearly the phrase; to see creatures in God. Each mode of angelic knowledge had the creature as its term. That which through infused species attained to them in their own existence was most obscure. Whence we see that the more exclusively our knowledge terminates at the creature, the obscurer it is as to what is most perfect in the created reality. Wherefore St. Augustine calls it in the angels their evening knowledge, because evening light, obscure always, grows dimmer every

instant. But morning follows evening; and evening obscurity changed for the angels to growing light as through all the heavenly choirs each celestial spirit, illuminated by those above him, illuminating in turn those below, perceived more and more clearly the perfect adaption of the creature to the end of its creation, the absolute infallibility of the Creator's providence in executing the order he had decreed. This St. Augustine terms the angels' morning knowledge. Its characteristic is to turn back in its growth to its primal source where knowledge is brightest, purest, clearest, to the Consubstantial Word Himself; and so in the words of Scripture, evening and morning were the day. This reference of all to God in which the whole angelic host conspired, was the hymn of praise they sang together. Expressing in it the utter conformity of the work with the revealed plan, they turned back to the primal vision, of all the clearest, in the Word. Thus, says St. Augustine, the evening and morning brought back the day, the essential Light of the perfect Day that is neither closed by gathering shadows nor reopened with dawning glow.

The angelic knowledge we have been considering according to St. Augustine's sublime doctrine, was God's gift, beginning and ending with the vision of all things in the Divine Word. So, too, the contemplation of creatures in God, here below, is a pure gift granted by God to whom He wills, when He wills, and to what degree He wills. Thus it differs essentially from the contemplation of God in creatures. This is given to all, since its exercise is obligatory on all. Had man been left in the purely natural order, the passage through creatures to the natural knowledge of the Creator and His law would have been a natural duty, incumbent on mankind. Man would have helped his fellow-man, impelled by his social nature. God would have given each interior light and impulse. But such, granted in response to a natural exigency, would have been natural only. Having been raised to the supernatural order such contemplation becomes supernatural. Not only its aids, its very incentive also becomes grace. Nevertheless man, thus moved and aided, remains free. He can take it up or lay it down. He can apply himself to it with more or less diligence. He can build a foundation for it of natural theology. Its processes do but correspond to the universal expansiveness of his nature. Though elevated by grace, they work out nevertheless through the operations of human nature in this mortal life.

On the other hand, the very first step in the contemplation of creatures in God, takes man by surprise. It is something beyond his powers, a gift coming from without. Never yet has anything approaching it been experienced, however great may have been the consolations of ordinary prayer. As St. Ignatius says, God has entered into the soul as into His own house. His presence and operation are experienced in a way that can be referred to no thought or operation of the subject, to no perception of any creature. The experience cannot be confounded with anything else. It cannot be forgotten, says St. Theresa. It is not without its anxieties for the inexperienced soul that can find no teacher to reassure it. Yet it so carries the conviction of God present in a way hitherto undreamed of, as to compel the soul to reject all that may be urged by ignorance attempting to disillusion it. In one word the soul has entered the mystic way. The mystic union has begun.

This is a matter of gravest importance. To assert, as some do, that there is but one kind of prayer, one kind of contemplation, that, namely, taught in ordinary books of meditation; that one may in this pass insensibly to the higher degrees; that all such extraordinary things as visions and raptures are very much to be suspected, and to be viewed in general as the natural consequences of some abnormality in the subject; in brief, to deny the existence of mystical theology as distinct from ascetic, is not only to go contrary to experience and to the testimony of the experienced, but also to deny *a priori* God's most intimate operations in the soul of His creature, operations there is every reason to expect.

As we have said, God in this beginning of mystic union is experienced in a way entirely new. Moreover the mode is obscure. There are no visions, so that one might speak of seeing Him; nor interior words, whereby one might be said to hear Him. Using the analogy of senses we say that He touches the soul in the darkness with a touch that makes itself recognized, as that of a friend is recognized in the night. With this touch comes an incapacity for acts. The subject cannot pray vocally, cannot meditate or contemplate in the ordinary way, cannot make aspirations. It can simply receive the divine touch and wait for whatever else God will operate in it. Hence its prayer is called the prayer of quiet, or the mystic sleep. This characteristic causes many to suspect such prayer, to hint at Quietism, and to look on those who experience

it as entangled in the errors of that pernicious system. Yet between the two there is all the distance which lies between the beginning of mysticism and the end. Quietism exaggerates the prayer of quiet; and then makes the pure passivity thus conceived, the very crown of mystic theology. The true mystic, led by St. Theresa, by St. John of the Cross, now proclaimed the doctor of mysticism, by all the older mystics and by St. Thomas himself, holds that prayer to be but the first steps in an unknown way, which is to terminate, as we shall see, in the most perfect spiritual activity.

For what we call the mystic sleep comes from the impossibility to seize at once upon the activities of the new life opening before the soul. This is due, not only to the fact that the faculties of the soul must, in the ordinary course of things, find difficulty in accommodating themselves to new functions, but also, and especially, to the vagueness, and obscurity of the divine operation. From these comes, to make the term *sleep* most applicable, St. Theresa's doctrine, so strange at first sight, on reflection so necessary a consequence, that the new condition is recognized, not in its brief duration, but in the moment of returning to one's ordinary state.

The mystic sleep is altogether different from the physical. This overwhelms the faculties in oblivion, so as to be akin to death: "The death of each day's life." That intensifies them. "I sleep, and my heart watcheth." (*Cant.* v, 2.) "Love watches, and sleeping slumbers not." (*Imit. Christ.* iii, 5.) It is ready to receive the veins of the divine whisper. Its attitude is that of Samuel: "Speak Lord for thy servant heareth." (1 *Kings*, iii, 10.) In its new experience the soul can do nothing until God manifests what it has to do. It therefore remains in that union with the Divine Will which comes to it from the mystic touch. Words are not spoken, for the expectant union speaks more clearly than words. Indeed the exterior spoken word of daily commerce between man and man is demanded when relations are exterior only, or are apprehended as such. Hence the new-found interior relation, more intensely expressive than any spoken word could be, forbids all those acts which in ordinary prayer the soul has been accustomed to use.

Nevertheless, this beginning of mystic union is imperfect. The divine visitation is transient only. It is given unsolicited. No effort of man can recall it. God may visit the soul at short intervals. He may leave it unvisited again even for years. Moreover, the course

of even one brief visitation may be broken in upon by distractions of sense and wanderings of mind. Though the gift is so great, those who receive it are but infants in things of the spirit. They begin to learn by experience what hitherto they have known by faith only, the sweetness of the Lord in Himself. They are aroused to new zeal against the flesh and its concupiscences. They are eager for the more excellent way of supreme charity. Their life must correspond to the impulses of grace, if they are to be carried on in the mystic way.

This imperfect union becomes full as the faithful soul is carried along in the mystic path of the prayer of quiet. Love grows. The soul learns to repose in God, thus enjoying a happiness mixed, nevertheless, with pain, Our God is a hidden God, so near as to touch us, yet eluding all spiritual hearing and sight. Concealing Himself in darkness, He heightens the yearning for clearer perception, till this becomes an anguish exquisitely intense yet none the less precious. But in all this there is neither rule, nor law of steady mathematical progression. Fidelity is the condition of progress. It does not merit further gifts in any strict sense. It may move God as God wills to be moved; but it establishes no title. God comes and goes. He enters the soul and leaves it as a master enters and leaves his house. No matter how long the visitation has been, how loving the touch, the soul may find itself left in a moment to the old way of meditation and simple affective prayer.

However, the time may come when least expected, in which there is a distinct change. The soul is plunged more deeply into God. The divine touch becomes a clasp. The union becomes stronger and more enduring, with a consequent certainty, greater than before, of God's presence in the soul. Distractions vanish because all the powers of the soul are fully occupied with their Creator and Lord. The senses still remain as links with the external world, enabling the soul to leave the mystic state of its own volition. Here all is intelligible but the expression, the powers of the soul are *fully* occupied with God. What does this mean?

It does not imply formal activity and definite acts in the faculties. The full union is not essentially distinct from the imperfect. It is a prayer of quiet, of silence, of repose. The impediment to action, commonly called the *ligature*, characteristic of the prayer of quiet, remains. It means, therefore, that what in the imperfect union was the prayer of a beginner, of one introduced into strange

surroundings, puzzled by them, conscious of the presence of a guide and waiting for his directions, is in the perfect union the prayer of the proficient conscious of his environment, cooperating intelligently with his guide; so that, as far as conditions demand or permit, his intellect is harmonized with the Divine Intellect, His will with the Divine will. He still waits on the Lord, yet with an understanding of what the Lord will grant, proportional to what progress is vouchsafed. The difference is that existing between the child in the first use of reason and the youth who has attained to its habitual exercise.

From all that has been said one gathers that in the prayer of union the soul's condition from the first beginning of the prayer of quiet is intensely dynamic. Under the divine touch it receives an elevation in its potencies, giving them a scope beyond anything hitherto experienced. In this elevation it is ready for immediate action. To apprehend the Supreme Truth, already obscurely perceived, the intellect needs only its adequate presentation. The intellect has but to apprehend that Truth as the Supreme Good, for the will to reach out to it, to rest in it, to rejoice over it. There is relative inaction because He, the Supreme Truth and the Supreme Good, who awakens these potencies and moves them, so withdraws Himself that the soul may exercise itself in the joy proper to its condition as a wayfarer, repose in Him according to the intimacy of its perceptions of Him, thirst for the full revelation of Him who now touches it in the darkness. Hence the prayer of union has an activity of intellect and will all its own, that grows continually from the first amazement consequent upon the first experience of the divine touch. We call it quiet, repose, mystic sleep not absolutely, but relatively, in comparison with the natural activity of ordinary prayer exercising the powers of the soul about truths, supernatural indeed, yet discussed according to the natural processes of human reason. Thus, taking it as explained by those mystics who best understood its nature, we liberate it from a too frequent suspicion, by showing its essential difference from the pure passivity of Quietism and the Manichean dualism involved in that heresy; and reconcile it perfectly with Suarez' assertion, undoubtedly true, that no mental prayer, properly so called, that is, no elevation of the soul to God, can be absolutely without some act of the intellect and of the will.

Since the vision of God, the beatitude proper of the life to come, is the necessary complement of the prayer of union, this will for the most part determine the limits here below of the mystic life, the degree attainable in it by each varying as God distributes His grace. We say, "for the most part," because even in this life the prayer of union has for some its crown, superior even to full union, yet inferior to its complement of beatitude. Of this we must speak. Before doing so let us say a word on some special graces, supplementary to the full union, by no means essential to it, yet perfecting it in this, that they give the intellect an adequate object and a complete act; while for lack of its object presented adequately to its elevation the activity of the intellect in the prayer of union and consequently of the will may be incomplete.

Ecstasy and rapture, St. Thomas tells us, are generically the same. Both are a going out of oneself. There is natural ecstasy and natural rapture, as is plain from the language of common life. There is a preternatural ecstasy and a preternatural rapture, which result from diabolic action, as was seen in the old pagan world, and is to be found today where the devil retains his power or has been reestablished by those who have abandoned Jesus Christ. With these, we have nothing to do. There are for us supernatural ecstasy and supernatural rapture, the special operations of God in the creature. These are differentiated specifically by their causes. Ecstasy is the result of intense admiration. Rapture implies an exterior elevating force. Both include supernatural vision. In ecstasy the vision is the instrumental cause, and is by nature antecedent to it. In rapture it is the immediate final cause, and by nature consequent to it. A word, then, on visions.

Visions are effected in four ways, of which two are preternatural, two purely supernatural. An angel may collect matter, form it into a body which he moves with a motion transient only and extrinsic to himself. Thus three appeared to Abraham on God's part, of whom two went on to Lot. An angel wrestled thus with Jacob; and so St. Raphael journeyed with Tobias. Such apparitions are to be reckoned among the appointed ministries of angels, rather than as visions. The heavenly messengers came charged with a message, or to perform a service for one or more definite persons; they were seen by all who met them in the way. In the second place an angel may by acting on one's material organ,

external or internal, produce phantasms in the imagination as of external objects, from which the intellect will draw ideas, and form judgments and conclusions in the ordinary way. Such operations are in the power of evil spirits and good. One effected by a good spirit, is a true vision, as was St. Peter's vision of the cloth let down from heaven. In mystic theology such visions are called *imaginative*. On the contrary, Our Lord and His Holy Mother, since they are glorified in their bodies, can appear, and, no doubt have actually done so, not only by imaginative vision, but also by actual bodily presence. Both kinds of vision are called *intuitive*, because one either actually sees, or seems to see material objects present before him.

The third way in which visions are effected is intellectual and purely supernatural. In this life our intellectual cognitions are naturally derived from the sensitive. Abstracting from the material image in the imagination all its accidental individuating notes, the intellect expresses representatively the essence. This expression we term the intelligible species. It is not the means of knowing the object, but the knowledge itself. Though by reflection, combination, division, deduction, the intellect can pass from its primary concepts, carrying its cognitions into the spiritual order—whatever is received, is received according to the mode of the receiver—it can not of its own power cut itself off from the material order in which all its cognition is founded. It can spiritualize the material. It can have no direct cognition of the spirit.

This limitation, however, comes, not from the soul's intimate nature, but from its function in this life, in which united substantially to the body, it is the animating principle of the human compound. Spiritual in its nature, performing even in the body, operations purely spiritual, it is certainly capable of purely spiritual cognitions. These God grants it by infusing into it intelligible species of the things of the spiritual world. But, as we said—and this must never be forgotten—the intelligible species are the very knowledge itself in the direct order. Wherefore we can simply say that God, entering into the soul even more intimately than in full mystic union, operates in it to know things transcending every possibility of this world. Such an intellectual vision, according to St. Thomas, David commemorates in *Psalm cxv*. "I said in my

excess, that is, in my ecstasy, every man is a liar.”* He had expressed his faith and hope in the words: I will please the Lord in the land of the living; and God had made him know in ecstasy the things of that land, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into man’s heart to conceive. The intelligible species operated in him by God were the intellectual knowledge of the divine truth revealed. Thus he knew clearly what, though supernaturally revealed and apprehended by the intellect enlightened by faith, is perceived in this world partially only, and in a dark manner, that in making much of the things of time and thinking little of the things of eternity, every man, even the best, deceives in some degree, if not others, at least himself.

The last way in which God effects vision, belongs to heaven. In it He takes full possession of the soul, plunges it into the depths of His Divinity, unites it so intimately with Himself, that He Himself is seen and known, not by intelligible species or any other intermediary, but in His own essence directly and immediately. Hence the Apostle expresses it, then I shall know even as I am known. (1 *Cor.* xiii. 12.) It is the beatific vision. This, which in heaven as a permanent habit actually beatifies, is, according to a common opinion, sometimes, though very rarely, granted in this life as a transient act without producing that effect. So with St. Augustine and others St. Thomas held that Moses saw God face to face. So too it was given to St. Paul to see God when caught up to the third heaven. Thus the vision was intuitive, not in the simpler sense explained above, but in the sense purely spiritual and that in the highest degree.

Though the intuitive vision is not excluded from ecstasy, especially in its lower forms, the intellectual vision is far more general. It therefore adds this to the prayer of full union, that intellect and will, which have, so to speak, been straining after their object, now receive it, and instantly pass from dynamic activity into full action in a sphere altogether outside that of merely natural operations. Not only do they need no cooperation of the exterior senses, nor of the interior sense except in the lower degree of intuitive vision, but they would even find in them an intrusion, a positive impediment to the purely supernatural action. Hence ecstasy is characterized by a suspension of sensitive operations. The body re-

*Later commentators give a different interpretation to this text. However, as St. Thomas uses it to exemplify the fact of ecstasy, not to prove the existence of the fact, the difference of interpretation does not affect essentially his doctrine.

mains immovable. In the simpler forms, it is true, this is not to be taken so absolutely as in the higher. Nevertheless in both cases the fact is verified to a degree sufficient to warrant the term, characteristic.

The ecstatic falls into ecstasy by a sweet interior necessity. God infuses the intelligible species, the supernatural knowledge of divine things; and simultaneously the soul's admiration of them carries it out of itself. Rapture proceeds differently. God falls on the soul, as it were, with loving violence and carries it out of itself to bring it into the secret chambers of His wondrous Being. Rapture may be so intense as to be justly termed by St. Theresa the flight of the spirit. Revelations occur in the higher forms of ecstasy; but they are given more frequently during rapture. So too the exterior physical effects of ecstasy often become of a miraculous nature during rapture. The body seems to respond to the spirit, rising in the air, giving out a heavenly radiance, a delicious odor. Then too, not by any natural operation, but in obedience to the divine movement, the tongue will utter what God decrees to reveal.

We have in St. Ignatius examples of the various kinds of visions and of the corresponding elevations of spirit. The apparition of St. Peter with the consequent restoration to health was a heavenly visitation presaging much, but in itself quite unconnected with any supernatural operation in the soul. The vision of the Holy Trinity received on the steps of the Dominican Church at Manresa and other similar ones were apparently imaginative or intuitive of the lower order, while he was in imperfect or minor ecstasy. At this time he seems to have been passing from affective prayer to mystic union at first incomplete, but becoming very soon complete. His vision on the river-bank opened a new epoch. It was clearly intellectual and the accompanying ecstasy was fully perfect.

A question arises of some importance for the thorough understanding of the matter we are considering; whether the intuitive vision of God by transient beatific vision granted to mortal man, must of its nature deprive him of the use of his external senses? From the texts quoted at the beginning of this chapter we see that Suarez and some later writers deny this, in opposition to St. Thomas and earlier authors, as well as to the school of St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross. Their chief argument is that the

granting of the beatific vision in such a way that its effects of beatification are not produced, is one miracle. If the effects do not flow over to the body, there seems to be no reason why this should not have its ordinary functions. On the other hand, if the privation of those functions were the necessary effect of the beatific vision so granted, the concession of them to Our Lord in His Sacred Humanity on earth would have demanded an additional miracle. They add moreover that from the fact that one granted the transient beatific vision, would not *need* the exercise of his external senses, St. Thomas concludes too broadly, that he would necessarily be *deprived* of it.

Suarez, however, fails to notice that the force of the argument he criticizes rests upon this, that in this life the intuitive vision of God is granted to man as a passing act, while Our Lord possessed it habitually. In Him it was ordinary, the necessary consequence of the hypostatic union. In others it is extraordinary. It lifts them out of their ordinary state, giving for the moment operations, that, notwithstanding the soul's elevation by grace, are entirely beyond its ordinary powers; and therefore engross necessarily all its energies. Here too we may add what was seen in the very entrance into the mystic state. This intuitive gift must be for the soul a matter of wonder, of fear, bringing in that very ignorance of its relations with the body, which St. Paul acknowledges. On the other hand the beatific vision habitually possessed flows over to the body. Like other habits it reaches connaturally the sensitive faculties, so that the whole man, as it were, is connaturally conformed to its conditions. So it will be after the resurrection with the blessed. So it was, apart from any additional miracle, with Our Lord on earth.

This question, in itself of minor importance, finds its use, as we shall see, in the explanation of the highest point of mystic life attainable on earth, transcending even St. Paul's rapture to the vision of God; namely, the transforming union or the spiritual marriage.

We have seen that in the mystic union, in the full union as in the incomplete, the activity of the soul is dynamic, expansive. It knows that beyond all it has received, there are nobler goods leading in a nobler way to the Supreme Good, or rather that the Supreme Good Himself is in nobler ways apprehensible by the creature. It feels that these are so near it, yet just beyond its

grasp through lack of adequate presentation. It knows that until such presentation be made, its longing, yearning activity, always in its proximate first act, will never pass into action full and complete. It feels the divine touch. It is conscious of God's intimate presence. Its thirst for Him, its constant cry: "When shall I come into His presence," is its prayer of union in which it reposes in a pain that is at the same time a delight. Then comes a further ascent. In ecstasy and rapture the longed for good is presented, and activity becomes the perfect act. But such presentation is intermittent; the act is transient. For this reason St. Paul's rapture itself did not attain to what is highest in the mystic way. It did not transcend the essential progressive state of mystic union. It could not be the term.

Again we have seen that the term of the mystic union, of the mystic way is to be attained only in heaven. There only shall be possessed unchangeably the infinite Good that terminates all desire. Nevertheless to certain chosen souls is granted here on earth what approaches it closely, as the most perfect state of beatitude man while still a wayfarer can receive. It is therefore distinct from all that is included in the way of mystic union. Because it thus is the consummation in this life of all deific graces, it is termed transforming union. Because in transforming it makes the soul one with God, it is called spiritual marriage. It is an habitual recognition of God existing in the soul by His presence, essence and power. Beyond the touch in darkness is the revelation of the Divinity by infused intelligible species, the intellectual vision. Thus are made known the principles of conduct on which the soul rests the operations of its supernatural life. The perfect union designated by the term spiritual marriage, brings about now the verification of Suarez' argument drawn from the condition of the blessed. This perfect union flows over in its effects to the bodily senses and faculties so that all impediment or ligature ceases, and the one so favored by God attends to all the duties of life without suffering any interruption of contemplation. Moreover, having reached a state in which all that is granted in ecstasy and rapture has become habitual, these transient elevations have no place in his life. The last grace given to such as God raises to the highest supernatural state possible in this world is, that the exaltation unperceived by others remains a life absolutely hidden with Christ in God. So in the passage quoted at the head of this

chapter, St. John of the Cross puts before us this happy state as he knew it by experience, giving us as its most perfect example the glorious Mother of God.

We have briefly but, we trust, clearly put before the reader the highest operation of the Creator in the creature. It began with the mystic touch, whereby God made himself known in darkness. With it came wonder and fear. By new experiences the equilibrium of the former ascetic life was upset. The contemplation of God in creatures which had satisfied the soul, was now impossible. Thoughts and words adequate to new conditions failed. Prayer became the prayer of quiet, the prayer of repose in Him whose touch was peace and life, yet in its repose reaching out for something more than touch, through the very necessity of the touch of Him who moves all things drawing them to Himself.

The union at first was imperfect. The senses, unaffected by it, drew the soul back. The mystic experiences were brief; the interruptions, often long. But God operating in His creature perfected His work. The reaching out to the hidden God who nevertheless occupied the soul, was in itself a growth in love, a detaching from exterior things, a constant exercise in virtue. Thus imperfect union became full. The visitations were more frequent and enduring, shutting out the distractions of sense.

This state reached, should God design to carry the soul further in this life, He begins to raise the veil and manifest Himself to the soul reaching out for vision. So He grants ecstasies and raptures which, like the mystic touch in the beginning, fill the soul with admiring fear. The lips may be dumb because of the inadequacy of language, but the intelligence responds to the object presented. It is filled with noblest ideas. Its judgments are sublime, in response to which the will burns with love celestial in its ardor. Yet not all is buried in silence. The Spirit breathes where it will. It grants to those in high ecstasy to speak; and so we have the fact of revelations.

Lastly there is the supreme state, which may be reached directly from the full union, without interposition of ecstasy or rapture, that of transforming union which we have just described.

God is wonderful in his saints. The mystic life, so perfect in its psychology, so orderly in its progression, so lofty in its operations, so enduring in its effects; the foretaste on earth of heaven for those who reach it; the demonstration of heaven on earth for


those who witness it, deserves our serious attention, demanding a study, not experimental in a psychological laboratory, but reverent and prayerful in God's presence. There are those who belittle it. There are those who misrepresent it. There are those who despise it. There are those who calumniate it. Why there are such, it is not our province to examine; though our readers will not, we think, be unable to conjecture. There are those, thank God, who understand its principles, grow in the knowledge of its reality, as he did who almost proved himself a mystic by his invocation of St. Theresa :


“O! thou undaunted daughter of desires,
 By all thy dower of lights and fires,
 By all the eagle in thee and the dove,
 By all thy lives and deaths of love,
 By thy large draughts of intellectual day,
 And by thy thirsts of love more large than they;
 By all thy brim-filled bowls of fierce desire,
 By thy last morning draught of liquid fire,
 By the full kingdom of that final kiss
 That seized thy parting soul and sealed it His;
 By all the heaven thou hadst in Him,
 Fair sister of the Seraphim,
 By all of Him we have in thee,
 Leave nothing of myself in me;
 Let me so read thy life, that I
 Unto all life of mine may die.”


Crashaw.

Yet St. Theresa was a . . . neurotic. So says modern science, loving darkness rather than light.

Finis.







A	M
D	G

REGINA

